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1 II T R 0 D V G T I O N 
The trnlted Nations is, as David Kay Tiais o1b»«rved a 
multifaceted Organization with a eowplex ndx of Oj^erational, 
supervisory* and informational activities under its aegis. 
None of its activities* however* have attracted the attention 
of the World at large than the ones directed toward the main-
tenance of international peace and security and* specifically 
the ones that involve the dep loyment of military contingents 
under the flag of the United Nations. 
Among such military ooeratlons the Congo case"tthis 
2 
most confualna of a l l rjeace-keeping operations* has been 
onf? '^ <: thp ^yztrGmnly challenaino t h a t came before the United 
Nations. Purthrtrrnors* i t caught th^^ organisat ion almost un* 
at-rares. The enormities and conplex l t i es of the case burs t 
upon the organization when, having trav®r.9ed 15 years of i t s 
eventful existence* i t was consi€lerv^d to have gained s u f f i -
c i e n t exper t i se in dealing with smeh locaiiiE«d breaches ©f 
the fMiaee «nd ^fhmn i t s nmx^mrt 9mA4k be esqpmeim^ ^ hmvm 
«%t*iaw3 at c e r t a i n leveS. of aa^turil^ wid p#lt%t@al aa§aei ty . 
The tfiii%«a Nations had wssthiiirsd iMm l^i^an QstBi.9 an i l ived 
throufh tifott Mvmii a:fgs««9t#nf and the Hungari.«n 4mM9M<sm before 
i t f9®«dl thm €a%9»%f9^« in the C@ni©. mmmmi&t 
! • Kayt:David*A«*Iiiii^«wiM»ii«i mt tmtlvma^m i n Hw 
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f lM Ctmgo pwefblmm WAS a pfo4o«t of «IMI «»t«iiiftl 
%liiw «n imtwiett of t^w oonfl let of eoioiiial. «»« «K«t* 
eoloniai ^wmm «^ «»ofiE in tiia Ujaitad nation* Ox^aniaation* 
THia was «fitiii.fMi^ \titi% thm ooia <;iar i>olitiea of th« Supar 
Poirara otid th« i r supportajni* "nie Conno c»a(i# «>iarafox«#«8«taHi<i9 
uniHinai iiiiioniiinoo aii<S x«l«a.9«d ahoek i#«v«a «iiat c»vaitoai««ad 
l^xoitglii "^ Mi <3aiieral JMiaoniily wnifl ttia 3««uxity CkvoHicii* Za a 
n^MiMir of ^>mfm i t eeun bo ecmsidbxMk! « tmiquo eaoo aa i t eem* 
bifiod the aoloiii«X# tlia coXairar an^ tiiH» African probiwaa idltii* 
i n tho nmita^ nations* fim nmto&r of oontingants involvod* 
and tHa attitnitlt of ^m fottso WUB aims i a i ^ r tti«n any othar 
l»eaoi*lc»«f>ittq c^pMirationa un<tarta)cen hf tha tMitod ftaticHia 
aaxi iar* n^ t«Kin^ Into account tho Kosntan oaao« wtiiflh ba« 
101190^ to m aiffacant eato^fy of enfoxcwmaat action* Zt ««• 
vHiiqua «iao i n lAia sansa that i t csotiibifiad n l l i toxy am t#all 
am • c iv i l i an pwo^wmmm of ootion* Anotliar inportont ftppwit 
of tha paolilani vaa tha diainta^cation of ^la Cantcal oaw»ii»» 
«Mi% or onv^  Cantvol. omlioxity in tha Congo i 4 i i ^ oonpliottlMid 
MMi«tOff»# fhft t r i i M l Alviaiona wid tha aioimitr ononQ tHo 
Cawgi>ia<a laodato ofiostMl oonditiono of aioovdar and ittiao*f 
tho Xotfit of adueatioiitaiininiotxativa and ta«lMi«*l aiciU mmng 
tho |NMB»lo nada tha pwMRNMet of a <|tti^ a«»»ewl« wmmtff of 
l iM • M H M f • ' I * * M M * * * VHa taacito of tiio miitod m i i a i U M I I 
in t^m €owf® f£9xt 'U& mppmc-i9,t&A otily in the l i f h t ©f thuse 
r e a l i t i e s * 
l«s i€«9 «}i# I«f«i p£ovi»ion» Qf ^ t t ^iril%«i sa t i#ns 
Charter «n<i l^e modal i t ies o£ the Orgenizatioas peaise^keepina 
p r a c t i c e s , the i n t e rna l p o l i t i c s of the Congo was a l so involved. 
Th© rol© of the Sscne-biii.)- General a l so became a cont rovers ia l 
mat ter . As the Congo case progressed from 1960-64, both the 
inherent weaknesses and the strong points of the World body 
came to sur face . 
This d i s s e r t a t i on seeks t o study the Congo case in 
order t o understand the nature of the problem, the pos i t ions 
taken by the Ambers concerned or t h e i r groups, the ro le played 
by the Chief Executive of the United Nations, the preva i l ing 
condit ions of the country and wh: t the United J^ations/able t o 
do towards the irapleraentation of the decisions*taken by the 
Sei^^g-ity Council and the reco^imendation made by the General-^ 
Aiataii&y. Th% analysis of the various fact#i« i s esqpected to 
f^MSt-^4ii«ir p i« tura of the ra the r confusing dlc^elop^nMifits* t he 
^C«aiMl ««••# iioiNiver» i s mere i l l n s t r a t i v e saliMir than exc^lu* 
sS:m « t i e«n, therefore , be understood f«illy ©uly i « the la^tger 
per®p«®tiir#s of the Waited Nations p o l i t i e s a»d i t s peace* 
keaping opeirations* 
9km m^ma^ has !»•«« ^ividftd im%9 a wmSim0^$m^f$ «NMii&|»i 
p]foM#m and <!teals with the provisions oi 1^ « (INatirtirr 
relating to maintenance o£ peace and seeurity^ and gii^ es 
an accoittnt of the evoltttioni of -^ le peaee*%ee^ingi"aS«ivi» 
ties of the united Nations and financial in^lications 
that arose. Chapter II is devoted to a brief examination 
of the social#educationalyS§ei°p5fitical conditions in the 
Congo on the eve of independence* Chapter III studies in 
detail the progress of the Congo case at the United Nations# 
tx>th in the Secnrity Council and the General Assembly. 
The last section deals with the stand point of the !*fember 
States in the United Nations. Chapter IV discusses the 
work done by the United Nations in the Congo in pursuance 
of the directive from the Security Council and the General 
Assewbly. Chapter V is devoted to an examination of the 
roles of the two lecretaries General in the light of the 
Charter provisions relating to their functions and powers 
•nd the relevants Council and General Assembly's resolutions* 
Thm Final Chapter embodies the results of the stii<|y in th# 
form o£ an assessment of the United Hationfi ^t&t'k. in the 
C(i»go including the interpretation ©f the €iwii*e«# it 
i«|.»*aier evaluate;? the roles of the Members «®ii«#med and 
of the Sieeretaries General* as well as the ftfe^its and 14»4» 
tati#ns of'the Iftiited Nations work in the Congo mn<& lt*s 
iir#>ft9% on the o»g«tisMitA@iif>' 
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iNit mmt 0 f ith«fi li«v« b««ii dofbt liaf tii« w«stit£n s«itoi«f» wi'llt 
th# «dmiiiaiiiA>l« «3i:e«ption of i^immmw l^ifi i i** nlii*|fi^..J6m 
H l l P i r t t l t i i f l i f t fflWO f f f l i l i * Wovtinfiitlo uttidiot i l l mm 
o*Bri«ii*s 1^ Kj^ingf. tn^, ,Bng?s''»,,iiM mMm^ yttlgn fiit Hf%»rf 
J«c^ Citrin's Ujnlt«d Nations Po«c<i*K««|»iiiig AetiviticNit A ease 
study o£ orgmiisfttioiisl task eacEMinsioni Mic]K>las Hazbart'a 
An Appraisal m»& Oliitod )9ations Pm&xm Fozusas ana the Qianging 
Globe t The lessons of Svm% and Congo« and Hbffman*8 in seaxch 
of a Thsaadt The nkiited Rati ems in fivEt Congo* 
Mitii t ^ vemBktkgSble e9i»::eption of Ho€ifRan*e objective 
study whic^ peziRits a eri t ical evaluation of Bag Hanmarakjold*s 
position* moat studies general.ly uphold the aecretary General*a 
interpretation of the Security Coimeils resolutions and the 
self-limiting policies that he followed in ti^e Congo* 
Xt would be usefult therefore* to pcesent an objective 
account of the Congo case a t tdie United Nations f icm iOm 
ctMid«poiiit Of an Af«e*Asian fbS4 
natuie of the case would pexnitt 
Observer as f a r as tlie COICBAAI 
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CHARTER PROUISIONS FOP THE WAINTILNANCE OF INTEBNAT lONAL 
PEACE AND SECURITY: 
Th« framsrs of the Chartsr of the United Nations, 
r e a l i z i n g the over^ridlng need for peace, Incorporated the 
Riaintenance of peace and securi ty as the f i r s t aim of the 
new organizat ion. 
Art i c l e 1 ( 1 ) of the United Nations Charter c l ear ly 
proclaims i t s purpose: "To maintain internat ional peace and 
s e c u r i t y , and t o that end: to take e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e mea-
sures for the prevention and removal of threats to the psace, 
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other brea-
ches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,and 
in conformity ui th the pr inc ip les of j u s t i c e and internat ional 
law, adjustment or sett lement of in ternat iona l d isputes or 
1 
s i tuat ions which might lead to a breach of the peace**. 
The pr inc ip le s s e t for th in Art ic l e 2 elaborate the 
f i r s t purpose , namely, the maintenance of peace and secur i ty . 
All members of the organization pledge themselves to s e t t l e 
tfivpHlMii ar i s ing among them by peaceful means and also sifree 
1» i l ^ « - i » 1 ( 1 ) , y..N. Charter 
/ 
to refra in from ths us t of force . They pledge t o g ive 
v«mTy mssrkmtmmtm^^ tfre tinlt et^i^«t ion« 4iT-i««»titiTw»H5TBk«n 
for the maintenance of peace and t o re fra in from giving 
asa i s tance t o any s t a t e againat which the United Nationa 
2 i s taking preventive or enforcement ac t ion . 
I t i s , 88 3ack Ci t r in aays , "beyond dispute that 
the Charter, in i t s Preamble, Purposes and P r i n c i p l e s , 
s t a t e s unequivocally that the fundamental aim of the United 
Nations i s to seek and maintain internat ional peace and 
3 
securi ty — - . 
The basic p r i n c i p l e s in support of the Security 
Counci l ' s pos i t ion are embodied in the Charter. According 
t o Art i c l e 24, the Wembers, in order to ensure prompt and 
e f f e c t i v e action by the United Nations , confer on the Se-
cur i ty Council primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the maintenance 
of internat ional peace and s e c u r i t y , and agree that in car-
rying out i t s dut iee under t h i e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y the Security 
Council acts on the ir behalf. Member s t a t e s further agree 
by Art i c l e 25 to be bound by the deciaiona of the Security 
Council . The re spona ib i l i ty in t h i s matter, there fore , i s 
not l e f t y i t h the Rembers s ingly and separate ly , but i s •n-
trusted t@ them c o l l e c t i v e l y . S imi lar ly , the pouera for 
2. Art ic le 2 , U.N, Charter 
3 . C i t r i n 3ack . , UN Peace Keeping Actions: A case study in 
organ!aational Task Expansion (P. 281) ;(£^d.)Gregg,(Robert U. 
and Barkum Wi^hsai- l^m,m^»t,t^m-^^'^j-^^.J^^Mj 
fjmttlon** «[.©. ?»n ir^-iick f©t « i r m i i t e d EgstSliist ^ tes s 
Pvt. t t d . , Rttf Oalhi, 1970 
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(fBeision.making ar« vsstad in them Jointly, and procaduras 
irmi4 4ovT\ accordingly. 
(a) Tha Pacific Sattlamant of Oisputaat 
Tha United Nations Charter haa also apecifiad various 
mathoda of Pacific Settlement of Oiaputea, Article 33 of 
the Charter says,"the parties to any dispute, the continuance 
of which is likely to endanger the meintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, ehall, first of all, seek a solu-
tion by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
A 
arrangements, or other peaceful meens of their oun choice*** 
Usually the member states are called to settle their 
disputes by peaceful means of their own choice. Houeyer, if 
the members ere not in a position to settle their disputes 
peacefully, they have an obligation under the Charter to refer 
the matter to the Security Councilv The Security Council can 
then recommend measures that should be taken to maintain or 
restore international peace and sscurity* 
However, in Chapter VII of the Charter, it is cieerly 
mentioned how and through what stages the Security Council acts 
on bahelf of the member a in matters^ relating to peace and 
security* The At^tiele 39 empowere the Security Ceuntil to 
•••iin.fcimi''*. I oil • uj -mi n ,1 
4» itfeift|» ' S a l l ) , ii>N. Charter 
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dptsruin* tha existanctt of any thraat to tha paaca, braach 
of tha paaca, ox act of agiQriaiton antf to mak* racofRBvact^ atlons^ 
or dacida to taka meaauras In accordanca with Actlcla 41 and 
42, 
(b) Enforcawapt Actioni Articla 40 providas for "prowiaional 
naaauraa** to and hoat l i l t laa . Articla 41 providaa for en> 
forcement action not Involving the use of armed force. It 
may be noted here that the Security Council resorts to en-
forcement action or adoption of forceabla measures only uhen 
pacific settlement fails ,eyp^f.^^ in the caaes of South 
Africa and Southern Rhodesle. The enforcement functions of 
the Security Council Imply i t s power to decide what measures 
should be taken to maintain or reatore international peace 
and eecurlty, when peaceful aettlement among the parties can 
not toe reached* Uhile epplylng the enforcement meaauras, the 
Seeurlty Council f lrat appllea meaaurea which do not involve 
the wee of armed forcea. Thia Includes measures l ike eompleie 
er ftartlal interruption of economic relations and of rai l»eea, 
a i r , poatal, telegraphic, ratio and other means of cemmunica* 
S 
tion and the aaverance of diplomatic relat ions, Uhen theae 
meaaurea io not yield the desired resu l t s , the Security Council 
can take aueh action by a ir , sea, or land forcea as way be ne-
ceceary t* iselfftaln er reetere international peace an# scetfrity, 
•OKIlOllWWiWlWililll <l,'.W^|N^IH»»».l»i.lWHIU..I«i]tii.ni 111 . I • pnm ipinii l i l i .m « imin»M. m, • i i m i a i m • i il w ill N ' K'lMr 
10 
Saeh iietion may includa demonstrations, blockade, and 
etiivr wparations by air, ssa, or land forcas, of flembvra 
6 
of tha Unitad Nations. 
(R) LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF WEWBERS: 
The obligations of tha flembers towards maintaining 
international peace and security spelted out in Chaptera 
UI and yil of the United Nations Charter, particularly in 
Articles 33-S1. The chief responsibility rests with the 
Security Council, 
Article 48 lays doun that the ''action required to 
carry out the daciona of the Security Council for the main-
tenance of international peace and security shall be taken 
by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, 
7 " 
es the Security Council may determine. 
It ie to be noted that although the Security Council 
can 'call upon* the member nationa to a«?ply sanctions against 
an aggreaaor, there ia nothing to fuarantee that the nations 
will heed the call. No doubt, under Article 43 of the United 
Natiena Charter all membera of the United liations hsve under 
taken to make available to the Security Council on ite call 
and in accordance with special agreement or agreements, armed 
•<*—«—«»»iifW<iii—mfcWiM».i> »i »i i i HI III • .1 ( I I I . I I I 111 I mini.- i i a • i m i i . w i i i a i j i iijiimmniaii. 
e, Afti«l# 42» W.N. Charter 
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fo tea f , ass iatanca and f a c l l i t i a s , including riflhta of 
pliSiiltft ^**^****^y for tha purpoaa of maintaining in tar -
nationaX paaca and aacurity . But auch agraamant hava not 
bean nagotiatad ao far bacauaa of the lack of unanimity 
among tha parmanant mambara, apacial ly diffarencaa batuaan 
Uestarn pouara and the Soviet b loc . Obvioualyt the i^ollac-
t i v e Security measuraa did not work out in pract ice accor-
ding to the l e t t e r of the charter . The ob l igat ion of mem-
ber atatea to implement the C o l l e c t i v e Securi ty meaaurea 
came to depend. Sole ley the good fa i th of the members and 
the p o l i c i e s followed by them, 
(«) The Veto? The moat v i t a l procedural element a f fec t ing 
the ayatem of C o l l e c t i v e Security created under the Charter 
i s the voting formula in the Security Council on aubatantive 
8 
mattara. Popularly known aa tha veto ( . . . , ) , t h i s formula 
prevent a the applicSation of pouara of the Security Council 
in cases where any apacial intereata of any one parmanant 
mambera are involved aa in Suez, Korea, Afghaniatan. 
8, Paragraph 3 of Art ic le 27 provided daeialona of tha 
Security Council on a l l mattara other than procedural 
ahal l k9 made by an aff irmative vote of nine membara 
inci««l|.nQ the concurring votes of tha f i v e parmanant 
mambjifll. Qbvioualy, i f one af the parmanant mambata 
vat« fftifativaly the deeis iona ia bleekad^ 
12 
MmrlT i« 1947, tim h^Bmi^ly hM m$mtm6,^3fm 
qmw%i0m of ill* px^tmim #i^»iiif ovit^(h« voUtii? fomnil* 
in thm Stmrnxtity Cmmcil %o Xitt«iii«tion«l Cmirt of <J^ u»t£e« 
for «dvl»ory oplaicm and tho s«ctt«lty Co^uieil h%A 
rmtmrx96 i t to the C«Ktiidt»e of exportd but no docieion* 
cotild be ta)c«ii« *%• ProaidOAt of tho ConMiitlliNi of 
»xp«irt» reportwS agrsAmant in prlnciplos on praetoo 
of eonaultntlon maong the mmhmxB concamad bafoxa 
lj?^rtaiit daciaions ware taken In t*»« Security Goundil. 
Mowevar* no lecjallatlc or slTll^ la pol i t ical «ol«tfon oowld 
aver ba found to ba adaquata to daai with the vato 
powar« 
13 
:->— Th« f a i i u f t of co l l«ct iw« •acur i ty maasuras in aiain-
tainiffig in ta r i i a t iena l peaca and saeurity to tha diffaraneaa 
among tha BI9 Pouara lad to tha davalopmant of paaea^kaaplng 
oparations of tha Unitad Nations, which are r ight ly consi-
dared a a igni f ioant innovation in tha Unitad Nations mechinary 
fo r maintaining in tarnat ional peaca and secur i ty . 
In couraa of t ime, the Col lec t ive Security rieasurea 
according to an a t r l c t in te rpre ta t ion of the Charter were 
found to be impracticable. Hence, the enforcement provisions 
of Charter V I I were t a c i t l y abandoned in favour of recominen-. 
datory ffleeaurea. noreover, steps were taken to permit the 
General Assembly to i n i t i a l peace-keeping operations in car-
t a i n circumstances and recourae wee had to the t n i l i t a r y re-
aources of the smaller pouera. Korean experience led to the 
adoption of 'Uni t ing for Peace resolution af 1950, I t was 
conceived aa a meaaure to meet c r i t i c a l s i tua t iona , apecial ly 
wlien the Security Council f a i l e d to diaeharfe i t a primary fee -
pifMaibi l i ty for the maintenance of in te rna t iana l peace and 
saeurity or uhen i t was prevented from taking action by the 
v f i * • f a permanent member. 
^ ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ - ^ U^fc^t^-fc^^ 
MfMMRMMMMMMifMMiept 
9« Un i t in f or Peace Rfeolut ion ' passed by the General Assembly 
911 ^ r i Nevember ISiQ and contained f i v a l ic i i i i ^ ju / is io iMi . 
(PalmWt ©•'ihiriien Ani barker» £« Per \^9mtm^''^l^^ma&m£MX 
I>it»rfi>tiew«l d e l a t i o n s . P. 3 i4 
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!<)—ApfilASjtlJJn^ Aliiost s i x year* l « t « r , in 1956, th«' 
Uniting for P*ac« B6solution»n»bl»d tha G»nar«l AttatHbly 
to neat and diacuas i n an amargancy aaasion the aar loua 
10 
c r i s i a in the Riddle Caat uhare big powers uere involved. 
The aame procedure was a lso employed during the Congo 
(1960*64) c r i s e s , when the Council was unable t o act , 
Thua, on a number of occaaiona the General Aaaeitibly 
has gone ahead with the establishment or continuation of 
operations in the face of Great Power opposi t ion. This 
uas i l l u s t r a t e d , among o thers , in the Greek, Korean^ 
1i 
Hungary and the Congo ceaea, The ateps taken in 
these caaea would cer ta in ly have enhanced the prest ige and 
atatua of the United Nations in general and the pos i t ion 
of the General Aaaembly in part icular . However, in the 
words of Gardner, "the record of United Nations peace-
keeping operationa shows that they have been aucceaaful 
more in bringing a hal t to v io l en t outbreaka than in l»ad« 
ing to f i n « l aelut ion of the underlying p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t 
that caused the or ig ina l break dawn of paat«, which i s the 
12 
ultiffiat* foaii of a l l auch operationa". After a l l , ^^* 
peace keeping missions has had important fnd f r u i t f u l ¥•• 
» r » » » - « . ">-w». r iiij |lilj[|jj|l|i>Tll»»l^l«ip|(|Bil|liWI|i|li^iill ffwiliUilL II III 1 1'liimliiii 
'Wis IMMAW. »«£~ «. UPWW, I, *m«i^j^^^jmmM,i>t 6t.».wi 
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Pw^wm^ff^MmXmw^w^ftmrwJ^-ftnwtwi^ 
-^m m*i%»4 n%%i»9m p««c#-ic««pif»t •ttwt* did nH r^liMf mt 
• • t 9«ti«tn« s i thsr In th* •pplieatlon of tha Articl«t of tho 
C^ftttof oc of the fp^oeodutoo «%# «o4«lit io» thai «9r« f«l|ot»«d, 
@a« eaoo diffotod fro* iho othor «i did tho viov points and into* 
root of tho noi^oro from tiMO to tiiBO» Froo Indonoaia to Gvaaeo 
to yoat Irian to i.ot>anon, Paloatina and Kaahmir, tha Unitad Nationt 
uent on adapting i t s a l f to tha etiangini) circuiiatancas and grouinQ 
i t a capabiiitiaa in tha proeoaa, 
Aa oarly aa 1946 tha Sacurity Council diractad a would ba 
Military Staff CoMnittaa to oxaiRina Article A3 and to find out tha 
bast nathod of tha aatabliahmant c^  United N'.<tiona arned forcaa. 
By April 1947 a CoRmittaa raportad general guiding principlaa, but 
beyond that any area of agraemant could not be found. The Interiw 
Comiittee, witabliahed in 1947, recommended tha appointment of 
Rapportuer or concil iator and Security Council agraMl to the ro-
comaandation in 19S2. Tha Interim Committee alao recommended in 
1947 the aetabliahment of a panel for encuiriea and conci l iat ion. 
The fttaamhl^y tfocidad to invi te each member to deeignata ana to 
fivm pmtvmiw wi tlia panki>. 
tutoaamlaiitly^ the Canaril Aaaombly authoriaed the Secretary 
ienarat l o • • l a b l i t h tinilad ^mtgmm fiaitf ft«tvlc«a to ptavida cer-
tain taoliii|««| Mtvic i^ %• tu^t^i »•%&•«• rimid Hiaaicn* tntf a 
ttnitmd R<%i«ii» Pmml af fimid Qto«tv«m» Tliia uaa domrn wi%h a 
vkm %o aaais i l i i i iaAtt i Umtimm tmmi^t^m in turn fwicittna af 
wmmw^mtm mm tiq^tvtaiwi « «f %wmm m Atail«ll««« i«ttli 
«««to«t«4 $mmmB mmm |Aa««# fm mi^Mm «M mmmi. i i i i«i i t 
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«l««l«it in til* flml4m4 wmmmmi mtmikmmm mm^Wt 
• M f M 9 i t » » i f to tlitt ! } • • « • k««plf i | f»f9bi«iM wi th r«doytol»4 •fi«t«y 
and •xp«4ttion« Ths obj«etiv«»» nctHodt snd i l l * f x t i A i of t k« 
^ • • • s k««pln« op«r»iion • • y « l l • • t lw iiannor i n which %hty •heii ld 
b« » financed were the subject of corMidoroblo ilvboto oinco tho 
ootobliohiMmt of tho United Notions CaoTftncy Fores (UNCf) ond tho 
United Notians opsrotior> i n the Congo (QhUC), D i f fe rent positiono 
wore taken by d i f fe rent f^oobor Stutos, I t i s to be noted here t h a i 
the United Nations £iier90ney forco» i t wes Stoessinsor remarks, «<•* 
e p o l i t i c e l end n i l i t s r y Rilestone for the United Notions, f o r the 
f i r s t t i a o that an intemet l tanal force wee const i tu ted, one not 
dominated by eny single Pouor, Uhet i s loss we l l known ie the feet 
thst i t also repressnted a f i s c a l oi lestono in the l i f e of the 
world organizat ion. For the f i r s t t i t w en in ternat iona l body 
decided that the coots o^  such en in te rne t ions l force should bo 
shered by the notions of the yor ld CosMRunity, This deeieion woo 
to hove for reechxng consoouoneoo* 
The f i e c e l problooo were soon to or iso . The COnerel Assoobty 
i n 1961, hevint boon inforood of owbotontiol orroore i n tho pmfmwn^ 
of •aeooooonto, oainly for ONUC end Wtf, odootod, on Ooooober 96, 
• roooltitioA recofnixing tho need "for outhoritotfwo l o f o l «widone* 
00 %o «bl,|<iotiona** of Noobor t to too wnder tho Cliortor in tho tnittot 
• f f i f ioiioii if t i l l United llotiefio opotoliofia i n tho Confo oi«i i n the 
14, V|«W«ilHI Alloootioi i end Aooootwiitot 
vtfitfo ii«Ct#, Ttiff Wiiii iilliin- int«tii«tion«i Oit«fiif«ti«i 
IT 
XAMilii eofiflnii# to th» p o l l t l c s l an# f i s c a l r » « l M of th« Unltatf 
•ttttioAs, but i t also ea»« b«fot« %ti» «f<»fl4*« htflwiai i w r f i e i i l 
t r i b u n a l , tba I f i tc rnat iana l Caurt of 3i*ot iea, THa Aaaa«blyt 
throufb i t * a raoolut ion of DacaaAaav 20 ,1961, askad tha In to tna* 
t i e n a l Couzt of 3i iotica for an aitviaosy opinion on tha quottion 
as to whatbar tba axpsndituroa i n tbo Congo, tmdortakan i n rss* 
ponaa to tha Sacurity Council and Canax-al Aasasibly dacisiona,and 
axpandituroa authoriaad i n raaolutions ro la t ing t o oporations of 
mif conat i tutsd *'axpanaa8 of tho OrQanization "within tha aaaninf 
of Ar t ic lo 17, paragraph Z, of tha Unitad Nationa Chartor, 
SubsaQuantly, tha Aassnbly, on Oacanbar 19, 1962, votsd to 
aceapt tha advisory opinion of the Int isrnational Court to the 
af fect that the axpendittiree for th« ie operations const i tute 
'*expenaee of the Organization** wi th in tha «aenin« of A r t i c l e 17, 
paragraph 2 , of tha Charter* The Aeeesibly else aet up e twenty 
onaMseaber working group t o etudy special aethode for f inancing 
peaee-kaeping operetiane of the United Natiena involving heavy 
expanditurae, euch as these far tha Congo and the Middl* Ca«t» 
Tbaea ttethede included e possible speciel ecale of asaesSMente 
t i « Cyefy—n*s tlni^ed l tat lans,f»»8 
1§. t%#geetiigar«9ehfi C«, tl ie t f a t i i tmae% Aiwltoffy apinieny(i#> 
Heist* 11 CCit). Ttie t l l l f i l l l l l W t l l f t f f i imf l l l ??iifflKi* 
$f»iv»|«t« I f of in* Hi eiigflet fortntits tHet the ikmmmmUf oMU 
«Bpt«»* III* kiii|tt ef til* 9ti«iAi«tl«ii aPi ilMl mi^mmmt 
* i i i t l i i i«iM» mr til* mwm99> 9» ^^9gU.m,m$ ir mm 
IS 
rm9 • M H mpmwmUi*: Tlit» ftoup w«» knmtn • • t»i« yotkint Group 
on %lio tMonifiotien of iho Atfoinistrotivo ond Budfa^avy ^rocorfutoo 
of «lio Ufiitod Moilono, ond woo roQUootod to oxomif^ o tho oltyotion 
orioifi9 fro* ttio orrooro of aoiio Mopbox &toi«« in tho pmYwmnt of 
oontritoutlono tewordo tho finoneiriQ of tho pooco-kooping oporotiono, 
furthor,tho UorkihQ Croup woo to toeemnond, within tho lottor ond 
oplr l t of tho Ch«rtor,orron«oiionto doolgnod to bring eueh poymonto 
upto dotOykodplng In itlnd tho rolotivo oeononlc pooltlono of oueh 
f^ oobor Statoo« Tho Aooombly also (toeldod to convono,ln 1963, • opoelol 
oooolon to eonoldor tho flnonclol eltuotlon of the flrgonlzotlon* 
ThuOytho fourth Special Session of tho Asaombly which not froM 
nmy 14 to 3une 17,1963 had boforo I t , among other docuMinto, e report 
by the yorklng Group and a report by tho Secretory-Denerel on the 
finenclal position of tho Organizatljn, Tho report nf the yorklng 
Croup Indicated that In the time at I t s disposal, the Croup was not 
able to arrive at any generally egreed rscomeendatlon on a apeclal 
fROthod of financing* However,the Group had managed to Identify the 
vleua of notibor Stetes aa regards principles for the flnenelng of 
future peace-keeping operatlone and poeelble adhoc approeehes to the 
flnenelng of current peeee-keeplng operatlone. 
The Secretory Cenerel In hie report stetod thet the def ic i t had 
Increaeed to S 93,9 u l l l lon on flerch 31, 1963,end be expected to 
attain the I 140 n l l l lon Nierk by Oeeeiibe&« It wee found thet severel 
ftoKber &tatee owed nearly I ISO million on their eseoeemente for the 
1963 and 1964 reguler budfote end for the poeco-keoplng operatlens in 
the IHddle Cast end In the Ceng*» The Secrotery Cenerel urgetf the 
ftpMiol fteeolon to ensure thet the Otgenlzetlon ehewld have the neeee* 
• • l y ««eh reeevrees to dofray peeoo^keeplnf costs either by eeeeaeini 
%tm ••i%t aMAi Renboro or by other Mithede* 
iis Mm % Wkw^m, K lit 
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•A si l iM rwmi ia fot %^m f inancini of WtCf wm4 OitlC fvr iii» p«tt«tf 
3uly 1 i « 0«««fib«y S1,19§i« 1% w«» dMSidatf %H«t M sppcrtisnatfit 
n«iii b« tfonii in r»»p«e% of the •xpenditifras lneu?r«ci durlriQ th« 
period 3yXy 1,1962 to 3un« 3D,1963« Thit bo«aii« pooolblo bocauso tho 
f<of*ior« ofrood that tHo procootfo of tho Unitod Notions bend Isotto 
would holp in dlochoroinQ tho orfoniiotion'o finaneiol coimiitMints, 
At tho sont ti»o,tl io AsBOirtbly also daeidad on tha aontinuatlon of tho 
I'orkinQ Group witft inotructlons that i t should soak a parmanant solu* 
tion to the problasi and naka a report to the Aaseably not Ister then 
et i ts 1964 seeeion. The Aseeinbly eleo sdopted soae releted resolu-
t ions, one ieying down Qonerel Quiding principles covering the f i -
nsnci-ng of future peece-keeping operetions* Another resolution 
dealt with the payment of arrears of asaessffient for U t^F and MNtx: 
expeneee, while a th ird wee concerned with the poseible establishiNint 
of a peece fund. By yet enother resolution the Aaeeably extended 
the period during which United Netione bonds Might be sold* 
The eeae yeert i .e* l e t e r . i n 1963, the Aessably, st i t s eighteenth 
eeeaion found i t neewieery to change i t s stend. I t erproved, saong 
other thinge, appropriationg for OHiSC for the period 3enuery 1 to 
3une 30,1964,end for WIT for the period 3«iuery 1 to Oecewber 31 , 
1964« The eoat involved were epportiwied eccording to e foraule whieh 
egain was adhea* The aatter was to be eonaidered further at the 
Aese«bly*e nineteenth aaeeion in 1964 for finding a aora peraenent 
nethod of finanaing peeee-keeping operetlone in the l ight of the 
next report of the Working Crowfi* However, the Uorking Growo an 
the axaainatian af the Ad«iniatt«liva end twdlalery f>raeadi*faa af 
tlia liaitad Nations adja«tnad m* the ava of the ninataanth aaaaian 
^u 
of %h« S«ii«r«l Attoably wifcHot»t oitopilnt any t»««MMndafciw« vt 
• lAni t t ino m rvport to th« G«n«»ttl A««»iibly, I t w«« avldOfit 
durifif ttHi nin«t««fitH • • • • i o n of tNo Aooonbly that In tho e l f * 
euootanoos that pravaiiod a far aMMro coooralianaiva atudy of a l l 
aapoeta of tho oiioation of ooice*koof}ifi9 ooorationa waa naeoaaary 
than had baan eontooplatad in tho roaolution which oatabliahad 
tha yorkinQ Group* 
aubaaQuantly, thorafora^tha Conaral Aaaoobly authoriaad the 
Praaidant in a raaolution adoptod on Fabruary 18,1965 to aatabliah 
a f a c i a l Comiiittoo on Peaeo-koepinQ Oporatlona undar hia Chairaan-
ahip and with tha aaaiatanca of tha &acretary Cenaral* Tha rMolu* 
t ion dirootad tha CoiMSittoo to undoftaka a cooprohanaiva raviau 
of tha peaea»kearing oporations, including uaya of ovaro'^oing the 
f inancial d i f f icu l t laa of the organization, and to aubmit a report 
to tha Aasenbly not later than 3une 15,1965. 
Tha Praaidant of the Aaaoiibly on rebruary 26, ennnunced the 
nanoa of tha fewbara states uho has agreed to aerve on the Speclel 
CoMiittea. 8«iidee, the bi9 powara, they included iMdiuM and 
aiiall Statee f r o * a l l ragiona^^ 
Otnring the period f r o * Kerch 2b to 3una IS , the CoMaittee held 
f o«ir%een •eet inta . After the f i r a t eaeting, the Preeident of the 
Cenerai Aaaeably and the Secretary^Caneral held eonaultatione on a 
19* Tha l^mribmt Stataa agreed to aerve on tha Special Ce»*ittee eras 
Afghaftiatan, Algatia, Argeniina, Auatraiia, Auatila i r a i i l f 
Canada ttyoehaalavakla, Cl Salvador, Cthopie, franco, Hungary, 
If idia, I rag, I t a l y , 3 open, l la«ritania, naxico, Natlior ! • * # » , 
Nigaria, ^aklalan, P»ltm4 Raitgnia, Satra ieona, Sp«tM, SWMIMI, 
Thailand, 0 ,S.S, i« , tlnltad Arg^ tapublia. United Kingtfa*, 
United Stataa, ganatwola and Vvgoaiavia. 
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Afttf %tiM« eontultatlonft, ttuiy iMtMd • r«po?t, on Pay 31, in 
%thi9h %h»y f)l«e«d bvfots the iNiiit»«v» of th« Comnlttaii on oecount 
of itio viOMO and •UQfOOtiono that wata mada both durinf tha 
infatnal conaultatiana and tha for»al aaatln^a of tha CoMiittaa. 
Tha l^raaldant and tha Sacratary Canaral in aaction X of tha 
raport mrnti* tha important obsafvation that thara did not appaat 
to axiat a ganaral conaanaua aa to uhat conatitutad a ^paaca-
kaapinQ oparation* and that tha concapt of paaca-kaapinQ could 
not be accurataly dafinad to the aatisfect ion of a l l F^ aabar btatas. 
Unitad Katifsna paaca kaeping oparatirina had bran orga izad in 
freece, Palaatina, Kashmir, Suez and Caza,Lebanon, 3Qrdan, tha 
Congo, yaat Irian, Yenan and Cyprus but only in the cassa of suat 
and Gaza and of Waatax Irian had tha i n i t i a t i v e for eatting up 
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thaaa »iaaiona COONI from tha Aaaanbly* f urthernora, tha report want 
on to c lari fy that Unitad Hationa operations could be divided into 
two wain cataQories, namely, obaarvar orarationa and oparatiena 
involving tha davata daploynant of ar«ad forced* And the wethode 
anpleyad for providing finance to thaaa oparetions alao differed 
widely, yhi le funde for aoiKi oparationa ea*e froa tha raguler 
bwdfat, athere ware financed on en adhoa baaie and a eaabination 
of aeeaaaed and volwntary eontributiona* The expanees of e t i l l 
othoraoparationa had boon oat on the baaia of a aharinf of coata 
by the govornoonta principally eoneotnod or through by voluntary 
oofitributiona laada by floMbor stotoo* 
I t hod frogwontly boofi aooottotf the report In i to oootlon IX 
polfilotf out, that a l l onfotooaofit aotiofia woro tho oKOliiO&vo pro* 
t«i«i4vo of tuo io«f«fti«y Couiiill^ imior tho ptovioiono of tHo 
mm %vwfmm*9 m fiMittp n^m 
2P 
Ch«ft«r« f^t %li« • • « • t i iw ••rlAiM ififf»t«fM«» »f view • x i t t M 
• • to i»li»i conatittftM •nforcaiMint action. It %it» found to too 
tho Qonorol opinion that any quMtlon wHleh Involved poaco*koofiiif 
opotationo ahould bo oxanlnod by tho Socurity Council in tho f irot 
plaeo. But, i f tho Council woo unabla for whatovor roaaeno to 
adopt dociaiona, thara waa nothing to provont tho Conoral Aaaombly 
fro« conaidoring tho oattar iwoociiataly and oaking appropriata 
raeoamondations. Again, a conaidarablo nuinbor of floobora aupport 
for tho viou that tho Assonbly ahould, in tha f irat instanea, 
addroaa i ta rocommandations back to tho Council, If tho Gonaral 
Aasottbly Toaolved, by the requited tuo-thirda majority, to «aka 
recoKiBondations to tho Security Council, the weight of t ^ recom--
nendationa yould have considerable inpect upon the eubsequont 
action of the Council, y i th regard to the scope and nature of 
the reconinandationa uhich tho AaoetRbly was authoriaed to n a^ke, 
there uere, quite c lear ly , vaat differenceo of viewe eeong the 
fieaboro, Aa the report stated aoipe iMMt>ere held the viou* that 
i f the Security Council waa unable to act in apite of a atrong 
recowRondetion of the Cenorel Aaoenbly, i t would b« proper rea l ia t ie 
t o «:cept the inabi l i ty of the orgeniietion to intervene in the 
given e i tuet ion. The view, however, did not eppeer to be supported 
by the Majority of neeber Stetea, There were eo«e who wanted to eiMi 
the Aaaaebly eaipowered in ouch a aituetion to authorlxa the poaco* 
keeping operetion. Soiie other loaiiere would prefer that the Aeaeably 
ehould Moke epproprieie rocoairwndationa for ineeeuree which would 
preferebly not involve the •atebliehMifnt of e peaee-keeping opera* 
t i en to deal with tha e i tuat ion. 
<~-3 
r«eoQnlt»ii W M t h a i ':>f th« ras iora t ion of tha soivaney of tha 
Or tan i fa i ion . For i h l a purpaaa tha taport indiaatad that i t wao 
widoly an aacaptad that aueh aolvaney ahould ba aohlavad throiifh 
voluntacy eontribtit iona by nai4)ara Stataa* Tha viawa on tha 
quaation of financinQ of fu tura peaea-kaaplng opavatiena d i f f a rad 
yidoly* Thata wara d i f fo rant propoaala for the aatablishinant of 
a financa eomnittaa t o naka racowaandationa to tha Canaral 
Aaaaaibly or tha Sacurity Counci l , or to both, aa to tha mannar 
i n which tha axpanaaa of a paaca*kaapin9 oparation ahould be 
apportionad, Anothar proposal aouQht to croata a fund made up 
of voluntary contr ibutions f ron which appropriations would ba isade 
by tha Assaably to inaat tha coats uf a giwan paaca»ltaeping 
oparation* f^anbara alao caKo forward wi th tha suggastion that 
any raaolut ion involving axpanditurs on a paac».kaaping oparat ion, 
ahould aa fa r aa poaaibla s tata aa to why tha raquirad f inancing 
for tha oparation was to ba providad* 
The organization quaationa war& takan cara of by fac t ion 
XV of tha r a p e r t , Thaaa includad thoaa quaationa r a l a t i n g to 
Ar t i e la 43 of tha Chartar and tha R i l l t a r y a t a f f eosMiittaa. 
fho taeratary«Canaral and tha Prsaidant of tha Canaral Aaaaably, 
i n tha f i n a l aaction of tha rapor t , praaantad aoiM obaarvatians 
and cancluaiana and auggaatad ear ta in broad guida l inaa which 
could apply to ftftura paaca<*kaaping oparationa. 
The Spec ia l Committee i « i t s f S r s t ran»rt •"> fhm AaS««klr 
• n 3uf ia ' f6^ ,^Mi; attsaaad tfMk naad^ for oiora i i e a t » eans l ivr t l i« 
quaation* SwbwaqtMiitlyt whan tha • • w i & t i t a roaiMwd i t s MHll infe 
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on Hufiift 1 * . I * h«.»d . t« t . . «» i t . ftom t h . T.pr. . .«fc«t ivt . of 
Uni%«tf Statas rapraaantativ* ra*aff ir»ad tha poaitian takan 
by hia Cmrarnnatit to tha affaet that i t i^ aa not proparad to 
abandon poaltiona which i t baliavad to ba conatitutionally, 
laoally> proeadutaUy and adniniatrativaly corraet* noraovaf, 
tha pracadent aatabliahad by tha Aaaaably i t aa i r by ovatuhaliRinQ 
ffiajoriti aa alao ahould not ba tindona or ravlsad* Tha Unit ad 
Stntaa taptaaantativa l iatad ataon^ thoaa ptecadenta tha Aaaai^ly 
raaoiutions lavyin^ aaaaaa«anta to financa UfiEf and CV^ 'UC, the 
1961 deciaion to requast the International Court*a adviaory 
opinion cm uhather thoaa asaaasmenta conatituted "expenaaa of 
tha TQanization" within tha aaaning of Art icle 17, the autho-
risation in that aana year of the United fiationa bond iaeua, 
the acceptance in 1962 of the Court*a adviaory opinion, tha re* 
eff irnation of the Collective finencial reeponaibllity of a l l 
Ninber Statea at the fourth Special aesaion in 1963^iRS)lKa 
appeal to a l l delinquent Statea to pay their atraara. 
The US representative went on to aay that , on tha baaia 
of the entire hiatory of the preblew of fineneinQ peace-keepinQ 
eperatiena, the "United Stetea had raoretful ly . Concluded 
that , at tha praeent ataga tha General Aaaeakbly wee not prepered 
to eerty eiit tlie relevant proviaiona of the Charter,li«e. the 
ep9ll««tl i i l ef file aenclien provided in Att ie le 19, leadliit %o 
f f 
tUv %mm 9i vv l i f i i t i fUte by neebeta eeneetfied that e te t * ef 
• • y Mil tfflb* in %hm 
>««i«l^p^'<fcl 
»>*'« -' 
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• f f • !? •« aevordlnQ to h i * w«« er««t«d by intran»i9«nt« ef • tmt 
•Miabsr t t c t M and thsir unuillingnvts to abld* by tb» r u l * of law* 
Tlia Unitad Stataa s t i l l aaintainad th«t Artiela 19 was applleabla 
In tba pteaartt cireunHitancaa. I t racfs^nliad that tha eonaanaua 
in th« Aasambly waa aqainat application ':>f the Articl« and in 
favouT rif havintj tha Aase^ly proeaad normally* Houavar* i t would 
not saak to frustrate that conaensut, since i t uaa not in tha 
intaraat of the unrld to have th« ftsaejrtJly's work iBW>r.biliiad* 
^everthalas&t i f any nei^ar State took the position that i t could 
nake an exception to the ptinci'^le of cDllectiv@ finaneial raa-
ponaibllity with respect to certain United (»ation0 activit iea^ 
the United States reserved the saiRe option to make exceptions i f 
there were cnmpoiiing reasons to do so. I n the words of H,G* 
Nicholaat "Dn the spectrun of posaible responses the pressnt U.S, 
doctrine on Art icle 19 would place her in &n impossibly vulnereble 
uin9. I t would ii^ply that whenever a two*third9 majority of the 
Canaral Asaenbly carried a res-^lution reeommandinf axaeutive action 
in the peaca«>keepin9 mn6, no lass, tha economic f i e l d , and by an 
equivalent majority aaaassed the membership to meat the expenaaa 
thereof, thet aaaassmant would become legelly bindin9,avan though 
participation i n the eparetion i t ee l f would re»»»ain voluntarily** 
On hie aide, tha rapreaantativa of tha United Kingdom atatad 
that lita aouniry and nt there had taken tha laad in t M e»>oparativa 
ef for t to and the finaneial cr ia ia by making voluntary and 
I l« H c M l a t t N.C. , The ttiiitad Natiena in Criaiet (Cd«) 
Key, Oavid A, T>^ f MftllfrfJirtttHf f a U t H i l l Y t t i i f ^^ 3 i f *9 iT 
iffw«iitfltl«fi»l eentribuUon* wiourvtiftt to 99m % f l i t i l l iofi* 
M» •ii|if«»»«tf l«»p« that t»iM« who had voted tmani»oif»ly In 
fovoinr of • ea-op»r«tiv« of fort would soon d«»onotr«t« that 
%liolt*» wi« no oupiy ooto* tha Unitad Kingde» wao eofwiS^od 
that tha otand i t had takon wao in tha boot intoroot of tho 
Unitoc! Nat ono, yat i t did not f a i l to rae<3Qniza that tharo 
woro difforonooo of opinion amon^  Panbaro i^out tha aaoooanant 
for tho Unitad fationo Hpavations in tho Congn and tho fiddla 
£ast« Tho United KinQdo* topreoentativt alsn rocoQniEed,ao 
did the Unitad Statea roptoaontative oar l iat that i t wao of 
overriding import once that the work of the General Aasoiibly 
should continue, for thio reason i t had decided that tha Aaseebly 
should resuiie i t e busings in the nnraal nanner without tha 
United Kingdon insieting on a resolution ^f the controveray on 
that isaue* 
In hie turn« tha rapTaaontativo of tha USSR atatad that tha 
najet i ty of neeber States called for revovel ^f the a r t i f i e i a l 
obstaelee raised in the Ceneral Aeeeiibly*e peth at the Nineteenth 
Seaeien and an unconditional return to nomel proeedures. f^ecsllin^ 
e teviet iMaiorafidui) of 10 3uly, 1fi49 he added that the peaee* 
keepine effaetiwenees of the United Nationa eould only be ensured 
by e t r i c t conplianee with the provisions of the Charter. He referred 
to the Afri«an»Aeian plan of Daeeaber 30,1964, provldinv that the 
Orfanitetien'o f inaneial d i f f icu l t iae ehould be reeolved by Mane 
• f volwwtaty aefitributiene f r e * a l l itiiMbere Sta%ee and eeid that 
1% had as i t s key fvalwre the inseparalile link between the i|ue»%io«i 
• f w»lttfit«ry contt ibutiona *fid t t i * noft^applicoliilitir of i r l l « l « 
I t i l l esnnaetion wi th th« unlawful •xp«n««« of th« Unltatf Na%i»f»« 
• i l t t c t y Optratiofw in th« ConfO and in tha niddla Caat* Tha 
Sevla i Union^ aceordlnQ to h l a had danonatratod tha maxliiiM 
food w i l l by adoptinQ that plan and a^raainf to vaka a aubatant ia l 
contr ibut ion,al though I t wa« I n no way raaponalbla for thoaa 
d i f f i c u l t l a « « Tharafora, I t could not ba axpactad that tha 
SfMiat Unitin would tRaka any voluntary contr ibut ion in tha abaanea 
of a f i r m guarantaa that tha ntjaation tsf tha a p r l i c a t i o n of 
A r t l e l a 19 would not ba raised again, Hathouatfar^walcoKad tha 
agraeMint in tha Coffinlttae that avary e f f o r t ahnuld be «adi to 
carry out tha unanlnoua r^aclslon that tha work nf the Asseinbly 
nuat prmsaad normally at the Twentieth Saaaion. The comffilttae 
held aeveral more ffieetlnga, A nuiAser of representat ives, apecia l ly 
those of Canada, 3apan, Plexlco and Nlgar ia atressed the Iwportanca 
of the et«p taken by the United ^tetes and the need for contr ibu-
t ions wade by t h e i r Covernnienta* f^embers of the Coniilttee generelly 
welcened the agreed deelre that the Ganeral Aasanibly ehould reeusie 
i t e work nornel ly , Saverat of than also enphaelaad that notwlth* 
atanding the agreemint reached ebout net re ie ing the qweetion of 
A r t i c l e 19 i n r e l a t i o n to debts er ie lng out of efwrgeney operation 
i n the i i iddle C(H»t end the Congo, eueh agraeeent ehould not be 
allowed to undariiine the indisputable eb l iget ion of e l l naebera 
Statee to contr ibute to the reguler budget approved by the Generel 
AMeatoly, 
The repyeeentativa of f fence en Auguet 3 1 , ahared the a a t i a -
f a e t i a n eaiitaaaad Ity ethers at the proa peat that the Aeaeably 
mmtl4 be able %• begin !%• wetk en tha eaNi^tat f tfate and that 
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tti« quMfclofi of Att* If would no lonfot bo «A io«ti«. Al««« 
with ttio isHliot not^oto of th« •pte ia l eoMdttoot h« ipoiniwi 
oyt that tH« prokloii of tti« procodufo to b« folloyvd with 
r«t«r# to poB»i^l.« ftitiito f)«ac«*k««pif^ OftnAtion f •••inod 
ufwolvod* tflo Go¥Orr«iiar>t had M yat nado no eomtitMwnt oa far 
ao voluntary e«ntributi«n« for tha f»urpoaa of aolvlnQ tha 
organiaatlons financial d l f f l cu l t las waro eonearnad. Tha 
Govarniiant of franca conaldarcd i t necessary that tha quaatlon 
ahould ba atudiacf In tha wldar eontaxt of tha Ganaral firtanelal 
policy of tha United Natlona and Ito apedallzed aQanclaa* A 
aolutlon of the i^tiestlon ahould, therefore, ha eouQht within 
the fraaework of ^anerel refor«« 
However» fortunately a broad area of a^roanent waa 
arrived at» Tha co««lttee formally approved, without objection, 
the Inclualen in I te eecond report to the Generel Aaseebly of 
a atatamant, which repreaented tha oonaeneoue of the eomwittee, 
that "(1) tha Aaaaatoly would carry on i t e work nornally in 
accordance with Ita rulee of procedure} (2) the qyeetlon ef 
the applleablUty or Art. 19 would not be ralaed with rafard 
to the United Natlona Cmerfoncy Farce and tha United Natiane 
Operation In the Cenfet (3) the f lneneiel d i f f ieu l t loe of the 
oroanleatlon ahould be eolved t^^roufh voluntery eontributlone 
by neiiber atatee, with the hl^h developed cowntrioe iMkin« 
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ewbetantlel eontributlone," 
33, Cveryiien«e UM.1Mt,P. 83 
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A»»«iiily,«n S«p%«iib«f 1,196S, sdept«tf «h« ««• r«p«ft« of th« 
•pceial e«Mtltt«»« I t furtH«r d a e l ^ ^ kh«t th» noda l i i lM 
f«r th« cwUnuanes of ih« ediMRlttM** work «tii3»l^4»» datura 
•mad st th« 20th S«««ion«, TM A««c«l)ly*» •paelal po l l t lea l 
coMiittM took up th« «|y«stlon s t i t s 20th •••«lon* H«r« 
Ireland intvoducad a ^ a f t Yaaolytion contairtin^ a waatoaf 
of apacific propoaala* thaaa wara daalQnadt awort^  othar 
thlnga tot 
"(a) aruiura that futuva peaea-kaaping oparationa raetHHiandad 
by th» Aaaanbly undar tha "uniting fot paaca** raaolutlona of 
195C would ba ral iably financad by mandatoTy aaaaaaminta undar 
ftft« 17(2) of the Chartari (b> pravant a confrontation between 
tha Aaaaably and a patnanant f^ aabar of the Security Courwil 
whan th«t f^aiibar votaa afainat or fa i l e to vote in favour of a 
peace-kaaping operation,(e) to amriaie ffanbere i f the Aaeeably 
aa a laat raaort to aaaart their inherent right to reeoaawnd the 
eetebliahaant of a paeca<»keeping operetion when a najlority of 
thev deteratinee thet they have auffieiant atrength end edaauata 
awppert to give affective aaaietenea ta a aiMll eteta which 
appaala to the Security Cawiciiy end (li) to aeka i t iiifiaaaibla 
for e ei tuat ian to atiee in which a aael l atata aeeking aaaia* 
tanaa auat ba twrnwi} away becawaa r>f oppiMiitien by one nt twa 
Beabere of the Organixatien*** 
tha I f i ah draft raeolwtian waa aubaaqwantly ea*apenearad 
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by aigltt •aflbara i ta taa balaiififit ta Latin il»arica»4aia and nfrl 
24» e«fItnpCoata ffi««»Cliana>Ivary eaaat ,Ut iaHatN«palt^i l l ip i ia i 
•tttf iawalia* 
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Th* tf^t«ri f i f f t l i«r •f>«ein«tf t h a i t i l l such Urn • • p9tm9nmi^ 
arrtnQMMfit* umtm •9fm4 upvn, m f l n a n e i a l •rranfamint ahould 
be T*»c)«td i l t ^ i n f wi th «xfMiri«9t of r*tic»»t(Mf»lnQ op«r«tion«« 
f i « « « aQrawd •xparaiM stiayltf b« IneliitNKi v i t l i i n tha tabular bucHiat, 
tha eaai of thaaa waa to ba airport! onad ao f o i l (Mat S paraafit 
anong tha loas dovolopad aaabara; 25 pareant aaong davalopad 
iNiaibara othax than paraanant iNMA»ot9 of tha Saeut i ty Counei l ; 
and 70 pareant among parmanant PaabaTO which vota i n favour of a 
paaoa-kaepinQ oparat ion, providad that no naabar s h a l l ba aasaaaad 
nota than SO pareant of tha oparation*8 net coat* 
F lnaUy« tha Spacial P o l i t i c a l Conmittao adoptad two raae* 
lut lona for recoMiandation to tha Canaral Aasoabiy. Thay ware 
adoptad by tha Aasaatoly on Daeat^ar 1S,196S* By the f i r a t raaa-
l u t l e n tha Aasambly, t ranan i t t ing records of dabataa to tha 
comi i t taat ra(^ua»tf«l tha Special Comaittaa on paaee«»kaepinQ 
Operationa to continue and coaplata i t a work ae aoon aa posaibla* 
I t fur ther ca l led on a l l aeabare to tnaka voluntary contr ibut iena* 
Tha eaeend reeoiut ion re fer red the I r i a h draf t proroaals to tha 
Special CaMKlitaa on Paece*keeping Operations for i t a carefu l 
eenaideratieffi* 
Subeaquently, i n the verioua debetee newbera aaphati iad 
that tha Itfi lted Nationa Peaca^kaeping Oparationa ahe l l be eada 
•ore eet ive and f r u i t f u l . To th ia e f f e c t , the Cenerel Aeaeably 
i n i t * a reeoiut ion (33/114) of 0ece«ber,19T8 elee eiiphaeied tha 
t e e p a n a i b i l i t y of nenber Stetea and aeked then to share equitably 
the f i f io f i t i a l bufdene of the eaid aparationa by aupt^ianentary 
^ ^ 'ft ' 
•oei«taii«»t 
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%lilt%y fmtttli • • • • i o n of IfTt ut%mtl tti* ap^tial Ceimiiitttt* on 
^•••••^••pinQ Op^rctiQn^ to •xp^dit^ i t * wovk for ••Tly «•»-
pi«tion of oQT^ d^ Quid^lino^ uhieH would Qov^rn th^ control of 
p^pco*lc«^pinQ op^ration^ of th^ United Nstiona in aeeotdMicn 
with tn« Chatter and to d^vot^ attention to opaeific diMatlono 
n 
r^lst^d to practical inplanontatien of pa»co*ka«pin9 operation*. 
This oHow^ how tha probl««» of rroc^du?^ and financing 
rolatinQ to the p»aeo«keeping oparatl'sn eontinuad av^n aftar 
tha Congo Pi^oblen had for»ally baan u<)u)^ d up in tha Unitad 
Nation** 
If a aurvtty i s isada of pol ic ies adoptad and practices 
followod by tha organ* of the Unitad Nations contiarnad in the 
f io ld of peace*k^^pin§, th^n tha nature and davalopHient of the 
peaca»keaping operations can beat be underetood* 
A cleat diatinction ahouid be iiieifc», however at tha out-set 
between enforeeaient aetiena under Chepter VII of the United 
Netiona Charter and pai^e-keeping Oparatiena ae such, At tha 
tiMf of the drefting of the Cherter, i t wes tbe generelly believed 
thet the Saeurity Council, aa tho executive organ of the organi* 
zat ien, would be able to wee n i l i tery force in e etretegie ••n**. 
I t ha* b*»n •hown oarliar in aaetien (A)of Chapter I hew Chapter 
VII previse* far • graduated eeriea of actions to be taken by the 
2 i . lliid»j f . « 
17, Q»C« 3«ntfi| liipertanee ef United Natione Pee*«»k««iilffig 
•p«r«tigii» eiiplia«ii«dt tfnit«d Natlena, ^MM^MiMA 3iiiy If79 
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$«cttti%y CowMill l ^ « i v l f ) f i Tift •e«n««ie m4 p o l i t i c a l 
• • f w l i o M antf Xm%w «ul«intttinQ in th» tM« of foreo, Noiiovov, 
tffiitotf ttationo octiof) undor CHaptor ¥1 and V I I havo not fana-
r a l l y foUetiotf tha i d o a l i a l i c atop by atop proeoduro If^dioatad 
i n tha Cliartar, Aa Ha^aaa abaatvadt "Tha kind af paaaa^kaapin^ 
functiona tha Unitad Nationa haa davalopad did not cema aa a 
conacious a l ta rna t ive to Art ie lo 431 titoy J wit avolvad out of 
nacaaai ty*"* * 
S i t d l a r l y ^ pattarna of paaeaokaapinQ and anforeonant aetion 
avolvad out of neeaaoity* 
3oni^ taiiarkas *'Xn diatinQuiahing batwaan anforcaaiKtt 
actiona and paace-kaaping oparationa, i t i s nacoasary t o noto 
th«t« ahould tha Sacurlty Ceurttil dacida to undar-taka an 
anforcaaant act ion , tha prcviaiona of A r t i c l e 2fS«:«7 would 
not ba appl icabia, Thatia ehawRain di ffaranca batuean pwmV" 
2V 
kaaping and anforcaaant*, Thua, paaca«>kaaping oparationa 
ara eonai^irad to ba conaant*t /pa aparationa «id can ba autho-
r iaad and aat i n aat ion only i i i th tha eonaant of tha part iaa 
involvad ar at l aaa t wi th t h a i r ea*opafatian« Without th ia 
paaaa»liaa|»ifi« i a nai t l iat daaitabla nar practicab&a* Thia i a 
aonf i ta«# by Saa ta ia ty^onara l M»Thanta obaatvationat 
"Oaaaa«ltaapin« Opa»atiana ahould not ba eenfuoad with 
tha uaa 9f faroa ta aanAlat a t t taaa ian aa ptovidad f a r i n 
2»« Wmm WtitHf t 
29, nil C h f M a a i a , 3« ly t979» P,1t 
CH»p%«t «SI « f i l M Ch«ri«r and tfw • • t d f»««e««li«»pin9 u n i t * 
• r * • • • • n t i a l l y p««6tt and not f i «h t i f i 9 fore«» and 0|»«r«t« 
only wiUi ovmivnt of the p a r t i s t e«nc»rnad**« 
GonsaQiMifitlyir U* Thant had to aeeada, tn flay f ^ 7 « to 
tha raoiiaat of f 'raaldant fiaaaar of £«ypt to withdraw iha 
Unltad Nationa CuarQancy forca (IfNCF) f r o « t h * 3 i n a l * f o r th ia 
ha va* aavexaly c r i t l c i a a d by thosa whe) did not r a a l i a a that 
onca ttw con«ant of i^ypt was withdrawn, thar* waa no la^a l 
baaia for U»Thant t c i n a i a t on naintainino tha forea* S i p i l a r 
yaa tha eaao wi th tha ConQO orerat ion* Th* mieh dlseu«a*d 
Hamnarskjold niaiiorftndum i n fac t did not charQe ths laoa l baaia 
of tha f o r e * I n Conqo which tfao to i a ^ n wi th at l e a s t , tha 
consent of the Govarnwant conccrnad, Foraovar, unl ike Cyrrus 
(UfFlCYP), t h * d is t inct ions bataiaan pa8c< •Iceapini^ m\tS «nforc*» 
want $ot b iurrad i n th« CenQO wh«n tha ^acurity Cswneil at a 
l a t a r ataQo of tha CHuaration, i n a reaolufciftn adoptad on 24 
riovaabar 1961» awthoriaad CMUC(Unitad Nations Oparation i n tha 
Confo) to %M9 forea t « a^intain tha Unity of tha ConQO. I t waa 
on tha st*«f i f th of tha Socurity Coyncii reaolut ion that QliliC 
carr ied out i t * •n f * re * i i *n t astion dwrin^ t h * b a t t i * fif KoIw*t i 
whiohi an^ad t h * * * * * * * i o n of Katanga* I t i a inpartant t * not* 
h*r* t h * t t m l i k * UllCr,(MUC had tha deufel* t**t( of *K*ludin9 
owt* id* i f i t * r v * n t l * n *nd c r *a t in9 i n t a r n a l v i a b i l i t y ! whar*** 
UflCf had only t * k—p tw* orQaniiad and account abla s t * t * * 
i^ir%»^^ 
) « • | * M t | « l ^ $ P t * * p M t * for fvastt-tovpinf(Ua*hin9t«#,%C« f 
tii*'ttMiiiiti*'Tfi*titiiti9ii««9ifTfp« B i 
3 1 . l l i » l i * i « * t M * t i * t t C,«P**B* r * t * * and t h * Ch*n*in« C l i k t t 
TIM ym^9m vf iiNif Ht^ tmmwt^mtmWtW^*) JMJMMa^ 
iigii«ii«.ifii*tfi*tiofiai 8t«*Mi*tioii* ani mdmmmmm^ W"^i '407 
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^••••«*lt««pin9 operation* «9«in can b« e l« t» i f i«d into %ii» 
typas aeeetdlnf to practie*. Tha f i r a t typa if^olvaa tha iiaa 
of unoTMrf Mil i tary obaarvars; and tha aaeond typa invalvaa 
tha yaa of national o i l i t a ry aontinfanta within a Unitoi Naliona 
paaca-kaapins fotroo* Aa ragarda tha military atoaar)^ara,"thay 
ara aatabliahad uaually oftar an out bra at of hoat l l i ty ^ d with 
tha priwary purpoao of varifyinfn complianca with eal la of coaaa* 
32 f i r a a , trueaa and armiaticaa by tha Sacurity Council." *» •o«« 
aa tha Saeurity Council has agraad to tho dispatch of n i l i ta ry 
obaarvara^lt ia the duty of tha Sacratary*&anaral to requaat 
aelaetad noabara of tha Unitad Nationa to naka availabia to tha 
United Nations mil i tary oboarvara for tha oboarvar niaaion. 
Howavar* i t haa baan the usual practice to raiiueat offieara 
with tha rank of Captain or Wajor. The Offieara aalactad for tha 
purpoaa hove higher n i l i ta ry training and thia anablaa the* to 
Make accurate raperta in d i f f icu l t a i l i t a ry aituatiorui* According 
to practice, once e euff ieient nueiber of uneraed military ob* 
aervara are Miaeabled» the Seeretery-Ceneral eppointa either a 
Chief n i l i te ry Obeervat at a Chief of Stef f , ueuelly of the 
rank of najor-Cenerel* I t i e hie taek to orgeniae his group af 
Mi l i tary obeetvere in auch a aannar ee to obtein the beet raawlta. 
The United Nationa Mil i tary obeervera are eeiled up»Wybroedly« 
ta daiiaf««%e aaaae f i r e linaa or what are Mere after eailad 
"forward-dMfMfidad loealitiea«« flereever, Obeervetion peeta are 
aetabUeliad on aither eide of the oeaae'fite l inea, for MaxiMMi 
>>• ULllaJlMilit 3uly,19Tt , p« ?• 
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obtvtvat ion p M t l t i i l l t y anil • eomnifilcstlon fi«t 1» Mt«bl l«t i * t f 
t o •n«bl« %ti« n i l i t s r y ob»«rv«t« tv eoiMiiinie«%« wit l i thsiv 
li«a#»quaft«rt« CacK e43sarvatlon poai ia iMfifiail by two unarootf 
• i i i t a r y oboorvoro. Thoir main taak i » t o o6aotvo» vooord 
and raport a l l v io la t iona of tha caasa*f l r« , t r i ieaa or a to io -
t i eaa and thoaa raporta are aant to the Saetatary-Canaral 
by tho Chief of Sta f f * The Saeratary*C«noral» on the basia 
of tba reports f roo tho floldy/^in a posit ion to in foro tho 
§octir i ty Council aoeuratoly^i The reporta of the m i l i t a r y 
cAsaorvore are of fltajor ioportaneo to the neabera of the Couileil 
during ee r i >U8 diaput^a, airuce they could Qiva accurate in fo r * 
nation on al logat ions nade t y par t ies to a dispute* By pro-
tfidinf) aocure channel commjnicationa batweon h o a t i l o par t ioe , 
the United Nations sr i l i tary observers alao perf orn cuasi-
d iplooat ic functions* Th«ro vara aono inatancaa whan Ofi l i tary 
obaarvere hawo assisted part ioe to roach agreoiiont on apocif ic 
iaittoa l i k e n o d a l i t i M for Qraxinoor harveatinf* 
The United Nationa has boon able to oMperinont wi th 
Hi i l i tery oboorvar Missions Obini t io when tho f i r o t " rob* Ie rs l i 
War broke out* At the rooueet of the ftodiator. Count fo lko 
Bornedotlo, the Soeurity Couneil , diepatehed M i l i t a r y obaervota 
t o asaiot i n v o r i f y i n t eoispUanca wi th the Cawnoil*e wandatos 
for ooaso*fitoa and truooa* I n 194f a f te r the ArMiotic* Aftoo* 
Monts woro oonoludodt tho o i l i t o r y obsorvore wore tronaforood 
to whet mm ool lod IMftO (Unltod Natione Truoo »«ipervidi»f« 
OfffonlootlVfiK The obaovvoro woto i i v o n iMportant tooka i n t t i t 
fun«ti«ninf of ih« lUxatf Atnlttie* CoMiittiont. Tho llixttf 
Cttimltsion* b«tw««n Coypt and I t t M l ««M«d to fufietion of to? 
tho &U01 Crioit in t9S6 with tho invooion tf tho Sinoi by 
i orooli fofioB, tills ^l««« of «li-T&% whiefc pwxtmmmt I t* 
tooko t i l l 19S6, in tho Sinoi woo thon tokon up by tho UMCf, 
folloning tho Slx-Ooy Wot, in 1967, U«TSO»o function 
was oQOin tronofornoil. In occordonco with Soeurity Couneil 
docisiono, Unitod Notions l i l i t o r y obooTvoto uoto ootobliohod 
on oithor aido of tito Suox Canal to verify coiRrlioneo with 
tho tmtms of the coooo-firo* In tho Colon Hoighta al«o, 
UNTSQ undoir«took tho took of policinc) tho Council'o cooooofiro* 
Hgyovet, 00 no oQrooiiont vos roaehod teciardinQ tho Doet 
Bonk of Jordan, wore fositionod thoro. There wao no fightinQ 
at that tiraa botuoon tobonon a^d lorael and tho aituotion 
olong tho border reotained unchanged, iut i n 1971 tho Council 
f e l t tho nood to iwtabliah f ive oboervotlon po«te on the 
Uobanooo oido of tho aroietico deaioreotitm l ine , After the 
Oetobor 1973 war, UMr&0*a funetiono wore roi^ Kiced with the 
ootobliohaont o f poaco-koopinQ forcoo in tho Sinoi ondon tho 
Colon Mi^i^to* UNTftO*o najor role in LirtHanon woo alee trona* 
forMd whon %ho Unitod Notlono Intorim Force in UbanonCtmirit) 
woo ootobUoliod in Hareh 1979* tlo«ortholooo» ao tho wilitary 
oboorvors woto wood to verify oooplionoo with tho limltationo 
of foreoo and orasiivnt* •ftood to by tho portioo, UMTSO 
eontinuod %m bo of mjor a eoiotoneo to o i l poa«**k««pifi« 
fotow* flioy woffo erfonisod aa flboorvor Utmpf\mW ^ %^^ 
Q|it«tv«ti«fi Croup t«b«non in %h« two plasM* 
Th» Swsurity Council ••tablisimd anothsr United Nationt 
oiNistyax a i s i i f n cailpd UNnoclP (Unitad Natiana Mil i tary 
Qbaar¥«r Cvoup in India and Paklatan), m a raault of tlia 
Karachi asraawant datwaan India and Pafciatan in If49* 
rollowiRQ iha 1971 confl ict batuaan India and Paklatan 
o*ar Banoladach, tha rola of UI^ HfiKiP ^ i » r^diflsfids aXthoufh 
i t did nvt caaaa. UKftOCIP waa kapt foinf on tha inaiatanea 
of ona of tha part i«a, that ia Pakiatan, Tha Unitad Natianat 
in 19Si, alao ut i l iaad id i i ta ry obsarvara i n UN I I I L yhan thay 
vara dispatched to verify tha alla^ationa by tha Govornmant 
of tabanon that Syria, than part of tha Unitad fktato f^apublic, 
wao i n f i l t r a t i n g nan and auppliaa into Labanon* Thatoparatien 
laatad aix nontha, Anothar i4>aarvar group waa aatabliahad 
by tha Unitad Nationa in tha Yaaan for 15 Months i n 1963-64, 
Thia oparatien was callad UflYOR (Unitad Matiana Yaaian Obsarvar 
fliaaion) and was «aant for intarnal p«: i f icat ion purposaa* 
Tha \M Haca^kaapin^ fprcaat 
Canaraliy, Unitad Natiorai paaca*kaaping actiona Hava »ada 
haadlinaa in world praas« Public opinion tl^snds to tltftata 
tha prostifa of tha Unitad Kationa ia diractly with what 
appears to ba tha auccaaa or fa i lure of tha Organizetion in 
the perfoTMnee of i t e functiena in thia sphere. Thet ie 
beceuee there ie l i t t l e eut ewereneee of the ceneent beeed 
nattfre end ether l iwltet iena ef paaeckeepinf eperetlone. 
A fMif«(i|ittv« •Xfilansiion of ih« fumstlofM of tlio UfHtiiri 
No%iofio Poooo»ltoo|»in9 foYcoo i t ti«»n by Inio Clauds in 
hi t P^wwt mn4 Xntornationol l^olationat 
* Ttela«*« i o »tA a davieo for dafaating agt^oaaora 
and eartainly not foT coaxelnfi Qroat fiowovo dotatainod to 
axpand iho apharo of thair control • but for • • • l o t i n t tha 
najor pouara in avoidlne tha axpanaion and oharponinQ of 
thair confl ieta and Mhiava in thoir mutual rolat ionahipt , .* . 
In ahorty ia to nake tha uorld oafo for tha balanea of pouar 
systoffi and tha balanea ayatam safe for tha world*'*'' 
In tha beQlnninQ of tha Unitad Nation;^ U f a , i t uaa not 
easy to forecaat that the ^rcianiration would ba able to diapateh 
into areas of conf l ict military unite of fiairtbar States* The 
f i re t Sicretary Oenaral Trygve Lie node SOIMI efforte to for* 
iRulete a proQraBipe for the use of United Nations military 
forces outside the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter* 
He could preaent a proQreRmi onlyfor e non-nilitery f i e ld 
aervieea Saeretery»Ceneral Oeg Haswiarakjold too was raltie* 
tent at tha outeet to plen for the Mtebliehaent of e United 
Netione adlitary force thet would be et the diepeeal of the 
OrQenitatien* Nowewer, in the context of the diea«tee«ei»ta iM 
the Security Caunail during the Suer c r i e i s , i t beeaee neceeeaty 
to aeteblieh a United Nations a i l i tary forea* for the uithdrewl 
33« lAie L* Claude; Power end Intetnatienal ffaietiene 
(Newyevk»1M2) , p . 2tS,(Quoted,HelM»«3«tin U t the Pol i t ica l 
and PHilwiopliical Aepacte of m ft«eurity rereM»(Cd*) 
Kay, e«#id,A, Tfrt m%9A PMfW f i l l l l f r i »yilMli !»• 21t 
• f %hm I s t M l l * f r tn th and Brit ish forcM frea th» 
Sinai and t h * canal lona, a faea-taving daviea waa eailvd 
for* Tha CMtaral Aaaanlilyt centf«nad on %ha l»a»i» ^ tha 
"Uniting for Paaea" raaolution authoriaad tha aaiting up 
of a Unitad Nations anarQancy forca. I t i a quita s igni -
f icant to note that i t iias tha Assanbly and not tha Sa-
curity Council that rac^ uoste^ d tha Secratary- Canaral to 
prapara a plan of wstion for the netting up and functioning 
of aueh a force* 
Oag HaflHsaTakJoldfin order to implenant the resolution , 
set out certain principles of peace-keeping which regained 
val id in subseQuant days. 
The f i r s t principle uaa that parties directly involved in 
Mil the diepute ehould not participate in the functioning of 
Force and aaeond that tha paraanant Fleabers of ths Security 
Council ehould i^ ot participate* In addition, he propoeed 
collective f inancial raeponaibility* 
The Secretary*Ceneral for setting up the foreea had 
tha necessary consultation with nanbers* After this ho 
e|>proaehed eeleeted meobere of the United Nationa with tha 
reoueet that thoy place at tha diapossl of the Saeurity 
Council a o i l i t a ry contingent each uaually of bottal ien 
a i i o , for aorviee with United Neti'ine. The bottalion wee 
to bo l ight ly aroad and uaually eeoprieed r i f l e eo»ponioo» 
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In ««ny ii%«t«n«»8, oth«t t y p M of battsl lorai Hava • ! • « 
I9«»n includad I n th« psacv-kaapiriQ forest* Th« nui*«f 
• f vountrittt t o t»» appreaeHset d«p«ii4«d on tho approvod 
otrongtn of tho Foteo. I'Hon tho eeiipooition of tho 
foveo hod boon sot t lod , tho 3ocrotory- Gonorol or tho 
Gonorol Aaooffbly oo i n tho caso of UttCf X- oppolntod 
i t o coimondor* 
Tho functions of the Unitod Notiono nt i l i tory fnrcoo 
included monninQ positions os u o l l as carry out obsor* 
vet ion* 8y tho fornor neons a Unitod f^^ations paace* 
keeping force could i n t e r d i c t moveinents into i t s tone of 
operation* Ord inar i ly , however, a Unitod Nations poecc?* 
keeping force could not be of auch overvholminQ etrength 
as to stop doternined e f fo r ts at ingreee in to i t s arse of 
34 
operation by one of the part ies* 
Interposed between the l e r e s l i snd Egyptian amed 
forces , VNCP acted ae an in ter^posi t ion force* Such func-
t ion of the Unitod Natione poMso-keoping foroee wea eeeent ia l 
for eetabi iahing ouiet i n an aree of operation and cteate 
the proper atnosphere wi th in which eet ive potfso-keeping 
34. Vf« i M t n l i l i f 3t t ly ,1979, p* 80 
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••Mid continu*, yh«fi tn« withdrawal of tha UNCf X 
in Way 1»«7 waa follawad i»aadiataly by tha aix«day 
Uar in 3una 1f67, than did tha intarnatienal eoMninitlr^ 
at larga raaliaa tha vaiuabla function of Unitad 
Nationa pa«:a»kaaf)ing forcaa* 
Quaatlona ralatino to Financinc and Authorirationi 
Tha nature of the paaca-keaping oparations of 
tha Unitad (fationa and tha nannar in which thay ahould 
ba financed have been a controveraial iaaua ainea the 
eatabliahmant of the United Nationa Cnerfaney rotee 
(UNCF) and the Unitad Nations nperatione in tha Congo 
(WiUC). 
HNIH: waa deployed in the Congo when i t wa« faced 
with reballiona, the moat aerioue of which waa tha 8eeea« 
aien of Katanga fron tha Congo. But tha perception 
of the Secretary-Canaral of the nature nf ONUC difforad 
f ta* thet of 9tiwm niniater fatrice LuauMba, While 
HaMiaYakiald aawght to underline what ha called tha 
indapendanca and nautrality of ONUC, Lwrniaba dawandad 
that tha UN r«r«a» callod in by hie Govarniiant, ahowld 
aid and aaaiat tha axacwtian of i ta policy. 
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Hsysvsf» tfiv«»«»nc« of viawt and th» unstable 
• l l i t a t y antf p o l i t i c a l a i tua t ion of tha Country eraatad 
aarioua {jtotolawa f o t onuc. F i n a l l y tha ONUC atieceadad 
i n waking i t a i«portant contr ibut ion i n tha maintananca 
of indapandanca and uni ty of tha Congo,to tha e rad i t 
of tha Unitad Nationa paaca-kaaping. Gut tha r o l a of 
t h i a paaca«feaaping forea cauaad aarioua danaga to tha 
aaaant ia l eonaenaua on peaca-kaaping. The parntanant 
Waateara of tha Security Council d i f f e red widely on tha 
wanagawant and f i n a n c i a l of tha operation and t h e i r d i f -
ference of opinion alinoat wrecked the organization* 
The dispute over the functioning of (MiX. brought to 
proeinence the wide divergence of viewa at the United 
Netione en the euthor iza t ion , wanagaiient end f inancing of 
peace-keepifvg operetiona* Aa i t waa found that tha eeata 
of tha UNCr were heavy enough, being about t 20,006t000 
a yaar* To thea were edded the expeneee of the Conge 
operet ione, which for ebout feur yeara were eoneiderebly 
3S 
greater than the UN*e regular budget* Ae haa been 
3S. Paleer , 0 , Nereen And Terkina, C* Heuerd, 
^ ^ ^ f f ^ i ^ f g " * ! f j l f H f f » f t S c i e n t i f i c Agency» 
Ca lcu t ta , I fTO, p* 3t2 
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(jl«eo«««il iff eh«f>t«r I I I f l « t« r t h « ^ ^ ancr 
r ranee , aiMfiQ o i h M s , r«fustd t o pay for tH« oxponooo 
of pottco. kooplriQ fo teas . Tho Sovlot Unltm iikointainoil 
t h a t only tho Sacurity Council could authoriaa, 
•lanafa and finance thoaa opet-atlorai* franca eontandad 
tha t ainea paaea kaaping oparationa wara of a voluntary 
nature. Befltiar atstaa had a r igh t to datartiina whether 
nr not to pay for than* The Canerel Aaaenbly, a f te r 
receiv ing en edvieory opinion on the nat ter f r o « the 
I n t e r n e t i o n a l Court of 3uot ice , endorsed the opinion 
of the Court that paace*keeping expenees were the expenaea 
of the Qrgenization* 
The Matter , however, wee esaent ia l ly p o l i t i c a l 
and not l a g e l . I t beeaiia i^vivus during the nineteenth 
aaaaion of the Cenerel Aaeei^ly thet there wae no preet iea l 
way for the USSR and France to be deprived of t h e i r 
rolea i n the General Aaaaably i f they refueed t o pey 
t h e i r epara of peaea*keeping eperet iona. To reaolva 
the Matter of peace-keeping eperet iona, the General 
Aaaeatoly, i n 196S, e a t ^ l i ^ e d e Speciel Comiittee of 
36«^Sp(K(i«l CoMRittae wee aet*wp for t M eeapreheneive 
t«vi«i iMl ef the whole ^tieatien of peaae^keeping 
eperatftena in a l l the i r aapaeta inelwdtng weye of 
•var«a««iffig the preaant f i n a n c i a l d i f f i e w l t i t * 
• f the Ortanixat ia i i . ( |y t ry>t f>* t «»• •*•» « i » t < • • • • , 
p* Tt f Spa t ia l CaMii t tea an Paaee«keeping Operetiona) 
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t h l t t y - t h r a * on pa«€•-»(• •ping op«r«tion«^ to TOtolvo 
%nm f i n s n t i a l fiispui»« • • ditcytsw) • • r U » r » Tti» 
Coiiii itt«« which i « a i i l l i n cxia ivnea, h«« ntado 
• • r i o u s of for ts to ^vor cono tho divsroarwo of vi«w« 
•monQ tho nanbtrt* 
Another najot qyestion which has daf iad ablut ion 
ra la taa t o the authori ty who should be rasponaibla 
for the day«to*day manaQaRient of these forcea, t>ihile 
the USSR held the view that only the Security Council 
aaalated by the M i l i t a r y Staf f ComtRittee could do ao, 
the United States laaintainad thet the Security Council 
not being i n a poai t ion to give executive d i rect ion to 
the fo rce , only the Secretary General aa the egent of 
the Counci l , could be in-cherge« I t ahould be noted 
that the Soviet Union, however, on a purely ad.hoo 
baa ia , accepted the r o l e of the Secretary*Cenerel i n 
the day to day nanaQaaent of the fo rce , without etgreeino 
t o i t a cod i f i ca t ion aa a p r inc ip le . 
The experience ef the Cyprus Forces 
Serious diffareneee peraiated awonQ the perstenent 
neebera of the Security Council referdinQ peaee*keepin« 
• u t when i t beaaate epperent thet only e t h i r d - p e r t y 
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i i i t«rv«nt len» auch • • th« Unitad Nations, could 
• v « r t • • •Y iou t in ts rna t iona l c r i s i s s t is ing out 
of ths f igh t ing betwosn Crssk and Turkish eosmunitiss 
i n 1963* 64y ths Security Council respondsd by sutho-
r i x i n g ths Mtirfi i ishiisnt o f a Unitsd/^ps«3S.ks8pin9 
fores i n Cyprus ( UNFICYP) , Ths USSn allousd ths 
council to ac t , asking i t e lsar that ths f insncing 
would have to he done vo lun ta r i l y and that fleiiibsr Ststss 
should not be ctsligsd to psy for the operation* Though 
ths rssolut ion uss unsninoutfly adoptad, the Sovist Unian 
ca l lsd for a ssparate vote on the paragraph c a l l i n g for 
the establiahffisnt of ths pssee»kssping fores* On t h i s 
3? 
v o t s , the Soviet Union, Czechoslovskis snd frsncs ebeteineo* 
The new elenent i n UKflCYP wee thst instsad of ths 
opsn sndsd durstion of prsvious psscs-ktsping esndatee, 
thet of unriCYP was U n i t e d to en i n i t i e l period of three 
nonthe* The l i K i t e d duretion would ef ford the Council the 
3 t . C i t r i n 3 a e k « , UN Peaee^keeping Actional A caee 
etudy i n (^ganieational Task Cxpaneien (P .90t ) { 
(Cd«) Ctegg, Hebert U* end tarkun nicheel* The 
tfffiHi yitllflifi, ^y i t i i iPMlliJtiiiillafMi> uTSTTefi 
•teeek for Affiliated Cast •ysst Prsss Pvt, U4*» 
New dslHi» it7» 
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9fif»»stufiiiyy on • cuiQulac hasit to d«t«Tiiin» wh«th«? 
or not ttio op«r«tion should b« oxtontSoif, Tho 
ptocoduto •nturod tho Stcurlty Council's, ov«r««ll 
eontr^'l of tho poaco-kooplng oporotiono. This boeono 
• otondsred proctieo* 
Another signifieonco odvanco in ptaco^kooping 
procodttros cano • • m roault of th« outobroak of f ighting 
In tha niddla t«8t in Oct«d3«r 1973, The Sacurlty 
Council called for a coaaa-fir© on 22 ^tobar 1973, 
but another peacevkeapinQ force uae not in the offing^ 
I n the context, hm^ever, of an escalating er isia between 
the 3uper-Pouer8 involving a nucleer confrontation, the 
non-eligned Stetee in the Courasil co-operated to requeet 
the eatirisliahiMnt of a United Nations anergency force. 
The Seetatary-Cenerel, in reaponae to the Council's 
requeet formulated principlee which aucceeded in bridging 
to aoae degree the gap between the Super«Pewera on the 
nature and conduct of peece-keeping operationa* The 
S«:retary<«Ceneral preaentad a working aolution for a 
problan inaoluble in theory. Three eesential conditiona 
were enu»erated in the report for any United Natiena 
peaee*keeping force te be effeetivet " f i re t i t sHiet et 
e l l t i M a have the f u l l confidence ^ d beekingef tlie 
Security Ceuncil* Second^ i t wuet operate witli %h« f u l l 
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6o->op«taiion of the partlss eenctrnvd, th i rd , i t 
iiust b« iibl« to fyfiBtion • • an ints^ratvd and a f f i -
ciant mil i tary uni t ." In ordar to aatiafy thoaa 
apprahanaiva of tha Saeurity Council losinQ control 
evar paaea^kaapinQ, tha report anunciatad tha principle 
that tha Saeratery- General should keep the Council 
fu l ly informid of devalopnenta relating to tha 
funetiorm ^f tha force, and that a l l nattere which 
»iQhti(the nature or the continued effective action of 
the force t^ould be referred to the Courcil for i t a 
deeioion* furthereore, the principle of co l l« : t ive 
f inancial teeponsibility for paeee»keeping operations 
3i yea re- i terated in the report • 
However, the principle of broad oeo^raphieal 
representation in a United N«tione peeee.keepinQ force 
took f i r « roota in the aetebliahnant ^f UNCr I I « Al l 
eontinente were repreeented in tha force and for tha 
f i r a t t i»e a raiireaentetive of tha yaraaw Paet* ^olandy 
wee participating in the forea* Both Canada and Poland 
provided tha lo^iat ie aupport for UNCr U . The bread 
taographieal toaae of UNCf in conjunetian with the new 
prineiplea angled tha USSH te afrea to pay for thaaa 
aperetiaita* 
6 
Tii» UMir I I antf iU N»w T»tk» t 
Of 
U h l l * UNCr I I fo l iay«d tha p«tt«vn/ ih« 
v s r l i v r p«ae»«1t»«tsrifm f ^ t e v s , • l ^ n i f ie«f(4 now 
taakt uara antvustsd t o i t . UttCr I I iiovod froi i 
ttio coneopt of an i n t a r - p o a l t i o n fores to a buffar 
fotca* I n addit ion to tha nanninQ of poaitiona and 
otoaarvation poata, UNCf I I , had tha faapona ib i i i t y 
of va r i f y ing tha l i a i t a t i o n a f forcaa and arMaManta 
i n apac i f iad aoraaa adjaeant to a i thar sida of tha 
buffar xona* Anothar a ign i f i ean t t o l a of tha fo tca 
waa aa a diplomatic too)^ i n working out tha varioua 
diaangagamant and i n ta r in agraateanta in tha S ina i * 
Thua, i t i a incor«aivabla that tha diaanga^afnant 
•graananta could hava baan auccaaafully eoncludad, 
without tha daploynant of Unitad Nations foreaa i n 
c r i t i c a l araaa. 
Tha auecaaaful working of VmtT I I halpari i^ tha 
coneluaian of an agraanant i n tha Golan Naighta i n 
nay 1974* Thia agraanant had to ba poliaad by a naw 
paaea^kaaping forea aoabining tha two typaa of paaaa* 
kaaping oparatiena* Hanca tha nana Unitad ftationa 
Oiaangagaaant obaarvar Forca (yfioor)* I t amargad during 
tha nagatiationa that l a r a a l waa iiora i n favour of tha 
daplayaant o f a paaea»kaaping forea« whi ia t y r i a pro* 
f arvad United Natlaiia Qbaarwata. Tha caaprataiaa wotkad 
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out !»•• th« eortiination of th» two olmonta int« • now 
Hybrid. Tfio took* UNDdP wst intTostoit witH l»ow«««f, uurt 
• • • • n t i a l l y o i i l l a t to thooo oT UNCF I I . UNOCT providod 
to ttto UnltocI Notion* tho opportunity to uork out pro* 
coduros for tho IntsQrotlon of Unltod Motions military 
oboorvoro int*' tho funetioninc; of a forco. This «o{$ol 
could be uooful i n a poaolblo future United f^ationa pe«:e* 
IceaplnQ derat ion in Kawihla* 
I n Bareh 1978« the United Nations Interiffi Foree 
in Leb«n«n (UKIflt.) yaa oatablished* The cont&tiona under 
which i t wee eetal>Uahed were siRilar to those for the 
establiahMint o f the United Nationa peace-keeping in the 
Cor«BO, There was an iribaenca of Qovernmental authority in 
aouthern Ugbafwnf coupled with en obvioue abeence of co-. 
operation with UNIflL on the part of aone of the a i g n i f i * 
eant partiaa involved* Thie ae in the Con^o, «ede the teak 
of ( M i n t one of the aoet d i f f i c u l t . 
However, beoinning with the Buei crieia» the United 
Netiona wee involved i n inportant peeee-keepinQ operatiena» 
includif^ the Major eoafliitaent i n the Con^o, and i t waa 
eentinwally entased in one wey er enother with diepwtea ^r 
ether eituetiena which threetened the peece of the World. 
48* P>«liMir» 0« Nftrwin And Perkine, C, Newerdt 
50 
TltiMi^  i t Can b« ••fiKi that tH« l«««on« laarnt 
In the Con^o cm*- hw eo»» in uaafuX in siHaaaqutwit 
e««a»* To iR«vi th« finaneiai contingancy, for lnstanea« 
paaca.kaapinQ nisaiona are nou aatabliahad uith a 
def inita t i i ia l imit fanaued in aubaaouant intavvala and 
tha axparii^Hsa of tha ConQo, Cyprua, Labanon and othar 
casaa ahouid alao prov« invaluabla to tha Unit ad 
ftationt in daaiin^ uitb tha d i f f i c u l t aituatir^na in 
Ziab^wa and ftaaibia* 
C H A P T t R - II 
THE CONS0 m TH£ EUH ,0F INDEPENDENCE 
INTRODUCTION; 
Ths Republic of the Congo (Leopo ldv i l l e ) i renamsd 
the Oeroocretic Republic of the Congo in 3uly 1964, a former 
Belgian* adminietared t e r r i t o r y in Central Africa, became 
1 
independent on 3une 30 , I960, In the broad penorma of 
Hiatory, the Congo paased in the short spen of eeventy>f ive 
years* from 1B85 to 1960- from the s t e t u s of a feudal fiefdom 
of Leopold II to that of a colony of Belgium and then t o 
2 
sovere ignty , 
(a) Terr i tory , Population and Inhabitants: 
The Congo uaa a vast t err i tory of 2,343,930 squera 
k i lometres- more than fourtimes the s i z e of franca but u i t h 
a population of only 13 ,700 ,000, scarcely s ix persons par 
3 
square ki lometre. I t*s people comprise "the pygmies of the 
I t a r i Forest and other regions through the Bantu or true 
Negro populations uho ware primarily a g r i c u l t u r a l i a t s and 
uhose ways of l i f e presented an ever-changing kaleidoscope 
4 
of cOiliural patterna". 
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1. Everyman* a UN-eth Ed. (1968) ,P . 168 
2. ^ y « l , Rajesuar; .W.i,f«iffn fpy. ^^mmMfsJti^.PlM IKf ^PmSi. 
§i$t Oxford ygj ivrs i tV Press . Deihi"^i976 . ( C h a p . m P. tS> 
3 . p L M £ l i i > Nov»*19i@, P. 15 
4. IHffit»»p>, AUaiii, tenoe B^ckoround of Canf^ct .Northern Uni, 
bd 
Th« Congo comprises aix provinces- Katsngs, L s o p o l d v i l l s , 
Kivu, Kassi , Oriental and Equator, 
(2) SXIAL CONDITIONS: 
Inspi te of various and abundant natural resources , the 
Congolese were poor and backward during the c o l o n i a l rule , 
. " . The intent ion of the 
co lon ia l pouer uas to i s o l a t e the Congo in po l i t i ca l • sconomic 
6 
and s o c i a l terms in a number of ways* One of t h e s e , was the 
discouragement of white sett lement in the Congo to minimize 
contBcts Africans could make with other n a t i o n a l s , e i ther Euro-
7 
pean or other Africans, Though the Belgian Government en-
couraged education upto school l e v e l for the Congolese, Uni-
v e r s i t y l e v e l education was delayed for a long period because 
of the Belgian fear of creat ing e l i t e a who would press for 
6 
p o l i t i c a l independence. Thus the f i r s t Congolese allowed t o 
leave the country for univers i ty education went to Belgiuw in 
9 
1952, However, l a t e r , the pressure from the Congolese for 
higher education l e d the Belgium co lon ia l government to open 
two u n i v e r s i t i e s in the Congo i t s e l f , 
5, Sharraa,D,N, ;Afr^o-Jlsian_iGroii^ the UN,Chaitanya Publishing 
House, Allahabad,1969,P, 147 
6, nsrriais ,P, AllaWjCongo: Backoround of Conf l ic t .P.33 
7, I b i d . , PP.33-34 
8 , n«rriam, P. Allam, P. 43 
9, Ifaift. 
Ot3 
Under th« Btlglan colonial admlnlittatlori th» 
prusa was not fraa, Tha colonial chartar of 1908 re-
cognized tha following civil righta- individual fraadom, 
fraadom of religion, freedom of opinion, freadotn of 
education, inviolability of tha home, the right to peti-
tion, tha secrecy of private correspondence, tha right of 
legal action against public officials, the inviolability 
10 
of private property and freedotn of employment. It did 
not recognize the right of meeting and association or the 
11 
freedom of preas. Accordingly tho first number of an ABAKO 
12 , 4. • 
periodical uea banned on October 29, 1959. '"is »t«P °^ 
ttir 
the colonial power was criticised by the elitea of^^Congo, 
specially, by 3oseph Kasavubu, the leader of the ABAKO party. 
However, under tha pressure of public opinion "freedom of 
the press** uas later granted to the Congolese. It uas aignad 
13 
by the King in 1959 with certain limitation. 
In couraa of time, faelinga in^African middle class 
about their position began to surface. Its mambara began to 
ask thamsalves and othara aona queations about human relations 
10. Berriam, P, Allan, P. 51 
11. ABAKO-(Alliance das 6a-Kongo)l9roup headed by 3oaaph Kasavul 
12. Warriam, P. Allan, Conoo Background of Conflict.P.52 
13. Limitationt That the person publishes a periodical wuat 
give prior notice in writing to the provincial Govarner, 
atating tha name of tHa periodical,ita ekjactlvas,aims, 
ditactors or managara a ptaciaa Hat of editorial staff 
etc. etc. (Plarriam,P.Allnin, P. 53). 
54 
b«tu««n Africans and Balglams In tha Congo, Thara ware, 
apaclally, dlstinotlona batvean the black and uhita 
in the penal code, by which Africans, for example,could 
U 
be flogged while Europeans could not. 
There were distinctions in government service 
based on race which prevented Africans from rising above 
15 
a certain level, 
A deep-seated disquiet emerged among the Congolese. 
They felt that the Europeans were getting the benefits 
while the Africans were being exploited, Many of the 
people were uneasy about the political developments insofar 
as they understood them. The feeling of paternalism orew 
with the Congolese, The slogans of soma political partiea 
for political rights for the Congolese added fuel to fire. 
The cry for independence then came from the Congolese,end 
ultimately they attained their long.awaited goal. The 
Congo was free from the clutches of colonial power. The 
Belgian Government had not prepared the colony for indepen. 
^dence. Consequently, the new state on 30 3une 1960 found 
itself face to face with a host of formidable problems. 
These problems spread over social, economic, political, 
16 
military and adminiatrative fields. 
14. Ibid, PP. 56-57 
15, Merriam, P. Al lan, P. 57 
l^' ON Review, Nov. 1960, P. 15 
bv) 
Th« departura of larg« numbars of Balgiar^ adminia-
tr«to*«, taachira, dbctora, and othar ataff on tha day of 
indapandanca laft a vacuum uhich inavltably eraatad a 
17 
serious situation for the Govarnmant of the nau Republic, 
The situation further daterioted by the failure to make 
proper arrangemanta for a systematic hand-over of the 
administrative machinery and essential public servicaa to 
the Congolese,''® 
( 3 ) tLCONOWIC CONDITIONS; 
The pre-independence economic s i tuat ion in the six 
provinces of the Congo was analyzed in a 45 page report in 
the tconoraic B u l l e t i n for Afr ica published by the Secre-
t a r i a t of the UN Economic Commission for Af r ica , In th is 
report apecial a t tent ion was paid to the contr ibut ion of 
Katangsi the r ichest province. The report stated that 
" i t was not pract icable from the economic point of v iew,to 
establ iah aeparate independent states baaed on the major 
t r i b e a and ethnic groups of the country becauae 'very few 
19 
of theae atataa would be aconomieally v iab le by themselves*• 
17. The Stateman'a y . B . , 1978-79,P, 1612 
18. UN RevUu^,Nov. 196, P, 15 
19. Afjric^JDairy, Ueekly Record of Cventa in Africa 
with Index,1961-62); August 19-25(1961),P,85, 
Vel. I,, No. 8 
Dv.) 
Tha Congo was a minlng-baaa and it ptoducad diffarant 
ulneralSi tha chlaf biins copptr, dlajBonda, ©old, ailvar, 
tin, cobalt, uranium, radium, garmanium,zinc and iron. Tha 
most important minaa in the Congo uara tha coppar-minaa naar 
Kpuah, Wusonoia and Ruwa. Tha total output of coppar in 
20 
1958 ua« 237, 562 matric tons. 
Among the provinces of the Congo, Katanga, aa has 
been said earlier, was the richest one* Xt had rich and 
profitable mining regions which enabled it to attain a higher 
level of production in relation to its population and labour 
force, as compared to the rest of the country. African 
uages in the Congo,especially in Katanga, were relatively 
21 
higher then in most other African countries. Obvioualy, the 
average people of Katanga were financially better of than 
people in other regions of the Congo. It was found that 
during the yeara 1956-59 the receipts from Katanga's exports 
. * 22 
amounted to almost half of the Congo's to ta l export receipta. 
But, the Africana did not effect ively control more than 10 
23 
to 20 percent of production, Katanga spec ia l ly , because 
of i t s abundant mining industry, turopean control over economic 
activity was even greater than in the other provinces. The 
management of the whole buainess enterprises of the mining 
areas of the Congo was reguleted and controlled mostly by the 
24 
Europeans* 
2o> mmamh*^, fn egflk,i96o,p.fi3s 
21* # f f ^ * &^v.Aue>19,2S.1961>P.aS 
22» m^l^M |y fyv ,Au«. 19-25,1961,P.85 
2 A ^^B^P^^"^*^ 
f)7 
£ven on tJN« eve of Indapandfince, the paradoxical sltua* 
25 
tlon existad on the economic plane. Despite the country*e 
9reat natural wealth, the people ware poor and lacked 
managerial and technical sk i l l s* The secession of 
Katanga, the wealthy and industrial province and the 
largest contributor to the Congo's total revenues came 
as the greatest set back to the Central Government of the 
Congo. 
A 
(^) /POLITICAL SUBV£Yt 
P o l i t i c a l consciousness developed in the Congoleee 
people at a f a s t pace, as compared to other countr ie s . In 
1958, there occurred a number of/uhich served to strengthen 
26 
the movement toward independence. 
Ona of t h o s e , was the International Exposition in 
Brusse ls in 1958. Several hundreds of Congolese from a l l 
parte of the Congo came to p a r t i c i p a t e . Hera, for the f i r s t 
t ime, people from far- f lung parts of the Congo could mix 
toge ther , exchange po l i t i ca l , economic and other views. They 
observed the Be lg iane , in the roetropolies and compared them 
with the Belgiana in the Congo. They searched among them. 
27 
aelvee for common p o l i t i c a l grounds. 
25. Oaval.Raieawar.gUssion for Hawwa o-'p-<-f: Thf, tojpgo 
£.r |j ia^ (Chap, I I , P, 15) 
26. ntrriem, P. AliaiPv, CeDt91ij19.Ktj.gvpd 9 / Cgnf3.tft»Pt80 
27* .l,^ 4Ai- * 
58 u 
It can b« said that t h i s f i r s t opportunity for 
contact among amarging p o l i t i c i a n a who had navar prsvioualy 
mat each othar or not bean ixpoaad to aach othar'a idaaa, 
uas of cruc ia l importanca to tha future of the Congo, 
A Second awent in the auwmer of 1956 which had con . 
s iderable impact upon the formation of Congolese p o l i t i c a l 
ideas was the v i s i t of General de Gaulle to Brazzav i l l e , 
Just across the Congo r i v e r . In h i s speech on 24 August 
1958, the French leader sa idt **yhoever wishes independence 
28 
can have i t as soon as he wishes". 
The general response to de Giul le*8 speech waa ac-
c e l e r a t i o n in the demand for freedom. A motion uas submitted 
to the Winiater of the Belgian Congo, Wr. P a t i l l o n , on 
26 August,1958. The motion was notable not only for i t s 
demanda but a lso for the urgency with which they were aought. 
Further, i t uas signed by a number of Congolese who were 
e i ther at that time or were la ter to become leaders of 
several p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Among them, were Oiomi and Pinzi 
of the ABAKO, Adoula of the Action S o c i a l i s t e , Lumumba, 
Mbungu, Ngalula, Nguvulu, Ngwenza and I l e a of tha future PINC 
(Wouvement National Congolais) and Bariko and flotingia of 
29 
the Bangle, It*a objec t ive included,"decolonizat ion and 
'' 30 t o t a l emancipation". 
naw»«iiapwnefc"ei 
28, Wartiam,P. Alia»<Eo.n"^>6.,ac,mty.wn.t ,of „ Conf,U,f t , P . 81 
2f. Wetflam, P. AUa>t, >^J5«^ Qffy„ffe,H J^?En#, •/., fi'f^^U'Ct ,l=>.82 
36. .JMii. 
59 
Th» third svent of importance at this tima uas tha 
Pa -African Confaranca hald in Aeera, Ghana, in Oaeantbar 
31 
of 195B, Threa Congolaaa laadara including Patrica Lumumba 
attandad the Confaranca. Tha thraa leaders were received 
with warmth and honour by the Ghanaians and other (Members 
of the Congreea. Hare, the Congolese delegates learned at 
first hand about the independence movements in other parts 
32 
of the continent, Lumumba was als-o made a member of the 
permanent organization setup at the conference. They also 
33 
met a number of renowned African leaders there like Nkruma. 
Lumumba made a short speech in which he pronounced the libe-> 
ration of the Congolese people from the Colonial regime. 
Upon the return of the three delegates from Accra, 
Kasavubu and Lumumba, who were leading antagonistic political 
34 
parties, were publicly reconciled. In April,19S9, under 
the leadership of Patrice Lumumba, a meeting of eight poli-
35 
tical parties took place in luluabourg and discusaed all 
about the total independence of the Congo. 
However, the most important event in the history of the 
independence of the Congo, was the Round Table Conference held 
31. m^, 
32. ff>rriaw.P.Alla»i>ConQo;Background of ConfJ^ict.P. 82 
33. J j y ^ , P.83 
34. Jl^Jjt. 
3S. I b | g . , P. 91 
GO 
36 
in Brua««l» from 20 3anuacy to 20 February 1960, Th« 
IciSoIutlans piSslW 1ft tfii^  ^ onfarende QuatintSai i ^ 
pendenca of ConQo as of Dune 30,1960, It la significant 
that the attainment of independence by the Congolese was 
quicker and almost sudden as compared with other coun-
tries like India, Algeria, Walaya, tu^ .^ '^ -^ft ,Kenya and 
Madagascar • 
The internal political differences was not resolved 
immediately after the attainment of Independence. Some 
difference arose among the political leaders, especially, 
between the leaders of the two l<>hgest political parties 
of the Congo headed by Kasafc'ubi^  and Lumumba* The main 
difference between them was regarding the system of govern-
ment to be adopted for the new state, Kasavubu preferred 
a federal form of government while Lumumba stood for a 
38 
centralised unitary government. 
In the first general electiona in May,1960, the 
party led by Lumumba won in Stanley ville, Kasaij^ ibu in Lao-
poldville, Tshombe in Elisabethville, Kalonji in Kasai 
. 39 
province* The fINC party of Lumumba emerged the single 
largest party in both Houses of the Congolese Parliament, 
' - ' -"• '•"• - - • • [ ir ^ i i L . iiwiiBW MMoi II j] .. ... _•..! II -HIT i [ III . I I I 11 iH iijii n i l , , m a i l T - i r r . . , . . J..I1J.I i M i M i i i i i iiu. 
3^« Xbi#f f P, 100 
3 7 , Sh»rma,O.N. , Afyg-A?^an Cf(?up, |,p, t h e UN, P, 148 
35,. IJgJak 
61 
In the bsglnning some hurdlas csme in ths way of forming 
m national Govarnsiant but a aolution uaa found with tha 
40 
formation of a coalition Govarnmant at tha centra* 3osaph 
Kaaavubu, tha laadar of tha ABAKO party had baan alactad 
aa head of the state on 24 3un8 * 1960 and Patrice Lumumba, 
leader of the Congo National Plovament, occupied the posi" 
tion of the Prime-Hiniater, 
However, neither of them could establish authority. 
Personal, tribal, and regional revelries led to the break-
41 
away of Katanga province under n o i s e Tahombe, 
40. Shsrma, O.N^, P. 148 
41, The Stataaman'a, y .B . 1978-79, P. 1612 
€2 
sven af ter gett ing ind0r>endenc© fjcom a»l<mial 
domination by Bel^ jits'n* the ycmug 'R&ovlblic ^ounA no peace* 
The Central Ooven»nent faced serious di f f ie t i l t ieo from 
within and fro^i withmit* 
The very existence ot thet new Stat«^ was in jeopardy 
owing to th& *Bel<jiam 
amed intervention in the Congo following the niuttiny in 
the Congolese ar i^y anS Tahorrtoe'a declaration of secession 
of katanqa from the Congo#••«],••• t^able to cope with tlie 
aituation* the Central Govemtnent* on 12 July I960, aaked 
the Secretary-'General for military aasiataace* Thia raquast 
was tor the protaetion of the Congolese territory againat 
the Salgian fnatropolitan troops which had committed aggs*** 
aion and for halping the Ooveswnent in meeting the prol»laiii 
2 
arialng f torn Katang's declaration of seceaaion by i t s 
pxovincial goveenniant* which the Cantral Qovammsnt dea-> 
3 
crilMd aa a threat to international peace* I t a lso aalead 
I * ftftaema* ]>«if*# Mm^^imn Ocoup in ti|a fM, Chaitai«r« 
Pal»l.i«liifig Hawai MlaaHaiiatii l^ i t i ' i»* 'l«it 
2* li|lafi«« 19«0* ^« i 2 
3* IffItliffilff*!* g^ - * * * WaiAa«a. StU Sditioil* l f i«» Pm t i # 
63 
thf« ihiltttd Nations to put an and to the soeaasiofi of 
Katanga aii^ meGumtH Bmltfiivm o£ baling foatered a eolo-
niaXist exmapiracy with a view to "taintainlnq a hold on 
4 
the Congo* 
TSia Secretary-General, in accordance with the Article 
5 
99 of the imitQd nations Charter* called for an urqent meating 
of the Security Council to consider the request of the Con-
golese Govemn>ent# 
The Security Cotaicil on 14 July, l #60 adopted a 
Tunisian draft c^solutSon 1^ 8 votes to 0 with thrse abs-
6 
tentions* The resolution consldeidng the Secretary-c^neral*8 
reports on the Congo situation^ Called upons 
"I, The Oovenvnant of Belgium to withdraw 
their troops from the ter^itoey of the 
Republic of the Congo; 
"2* Decided to authorise the Secretary-
General to take the neeessary steps* 
in consultation with the Govemmint 
of the Republic of the Congo, to provide 
4i» Zbid«» 
S* Arti«le 99 of the va Charter authorises the Saeratacy 
Oeneral to "^ bring to the attention of *hm i^  . Seouvi^ 
CouiMiil any MiAtar wiii<ai ^ ^ s oipinion inay iiif««^» 
Hie maiAtanaiioa of latex»eti%«l peace and mtmmiW** 
G4 
l^e ©isvemraeat with such military 
assistanee* as may' h&' iie«ses«a£y,#.. 
Tintil# through the effojpta by the 
Congolese Government with the 
Technical assistance of the United 
Nations, the national security foi>-
cea may hp able» i 
---.. •':•••)':'., :.,;..,i'-/ in the p 
opinion of the Government, to meet 
fully their tasks; 
"3 Requested the Secretary-General to 
report to the Security Council as 
appropriate ** T 
The Security Council considerlno the first report of the 
Secretary-General on the implen^ntation of the resolution 
of 14 July *1960, unanimously adopted another resolution 
on 22 July 1960 which appreciated the work of the 
Secretary-Gone ral and the prompt stajjport given to him 
by Mernber States* It recognised the urgent need to con-
tinue and Increase- Wniteri Nations forces in Leopoldvllle 
and reconwwnded the admission of the Republic of the 
Congo to the United Nations: 
The resolution further: 
"1. Calledupon the Government of Belgium to itnplement 
speedily the Security Council resolution of 
14 July 1960, on the withdrawl of their troops 
and authorises the Secretary-General to take 
all necessary action to this effect; 
7. XJSML' i^ ®^ '^ * ^ 2, S/4387 
Go 
"tm ^mqam»tmA alX States to refrain £rom 
mm iKSticm which la i^t tand to inpeaa 
tha rai%9ziiti®n of 1MM an<S ordar and 
the anavQlaa by tha (Savaffnmairit ot <Smii^R^m 
of Ita authority and also to safrain 
from any action whieti might undermine 
the territoriaX integrity and the pnoXitical 
independence of the Republic of the Congoi 
"3« CoftEnendad Vtm Secretary-General for the 
profirpt action he has taken to carry out 
resolution S/4387 of tlva Security Coimcil 
and hia f i r s t report; 
"At, Invited th© apecialiaed agencies of t*ie 
United Rations to ren<!ter to the Secretary-
General BtxAi assistance as he Ttay require; 
"5» Requested the Secretary-General to reoort 
further to the Security Council as aporo-
priate^.Q 
l»ie Secretary-Gen«ral on 6 August 1960 sulxnitted 
the se<K»nd report on the iinpleniintation of the Security 
Council's resolutions of 14 and 22 July 'l^ fiO, with parti-
cular reference to Katmqa. In his report* he stated that 
the Belgian Government had accepted his intespretation of 
the resolution which applied to Katanga province* itatar* 
it was found that entry into Katanga would have to be 
adiieved by forcet and since the Utoited lotions Forcw was 
not entitled to take such a^ilitary initiatives* the Seere* 
taxy-Oeneral caneellad the qperations and asXad for further 
«* y#*»* 19*0, p. 9*f • S/4#05 
9m l^t)i,Am0 ^9 S5 
GG 
10 
cofi«>id«r«tioii of ttie i«Bttj»je TS7 ^ » s » e a r l t y Cbuneii* 
A meoting o£ the Securi ty CcnmeiX was eonvened on 8th 
Au^8t#196Q t o conalder the second repor t of the Secre-
tary^ Geii«%ral« Tbm Secretary«-C3©ii©ral In h i s report 
&tmf attenti?^n .to the rmin d i f f l e a l t i e * in implefmntlnq 
n 
the Cottticll r e ao lu t ' ons , He aatced for ensuring the 
speedies t possible* withdraw?! o? the Belgian troopa vAiose 
presence* he thought continued to be the main danger to 
Deacfi in the Con^» 
On 8 Auquat»1360 Ceylon andTtmlaia sub'Tdttte*'* a 
lo in t d ra f t resolut ion %^ich vms adopted by the Securi ty 
Council on ? August I960, The reso lu t ion conflr?ning the 
autlwjrity vested in the 3ecretaty*-General by "Resolutions 
of 14 antl 22 July* 11*60,requested* 
!• '*hira t o contintie to carryout the respon-
s i b i l i t y placsid on him thereby; 
2 . Called u^ Jton the Government of Belgi«Ri t o 
with-draw imiedia te ly i t s t roops ttom the 
proviaee of Katanga tuider i^peedy modall* 
t i e s de tamined by the SeerstarJMJaneral 
and t o a s s i s t i n evary possible way the 
iitq^lementation of the Counci l ' s r e so lu t ions ; 
3« Daclared t h a t the ent ry of the ^Jnitad nat ions 
force in to t t ^ province of Katanga i s nseas* 
•mrf for the f u l l iaplementation of t h i s 
r a so lu t ion ; 
G7 
4* Reftffir t^wbd thftt the Unitttd Nations 
Force In the Congo* wi l l not be a 
pa r ty t o o r in any way intervene in 
or be used t o inf l i»nee the outcome 
of any i n t e r n a l conf l i c t*cons t i tu t iona l 
o r otheicwioe; 
5 . Called viipon a l l Jfeirtoer state?3# in accordance 
with ArtlclftB 25 and 45 of the Charter t o 
• accept Mid car ry out the d«>cisions of 
the Securi ty Council and t o afford imxtuel 
aaoiatnnco in carrying out measure© decided 
i^on bySecttrity Council; 
6 , Hequeste^^ the^ Secretary-Geiteral t o implement 
t h i s resolut ion and t o report fur ther t o the 
Securi ty Cottncil &a appropr ia te . 12 
At a msctlncf of the % c u r i t y Council, held on 
21 August a t tho request of the *'rime-Minister of Congo* 
the Secretary-General s a id : 
'•^ 'Jhen the uni ty of the Congo had been nianifested 
by the presence of the tftiited Nations Force 
a l l over the Rp>pvi>lle tuickir a un i f ied eonvnand 
and when t s e coirplete withdrawl of Belgian 
f roor»s was wider way* act ions and a t t i t u d e s 
of the tmited NSatlons and i t s S«cretsry-<Ssn«ral 
hsd come under severe c r i t i c i s m feoti the Prima 
Minister of the Congo* and t h a t t h i s c r i t i c i sm 
had been followed by a se r i e s of ac t ions %mich 
gave an isepsession of dteiep d i s t r u s t and h o s t i -
l i t y fooMinted for p o l i t i c a l ends'*, 13 
i 2 . J f , y « ^ . I960, P, 98, S/4426 
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On 23 M»^m%§t9&Qt! thfi S»Btxmi»icf'<^mw»rml 
i nv i t ed the Penwment f^epresentativea of Canadftt 
EthiOT>la# Ohana« GNiinea* indla« inftotmaia, irtilanAt 
Liberia* ^ l i , *ia)rocco# Pakistan* Sudan* Si«saen« 
Tmiiaia and th© United Arab s«ptft>llc t » for^ tind«r 
h i s ehairmanahip* an Advisory Co-wrdttt*© wWch t^ould 
b© ca l led on t o give ad'/ict^ on the '%it«*d Nations 
Operations , ifi the Congo* 
Several rasiriber;? of tna Cotmcil voiced t h e i r 
8atlsfa<^ti"'n» during the discussion* with ti>e progress 
of withdrawl of Balgian t roops and appreciated trMs 
e f fo r t s of the Georetary-Genoral in inpl€M39entlng the 
r e so lu t ion . They '^Icoraad the Secr»tary-General*s 
in ten t ion t o c rea te an Advisory Connaltteo. 
However* th«5 rep'-esentatives of t^e imSR and 
Poland questioned the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Seeretary 
General and claifsedt "the foreign Inspixed s e p a r a t i s t 
m'"»ven»nt in Katanqa could not be regarde-' as an i n t e rna l 
-natter and t h a t the f^ecretary-^naral should not have 
e n u r e d i n t o c<»tract with anyone apar t from the 
14 . Central csovenwwint o* the Congo** 
^^* IPH' ^« ®^ 
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A ar«£« maolvitioii propotmA hf tsnm rmpmmmn^»%ivm 
»f t^bn tmuw to #iiaiiti«li m w<>m* of «9pf9smit»«iv»B- to 
act ifi csoajurteticm vi th titer 9metmtmvf*>Gmimt9^l to tmrnkwrn 
thu emmstttion of the Osufieii** A'*eiBi,fma in d«il.y ooruKil* 
ftatdLofi i#l%h t,lwi Con^iisa® < o^v»ifii!!i(iiit i^'®* not: awoporfe*^ by 
« m»iority c»f t!i© 'WMKbwr of thp? Ce»HK3ii» 
llwi SftcinBtajTH^tfierai in hia th i rd r«rjort to the 
Sacurity Council on iO At*qiti3t 1^0# on the inpiemsiitation 
of ttoia oriQfiin's je®3olutlon»# infor'ie*1 tli^ Cmmcll taiat th« 
united Nations tmd tsken-ovisr ftiil fiwaponaibiilt? Sof tiKB 
Q^teniiiiatration of tho i^atnina and etiteme lyases* He {ii&ation«Nl 
that th i s was a osovisional measuiB t#it lOut pcoitidic® to 
f^ i9 r i ^ t s f-md olsJjR^ of til® i>artie»Ei isoneamad. Die 
s«ierot«xy^o«n«x«X ttad aiso mrrismmd vtith Bmlgivm for the 
twtinntion of the ascHfMisttxy miibsr of tse)»iiei«iis in a 
e iv i i ian Capacity* Hs* timn ad<%idi '*Aelays oeotxwdi* how 
«v«r# in ths witdidtriwrl of B«l<|i«n oo^ t^Mit titMms# alls^sdly 
htm(m»9 of ^st»kl«3nit«R(iin<gs Mia ths iiMulsqiisefr of WMMIS 
of IBriMisooirt?#••»•# 
During tJia f i r s t «Mi<ik of Soptainb^r 2960^ ^ M Sseff«» 
tarf<*><3sfii» r«l asleadi th9 raprasafitat^vs of B«l<|i«ii fOr in* 
forttiation on isiQian offiesrs attsolMd to th« K«taiiqts 
fof«Mis* HmmrmWf hm oo«i4l wot ^mt ths sjiaot 
OR 5 8<ipt«ffitM»]r» tivi s«enit«rf'<^ii«r«i ««)o»<!t th« 
US5R*« Fepr«s«nt«tiv«i abotst the tectmleai aasistanee which 
1% bmd ott&E6A t o ^ l * « d WatitGni Force but w«» fM»t a e l i * 
yered to the appropriate tinited Nations Authorities* att 
also souoFht information regarding the national i ty and status 
of tlM» crew of certain troop-transporting plan)<%a which the 
xms^ had placed at the disttosal of the Congolese GovemrtMsnt* 
The USS«^  delegate clalnie^^ in h i s r«srply t^at the Security 
Council's resolutions did not res tr i c t the Congo's right 
to receive assistance from other states and the USSR a s s i s -
tance to the Congolese Governments in the form of ffotor Ve-
hic le and Civi l a ir crafts operated toy civi l lansy was fu l ly 
consistent with the resolutions« Yugoslavia charged that 
there was coiott lal ist interference in the Congo and outside 
help to the secessionst leaders* i h i s he considered as 
the main £«ason for the conf l i c t in the Coinyo. He eaMnaxized 
the iinportanee of c lose co-operation between the tjnited 
Kationa Conunand and t^e Central Government of Con^. Ttie 
representative of the USSR blamed Belgium ioh not i'nplemea* 
t ing the Cooneil's resolutions and charged the United Nations 
COMmand and the Sec rata ry-General of "taking the side of 
«i^ c o l o n i a l i s t s and encouragii^ anti-popular divers ionist 
elMMnts"* Crit ic is ing the third report of the Secretary-
Oenefol on the growid that the proposal of the Saeretary-
Ganaral would load to a United Nations trusteeship ovov 
7. 
lsh« Congot h« 0iii»niit%«d • draft jcvsolvtion* Tim rttsoiu* 
t ion urq«d th«t the tlAit«d Nations command shal l oaaaa 
IfitarfaraiMia in tha intamai a f fa im of tiia Congot to 
evacuate aisports and hand<»over t ^ radio station to the 
Cantral Oo^^mmnt* Finally* i t requested a i l ?%mbera 
financial and econo-iic assistance to 
s ta tes to provlda/th® Central Government of the C^ n<30 needed 
by i t . 
Th® S«cr»tary-<3eneral denied the al legation made 
aaainst hi-n by USSR* Ttm representative of tOie tAiited States 
charged th© 0T5Sn with de®T>atehinq personnel and radlitary 
forces to the Congo and requested tih^ 'te^ flber States to scrp-
port tftilted Sfations action in th© Conqo» He also submitted 
a draft r*»9olution in «#hich he urged that the Secretary-
General should continue to give v i ^ r o u s e f fec t to the pre-
vious resolution of the Council and Meraber states should 
make voluntary financial contributions to the United Hations 
Fund for the Congo* He a lso requested a l l s tates to refrain 
from sending personnel or any assistance to be used for 
military purposes in the Congo other than through the United 
Nations Force* Soma aMMribers liXe the tl*K* and Italy Bvtppor* 
tad ^^m draft resolution of the USA* Poland gave i t s sup* 
fM»rt to the USSR draft resolution* The representative of 
t imila blamed and c r i t i c i s e d Belgium for not iit|»laiiian%ing 
the C9iineil*a vssolutions* 
On 7 Sftpttnlwtr 1960« tiltii/9«fMir«l sYdMiitlHiel a fourth 
with tho tmmA for urg«iit intextiAtionai financial ai^ to the 
Congo and reeonmendad t<ie eatal^ishnient of an intomational 
fund to channelise contribution* 
ThQ representative of Yugoslavia on 8 Seoteiriber 1960 
asked for an urcjent rnsetinc? of the Sacurlty Cotmcll claindno 
that the s i tuation in tlte Congo -las a threat to *forld o»ace« 
The cOftitMnication of Yugoslavia, and the fourth reporrt 
of the Secr©tary*-<3eneral on the Congo wsre included in the 
agenda of the Security Council for i t s meeting of 9 Seoteniber 
17 
I960* After a long <Jtebate t l^ joint draft resolution of 
Ceylon and Tunsia was not adopted OfiitnQ tx» the negative vote 
18 
of the tJSSR. 
TiM United States* then* proposed a new draft resolu-
tion to c a l l an emergency Special Session of the Gansral 
Assen^ly to c o n s i ^ r the Congo question* The S s e u r i ^ 
Council at i|:s 90$th meeting on 17 Saptetiber I960 adopted 
a SMSolution and (decided) to ca l l an emergency Spaeial 
Session of the OmomrmX Asse^nibly as piovidad in Qaneral 
Assani&ly rsoolution 377A(V) of 3 i^ vaniMkr 19S0* in order to 
ao 
m«1«s •ppf«^i'i«ts rsooamsfidlatioss* This x«soliition was «dtep%sid 
mmimmmmmmtmammimmmm0imm>i>>i<mmf< nm i—»—<»•— •••••••ii»Mi«<»ji>»iiiMM>iiM«i»».«iiiiiiiiiiin IIIH.HMIIII 
it i^^2# p* i t 
h»t ' ^ f M 
1»y c i ^ t votms to two (POX«IIKS« t^SR) with one abslMintiona 
Urn tfm Kvmxgmnof Special Session o€ the Generel AssentoXyt 
The fourth emergency special session o£ the General 
21 
Asse bly was convened on the nioht of 17 Seotetiaer 1960. 
It met for six plenary meetings andi ended on 20 September 
1980. 
Dttrlnq the <!!ebate# the unitef* States and tIsSR xepre-
aentatives criticised each other's actions in the Congo. 
Openinci th« disctisaion* the yftitec* States representative 
said! "ii^ ile the Security council's action in the Con^ had 
been based on the pramise that tiie Congo "lust not become a 
battle ground in a conflict between the great powers* the 
USSR had intervened by ths despatch of so-called technicians* 
transport aircraft and trucks to the Congo•*• The tJnited 
states iepr»i^nt*tive added that the external assistance 
to the Congo irilKMild be provided through the faited Nations* 
On the otduir hand , the USSR representative claimed 
that t^ expulsion o£ Belgian troops and the safeguarding 
of the Congo's tarrito^ idLal integrity and political indepen-
denee*which wef» tina main paxposes of the Secuvity Cotmcil 
resolutions had not lemmn aohieved* i%rsoverf he charged; 
74 
of the tftii'toff! Sttttfts tmd i t « «l.li«» en the Con^* xm€^r thm 
comoKifid ana the i^cretal'ry ®«i»eral pm ram%»l%f had supported. 
th« oolof i ia l ia ts hf a pol icy of OXscmAitSriq and obstnjKstlug 
the lega l Oowsrarnent*^ Thfs lawful Oovemraent of the Congo 
h® adde^i. was rsmioimd W a *ian<l of jpeb@l8» The Prim© r^inistar 
of India ( Jawaharlal *^hr«) mxqmmtBA t h a t tfm tlnited l^ationa 
ahotiid help th® Parllatiwnt *iw»®t m\S fxinction BO t h a t the 
Conejo*s p£Obie?iis miglit he <^©elt with by i t s own people . 
The Pjpesidcmt of Ghana suggested t h a t ttj© f-s3e'">'^ lv shoul'^ 
mate i t c l e a r t ha t the fesovar-ridiag r e spons ib i l i t y of the 
Wni^d l^ations Fore© to presorvo law and o rds r cotild catily b® 
fi&lfillad by aapport iae tlie Perlia'-.^ntary frana*wor1c of tha 
s t a t e* He effiiwiad t h a t the nat ional arrwy ^o t i l d tm r a t a l s ad 
and wiorganiaad in co-op«ration with the leg i t imate Central 
Govaiwiiant and tdnta ttedt^d nat ions should a c t in the Congo 
thxmiQ^ the «Miidl«?« of independent African States* 
'Fhus* thtt difiairaneaa of opinion a!!»tng tha iiriportant 
ns''h&xm can t ied not emly on th« manner of impleiiiantation 
of the Saeur i ty Co«BMiil raaolitt iona but a l so on t h a i r inlMir* 
p r a t a t i ons and tha p i iposas behind the i n t e i ^ r e t a t i o n s * 
IHirliK; the discussion hcmrst vairiatts t<«prQaeiit«ttv« 
ffixpi»999«1 t h e i r stipport t o the part icni l«r pror i s ions of 
the Secur i ty Councii reiroiutiona r e l a t i n g to the n«i^ t o 
preserve the t e r r i t o r i a i I n t eg r i t y and p o l i t i c a l indepen-
dence of the Congo. !lowever# there was wide divergence of 
opinion on the question of the cor rec tness o? the irnplewan-
t a t i on of t he S a o ' r i t y Council r e so lu t i ons . 
A nuTTtoer of representa t ives supported tii© vsnn p o s i -
t ion and c r i t i c i s e d the 3ecr©tary-<3en©ral and the uni ted 
'Jations comraand fte»r not a s s i s t i n q the Centra l Government 
Of the Congo, a ^ p t i n o h o s t i l e mefasurea aga ins t the l ega l 
Govem'Tient and allowing? oeXgiu-n t o support s t rengthen the 
Sf^cessionist forces . 
On the o ther hand* sonie represen ta t ives f e l t t h a t 
the united M;^tions ac t ion had been e f f ec t ive in ensuring 
tim withdrawl of the Belgian troops* but not i n e l iminat ing 
in te rvent ion in o ther forais. They claimed t h a t the tmitad 
Nations corvnand m v had marte some fiiistakes* p a r t i c u l a r l y 
in not ensuring c lose e»>*€ipe rat ion v l t h tha Central Oovatn* 
ment and i n erronously i n t e rp re t i ng the p r i a e i o l e of iK>n* 
in te rvant ion in i n t e rna l a f f a i r s of the Congo* 
unlilce the USSR reprascmtatlve they enphasised t h a t 
a l l a ss i s tance t o the Congo for i t i l l t a ry purposes should 
be provided through the Uiiltad Notions* t h a t tha tXnitad 
Nations operat ion should be eontinuad* and t h a t the ntaadata 
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o£ tho OkiitAd Nation* Foirese should be e l « a r l y intexpretefd 
-«© A»^-to ^pttimi't iib ico glvft «ff«itIV« pfotee t ion t o the 
c lvi i iaf i ooptilation aqalnat vioXenc©* 
Bcnrnvmr, a larcie nin^bar of reoreaentat ivea enphasisiie«*l 
the need t o u ^ o i a th« au thor i ty of the Tjmt®« Hations in 
the Congo. They condenHiiad th*=> a t tacks acralnst the Secu©-
t a r y - General and expcesaad t h e i r apprecia t ion for h i s 
e f f o r t s t o ifflplemient the Securi ty Counci l ' s rasoluti-^ns. 
On 18 Senten«>or# I960* a draf t reso lu t ion was at]ft>mittad 
by ti¥3 fol^owinf? sevanteen (17) rtember^ ^ ^ Ceylon# Hthlot>ia# 
f'hanat Ouinea# Indonesia* I raq , Jordan, I*ebanon# l»lberia# 
Libya* florocco* Mopal* Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunaia, thn 
United Arab Republic and Yemen. On 20 Septeratoer, the 17 
power t e x t .^^ -as f i r s t voted on in tvK> n a r t a , Thf nera«|raph 
on the orovlai^-n of ass i s tance for t d l i t a r y purposes was 
adopted by a vote -^ f 30 t o 0, with I absent!on« the reniainder 
of the t e x t being approved by 71 votes to d, with 9 absten* 
t i o n s . 1 ^ t e x t as a J^ le was then adopted by 70 votes t o 
2t 
0, with 11 abatentiona, as resolut ion 1474 (ss- iv) 
^^* i'^byiiiffiticps8 Albania, Bulgaria^ By«?iorussia, Csechoslovakia, 
Fmnca, Hunfary, Poiandt# %>m«iia, tSie tjfkraine, union of 
South Africa and tiie TTSSR. 
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fnlly Bvipporting the x««oXiition8 of 14 and 22na 
^^%y and 9 August 1960 of the Security Convieili the 
Aseerriblv rasolu t ion reqtiestar?: 
"the Secretary GeneraX&to continue t o take vigorous 
ac t ion in accordance witn the terms o€ the a fore -
• a i d reisolutiona and t o a s s i s t the Central Govt* 
of the Congo in the rnatorat lon and aalntenance 
of law and order throunh out the t e r r i t o r y of the 
Republic of the Conqo and to safeguard i t » unity* 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l independence 
in the i n t e r e s t s ot i n t e rna t iona l peace and 
Secur i ty . 
••3 Anpealed to a l l Con^leso within the Republic 
of the Congo to seek a speedy so lu t ion by peace* 
ful "^ans of a l l t h e i r i n t e rna l con f l i c t s for 
tho uni ty and infsac^rUt^ of th<? Congo,with the 
aaaistancey as appropriate* of Asian ar»S African 
r'sprssentatl^/'es appointed by the Advisory Coiwni-
t e e on tht» Congo, in consul ta t ion with the Secre-
t a r y "-General, for the purpose of conc i l i a t i on ; 
"4.,Aor>©aled t o _ a l l ?,«n*9er Governments for urgent 
v6lunt i?y coiftrlButions to a uni ted Nations 
Fund for tho Congo to be Insaused under Uliited 
Raticms control and in consul ta t ion with tlie 
c:entral Government for the purpose of rendkiring 
the f u l l e s t poss ib le ass is tance t o achieve the 
o>>JectiV3 -nentloned 5n the preasttolei 
" S . Requested 
*(a) All s t a t e s t o refra in from any act ion which 
might tsmd t o iaipede the r e s to ra t ion of law 
and order and the ejcereise by «ie Govejwwent of 
the Ri^»ublie of the Con^ of i t s au thor i ty and 
a l s o to x«ira:^^^froi^Miy ac t ion which m i ^ t 
^nimmd,^'"^ vmmv^^i^riml intaflwiff m^ 
the 5 | < S i t i ^ ^ a a p e n l ^ l ^ of the nmpi^tie of 
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'*i.h) All Mmitoftr $%•%•• in aceortf«ne« 
nlm^ A3^tle^m 2§ mn€ 49 of iskm Chmrimr 
osrty out thtt 4«ei»t<iiHi of «ti» SiKmriny 
Cottiieii msa to •ff0«tt mxtiMi as«is««ne« 
in cttrtfing ovit nie«si»tts dscidttd %kp»n 
by the Smmutity CounclS.! 
"6. ifitho^t px«jttdie« to th« aoimrtiigii 
ilghta of the Reptablie of tho COIICN»# ( (call«a) vs^om ttll @t«tos to rafrain 
fiotn the diieet end indirreet pit>vi«ioii 
of «rnMi or OfWnmr raaterlaXe of i#ar and 
railitaiY personnel and other aseletenoe 
for miXitery ptsrpoees in the Congo duc^ 
iag the tenoporvry period of lailitary 
asaistanee through the United Mfationa* 
except iQ>on the request of the united 
nations through the Seesetary-<3enerai 
for carryin*' out the purposes of this 
resolution and of the resolutions of 
14 and 22 Jttly and 9 August I960 of the 
Security council*,23 
On 20 Septs'^ tNir I960, the General Assembly decided 
to ad^t the Repul>lie of the Confo (Leopoldvilld) as a 
mssJEwr of the Uiiit»d Hations* Zt referred the <i«wstion 
of i t s lepiesentation to the ezedentials 0»imdttee of 
the AssMibly. 
The aooretaxy-'Oeaersl speaking in the Assent>ly# 
pointed out that the constitutional er i s i s in the Congo 
posed a dilenma for om9C in eoni|»lyin9 with ^le rsquirs-
iisAts of the Oaneral Assembly resolution of 20 S«pto»i»er« 
Ql|tlC*s efforts to maintain an attitude of s tr ic t 
9>« Xitiyi* I9^^« P» ^^^ * i^'f* i99»^> 
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lenpairtlA^ity hai4 led to ££«i<iiiftfit eritieifli% %^lpd^ ««MI 
liil)|l,7 lUi im said* £rc»n the Pzwaidant and Ptijm Mtliiistar 
of tam Congo, nmmvmr* th« Special RepiiBaiitative «« the 
Seez«taryOeiieral# jfud i^ng the whole confused poiit ieal 
sltuatloRy eoneltided that tiie only tuo inatltutlona wlioae 
foundations s t i l l stood i#ere the office of the Chief of 
the state and the Parlia«iant» 
III» /^proval of the use of for2e*- the Security Council 
S\dd8e<|i»nttly# 11© Secretary-General on 8 October, 
asked 'X'shonSse* the p£esi<!tent of t i^ Katanaa provincial 
Goyemraent for his oo»operation in connection with the with* 
drawl of Belgiwi personnel* Be suggested that t^e Katanga 
problem should be resolved in a spir i t of omnciliation and 
unity in the interests of the future of the Congo «md of 
international peacMi* 
On 10 Octe^ ber I960 Guinea svftmltted a draft resolution 
in tlie AsseHft>ly i^ieh was subsequently revised and teplased 
on 28 October by a joint draft resolution ^ponseied by 
Ceylsm* Ghana* <^inea# Zndiai^  Indonesia* Mali^  Hbro«eo and 
the Utoited Arab Republic* 
The lesolution would have the A8sesl>ly de«i4e 
T^BS iWllir UMI MlpJVWItllVlCrviV^*! WV ll i l l i i lSl . WHIPmmWmWw'• 
peiNiing • dseistttn on the mm9% of "liie Cxedentials 
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%«}€• «t«p» to pcemottt aa4 eiumm ttMt 8«entrity of • 
niNitiii^ of th« R«^vl}].lo*i ?arUjBiieafe%24 
HtMB Prooidtint of tim Congo pi!Ot««l»»(3 againot tho 
Propoaal to alioiir aeexodetioa of tha i»|»f«iaeiitativtts of 
'UammtoB*& Gmrmrmmnt^ 
Hha eanarai A9se{id>I,y on 8 HOv«rbQr#19<IO heard an 
addreaa by the Peaaidant of the Congo in lAiieh he aiuioiinead 
a nmf delegatioa headed by himaelf and aalced that Ita era* 
dentlala be examined inrnsdiately* claiminn that tlw Chief 
of State waa tha BX>X& authority entitled to ^aignate 
repreaentativea t»> t^e Asae^ly* Mean%ihiXe« the USSR 
repre»entativ©# o» *• l^ee-^tjer calle^i for a msating of the 
Security Coumsii to conaider# "urgent maaauraa in fiKmneieion 
with the latest eventa in the Cemgo*** Strcmgly oriti«iaing 
once again* the act iv i t ies of ttm Seoretary-*Ceneral and 
his Special Repceaentative# the USSR Oevenimnit eallad 
Y^ pon the Tlnitad Mat! cms to taJoa daciaiva steps to samiva 
the release of Umm^mt other "^iniaters tmA Maatoais of 
Parliamaat ^ o had been detained. He emphasised tha irnpor** 
tanoe of th«i reamnption of the activitiaa of L«Riiinba*a 
lanrfiUl Oovemnant and of the Parliaoant* 
24* Xtllaaa. 3t9«0 , P. €9 
s± 
Ha e«ll«d for ttMi diaamdng of "Mtttmtu's band of torcoriatc*** 
M» ptopoamA ^tm estvl^li^^wii^ « i « <s^ pec'i«i OcRfmlaiiidn of 
Amimtk and African repK«a«ntativtto to invustigate ttMft souccaa 
of finance and &trm to the leaders of the secess ionists and 
to reraov© a l l Belgian troops and o f f i c i a l s from the Congo•* 
Thffi SeeuirltyCouaricil considered the question between 
26 
7 and 13 Tme®rrtomT I960, The attention of nwin*>ers was drawn 
durlnq tlie course of these nieetings to certain developments 
which affected the United Nati(»ie Operations arising specia l ly 
£rom the detenticm of hwmiTdba and h is c»ll©agt©a. Ttm Govwrn-
niant of Ceylon., Gttineo# Indonesia* Morocco* the ttoited Arab 
Rep\iblic and Yu^slavia indicated t l ^ i r intention to with-
draw tha'J^ Tdlitary units and pec^Kmnel fro^^ tiie UnitMsd 
nations Force because of the ir d issat i s fact ion with the po-
l i c i e s followed in inplementing the resolutions of the Seen* 
r i ty Council and the General Assenidly* 
Argentina* Italy* the tJitited King^ kMS and the llnited 
States s«d»aAtted a Joint draft resolution in the Security 
Council* as xevised on 13 Deoeiriser by whidti the Cottmcil %foitld 
dteclars that any violat ion of htman r ights in the Congo was 
inecmsistent with IMilted Nations purposes* They expressed 
the hope of allowing iSm International Coiimittee of the Red« 
Cross to eiiamine detained persons throii0iout the Republic* 
2^» y*Pty* S960» p* t2 
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1fti«y rmq^mmtmA lOie Smcwetrnxy-^SBtrntml to aAtspt a l l mcma^' 
vmtf'mtmvkXWB imfiMng to •afft^aira ecivil and hvwMoi rights 
for a l l poysons «rithin the eovntrst* The USSR jr«px«aeiita«> 
t ive opposad the fous^-powar (Acgentltta* italy« tr*K««aSA) 
draft reaolutlon on the groixnd that i t was intn^idad to 
lead the S a e a r i ^ Council away from the naeaaaary and urgant 
niaasuraa and t^at i t inpliad aoproval of criinaa ctomnitted 
by Mobotu* 
The sponsors of tfv& four^powar draft resolution 
argtied that the General Assent>ly*0 decision on the Congo's 
representation implied that hveaanim could not be oonsiderad 
the PriIne-^Jinister• But as a oit isent/had the right to due 
process of la%f and to humane treatment* The re^resentativas 
of China, Ecuador and France supported the four-power «^raft 
resolution and opposed \3SSR arguments* The represantative 
of Polandf on the otherhand* supported the ITSSR viav* The 
draft resolutions»both of tha USSR and of the '*Four Powaiw" 
were r«ja«%a<* tiy ^w Council* 
On 16 Oeeeinbar* 1960 the Oanaral Assefli>ly resum»d dis» 
cussicm of the s ituation in the Qongo at tha urgent request 
of idm i»prasant«tiv«s of India «fid Yugoslavia. On tha 
sa^ ne day* Csylen« CAianSf Zndia« Snaonesia, iraqt Msn»eeo# 
tha iiiiitad Arab { p u b l i c and Yufoslayia subiilttad a draft 
resolution which was ranrisad on 19 l)acanisiar# By t h i s taict* 
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'*^m As»ttRda»l.y« eonseioiMi of tim nvgmn% 
xwsponsibility of th« tJlAit«a HAtioBS 
in Yimi &£, th»L i§twmt and «MQ»toiw» d»¥«h' 
iopRMiiitui and oon%i.milng aetcurioirat&im 
In Vh» Cot}90# tlici «b»enc« of oifttctive 
Cftiitral tmtliDirity and the hostil® 
att i tude and reaistanee of amed detaohf* 
mant t e the ^itat^ Nations pperatlon« 
tifould consider that the United nations 
must henceforto inaple<iient i t s mandate 
fwlly to prevent breach of peace a«id 
security, to restore and :T!a-*ntain law 
and order and the inv io lab i l i ty of pmr» 
Bons and to tako urgent meesuses to a s s i s t 
the Congolese people in raeetin« the i r 
most p3C®ssing economic n€ieds'*.27 
The draft a l so urged l^e imraediete release of a l l p o l i t i c a l 
prisoners rnider diStftntlor^.^ -nors particularly raeirtoers of 
the Central Goveriwiattt and Parliament, and draw the attention 
of the Belfflan Govexramm to I t s grave r e s x m s i b i l i t i e s in 
disregarding the resolutions of the tMited nations. I t 
deman^d that a l l Belgian i»ilitary# quasi-military personnel, 
advisers and technicians be immediately vithdraim. I t a lso 
decided that a standing delegation appointed by the General 
AssetBbly should function in fu l l eo»operation with the Unitad 
KatioiMi Special Raprssentative in the Congo. Finally* i t 
seooflinMindad that a l l necessary financial and technical a s s i s * 
tance shou d be piovided to the Congo by Maiiber s tates througll 
the united Rations so that such assistance f:ould not be used 
as mn instruiiant for continuing foreign intervention* The 
sponsors and supporters of the eight poiier dsaft sesolution 
37* Xi&dl«# t9i@« P« 7i 
8 
•tmstfttd th«t uxgant action lay th« 0«ii«inil Attamr^Xt 
W9M the need o£ the hour in the f«c» of grmm det«clo« 
rfttion in the aitust ion in the Congo end the thimet of 
c i v i l war. They farther urged e f fect ive functioning of 
the tmitea Nations Fnj-ce in the Congo in acXioi^ aiKJe with 
changed s i tuat ion and argued that th© mandate given to 
the Secretary-General vas a'^equate but nse-^ed to he 
Interoreted more l iberal ly and exCKsrcised more ful iy than 
in the parst. whe 
fhe Secretary-General atat'Ma in reply that 
"he doUbt^d the usefulness o : a wider rnandate or new mamnm, 
though a strengtiBsning of the authority of the tftiited 
Rations representatives in the ir e f forts to work for the 
TTnlte<3 Nations aitas by peaceful and legal nv-»ans would be 
hiohly desirable. The Asse«iably might a l so help by eaqs^res-
sing world c^inion in favour of measures to f a c i l i t a t e a 
return to const i tut ional i ty and national reconcil iation 
28 in the Congo*** The •ecretary-Oeneral pointed out that 
the tuiitf^a Nations action would be more ef fect ive i f the 
personnel for t ^ Congo would be sent through) fitalted Nations 
agencies. 
However* the General Assenl>ly» on 20 Deeeiriber 
rejected the eight<-power draft resolutimi by 43 votes to 
28 « with 37 abstentions* thus the opportunity for provi^Atig 
28. laOEillj,, i9«0, P. 77 
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a miAnln^ftil and ef foet ive leadeirahip tf the Asaanbly 
tn taw- ttHaMpwat of paaee 111 fSWt c^n^ was loat* 
Tha Genarai Aasainbly than aefoptad* wildiout 
objaction* a £a«9l.ation ( lS92(x7) on a proposal by 
Austria whesaby the Asssmbly* '"noting that previotia 
raaoltitiona of the Sacarlty Council and th© Oeneral 
As0ena>ly on the subjact were s t i l l In effact* decidad 
to retain the it@ti on the agenda for the second part of 
tho AsseiobXy'a S^^aalon tjhlch t-?aa schediiled to be held In 
29 
•arch 1961". 
The Secretary- General on 21 Deceinbor 1960, drawinq 
the attention of t to President of the Congo to the dlscms -
s i - ^ in the Assembly* en^hasiaed that# "tlK)\^h a def inite 
decision had not be»en edG^tad# i^ ^ t^ser States had shoim a 
mticong concern about the relationship between tha llnitad 
Nations and the Congolese autdsorities* Hie dismission had 
shovn widesnraad and str9n<| opinion that tha coirraning 
of Parlia'7«ent and the return to damoeratie priiketi«aa mis 
a <nattar of oreat urgfaney* that due proeass of ISM should 
be applied* anA that mi^bmr States should xafrain from 
giving assistance ft>r military pusposes in the Congo*. 
Tha 8acratary«Ganaral a lso astprassed h is eonemm about 
tha dai>alO|»iag eiiril war in tha Congo that would h«ra i t s 
uiiavoidid!»le aff«ots«on i^m pxasaaca of Wim United nations 
mmmmlimmmmmimmmmmmmmmm m i i i w i M — « « i — — m w — nm • i ii n -
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row&m • ThttA h» oemelvuSmA t)ui« '*td«> tiim had eotas 
for th« Pxe»id«nt to uf« h i s InfXusnoe urgontiy for 
i pn^efoX soltttiaii m th« CdA^ Nr*s iit«»m«x ptmx^fm 
mnd to m«7-:e «» «Bie<|iaivoe«l d«€l«rfttiofi a^ftinst izitor-
fer«me« v i t h the tfniimd Nations Force in the parformance 
of i t s tasKs*** 
the SecretarsT'-Oenaral on 1 and 2 Januazy 1961,, 
riXOtBrntm^ to "elgiijoa for ass is t ing in the transi t o£ the 
Congolese troops in Luanda- Urundi and cal led for invne-
diet® and ef fect ive measures by Belgium to prevent 
diroct or indirect assistianca to ndlitazy acti<m by 
Congolese troops, llse representative of Selgium defended 
Belgian action in RugHtida-ilrundi* tmt indicated that 
Belgltim did not intend to any new trans i t of Congolese 
troops* 
The represantative of the T^ 3R on 7 January 1961, 
tm<^mmtm4 a nieetin^ of the Security Coimeil, claiming 
that a serious threat to peace and security had arisan 
as a rasttlt of fresAi acts of BA>lgi«ri iKKTvassion against 
the Congo and the flagrant violat ion of the international 
status of the Trust Territory of Huanda tdiundi. Oa 12 
January* he coiwmmicated a statesiaat of h i s Gov^nMiant 
that Belgium Should be deprived of a l l r ights and powers 
with rsspaet to Ru«tida»Uruiidi and l^at the Hsrritoi^ 
should ba graiilwd iiiiMi'diate iadapandenca* The S««iivity 
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e^oiietl dli«eusii«a th« tiMittwr b«%if»«ii ],2 ana 14 J«iniaiy« 
Thm 3Wip**s*«iit«ti'9'® of Bel^itm ana th« Congo (XAqpoldvill®) 
wmf invited at thair req«K»«t« to participate) in td)e 
Coiiiieii*a aellboratiomi. 
Cftyl4»a# I*iboria and the T i^ta<9 Arab Hapiiblic 
9id»i^tted a dr^ f^t zesolution whar^iy CoimeiX callad upon # 
•* B&lqinrjt, as the Administering i^thortty of the Trust 
Territory of r^uanda-Urondit ini nediatesiy to cease a l l 
action acfainat the H@pui>lic of the Congo and to obser^m 
s t r i c t l y i t s international obligationsi 
(2> Further cal led t^on Belgit»n fco withdraw Immediately 
from the Conqo a l l Belgian ndlitary and para~'nllitary 
o^rsonnel* advisers and technicians! 
(3) recoTOnend l^at the General Assembly cwnsjder the 
action ta1<»n by Belgium as a violat ion of the tnisteashlp 
. 30 
agtttemwat". 
Howavar* sevai:«tl othar rnanibars of the Council 
considaxtad the aecmsatiiNis a ^ i a s t •a lg ivn aa wiio^mdad 
or axaggaratadt mnA aiQ»i«ssad aatiafaetioii i«ith Belgian 
assuraneaa* Vftm raptvaantativa of Congo (fiaopoldrJlla) 
claifMid that idm tiatioaal Amqf'a intairvaiitiafi against 
rebel aoldiers in tsikavu was ai i t i taly Juattfiad and that 
the Soviet ifnion** oanolaint was i n v a l i d The thf»»»poif«r 
S8 
dirtift x«solution was not adoptikl bceause It x«<M»iv«a 
tml.^ 4 yotptf in favour* O against* and 7 abatantions. 
The Pr^al^snt of tha Congo* on his part* ncigad 
the xecall of the Special Rapz«aentative# Rajeswar Dayal« 
bla-nino! him for oertlallty* Tt^ Secr^atary-Genoral^hovrnvar* 
did not acced© to the demand* On 19 and 23 Jimuarjr* the 
Secretary-General and his Special i^ epresentative urged 
fcl»e authorities in Stanlevllle and Bukavu to and arbitrary 
restrictions iwposed on the f tee -novement of foi»ign nationals* 
to prevent the Any laiits from interferlnq in the protective 
functions o€ the United Nations Force and to ensure order 
in the areas under thalr control. Within the next few days* 
tim Security-Council received three requests for conside-
ratinn of matters relating to the Con^# On 26 January* the 
representatives of Cmylon* Ghana, Guin(»a« Mali* Morocco* 
the united Arab Republic and Yugoslavia (subsequently joinad 
by Libya) strongly protested aqainst the treatment of Itmmi^m 
and his eolleaques and raquasted that the Council should 
meat to consider the recent develoi^iants in the Congo* 
Ttm representative of the USSR, on 30 Januacy* aoleed 
the Council to consider alleged new acts of agqxessian by 
Belgium. The Security Council met on 1 Fabxuaiy 1961 in 
rasponse ^ these requests. IRia representatives of Belglwn* 
Congo (taopoldville) t Ghana* Guinea* Xndia« Indonasiat i»ftbya« 
Mali* Morocco* Poland and Yugoslwrla K»ra invittd at i^ tair 
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nqtMti»t t o p a t t l c i p a t e in the Counci l ' s dolibairtttlons. 
Tha 8««sitrlty Council HidT a mxirnber &i otitiejr aomiflMnlyi 
b«for« i t on th« Congo s i t u a t i o n . i:tie8e IncluAodi 
"(a) Sevieral not«« by the jfepiwa^ntatlva of Be}.gl«ni 
complainlnq agains t a l leged i l l t reatment o£ Belgian 
na t iona l s in Orientals ana Klvu p3COViiKes# and the de-
ten t ion in S tan leyvi l le of e igh t Belgian so ld ie r s who 
had s t rayed by ndstaKe i n t o Congolaae t e r r i t o r y from 
uuanda»llrundi on 13 January#and request ing tUnited Na-
t ions action? tb) a l e t t e r of 21 January from the Secre-
t a ry -General to the represent?,tlvo of Belgium re fe r r ing 
t o reiwrta of neao t ia t ions on the fortier Bp»lglan mi l i t a ry 
bases in the Congo and ina?catinf? t h a t the bases o r war 
mater ia ls s tored t±iter^in could ntst be t ransfer red t o the 
Mmst*. MUm^l^, <=gnqg,^^te.,„^^^thout the anproval of the 
Security ^'ouncllf (c) a report of 26 Januar^/ by the Secra-
tary-c?eneral point ing out that* despi te h i s appeals t o 
Oc»imrm«9nts which had announced t h e i r in ten t ion t o witli-
drm>9 f ro^ the united Nations Force, Yugoslav members 
had withdratm and t h a t the wlthdrawl of the Guinean 
c o n t i n e n t was in progzeas« vh i le Indonesia* T^IOCGO 
and the tmited Anto RepDft»lic had no t i f i ed t h e i r de f in i t e 
decision to ii^ithdratf; (d) a l « t t e r s of 28 January from 
the Pfiasidant of the Congo asking the Seeretacy aens ra l for 
m i l i t a r y assistat ice t o suibdue the a u t h o r i t i e s in S tanley-
v i l l e and Hisiiavwt and s t a t i n g t h a t un less ass i s tanea was 
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^txnfi$»d hf the Uhited si«tion9* h i s Gov eftUMiit wcntid b« 
eongMilliid t o »e«k i t elMnitiertt d^aaplte tlie Aangwr of t ^ 
oonfXiet becomincf intexftationalf (e) a message of 1 ftto^ 
raaiy from Tshonft>d expr»8«iiig astonishment a t the eoneezin 
sbO«m by t h e trnitwd nat ions in x«;ciard t o hamjsttoa and flec-
lairAfifi that# for thff tima beinqir the re would be no eont a c t 
between itti-m.t'nhs and t\m o t t t e l ' ^ tr»rldr an^ (f) a cable of 
7. li'c'bniary fr->m the Pres ident of Confio t o the President 
of tfe? i^c t i r i ty Council reqtiestinq the reca l anff r eo lace-
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rnent of Anfcasoadoff Dayal", 
On t February 1961, in a statoment t o thfs ^ c u r i t ^ 
Cotmoil* tho Secretary-General pointed t o the grave s i t u a -
t i o n crea ted b / the continued divis ions within the Congo 
and dialntegrati-^n of the Fotre publique* foreign i n t e r -
ference, jceductions in tho United Kationa I'orce and th« 
increaainf? p o s s i b i l i t y of c i v i l war. Jte f e l t s ** the 
organisa t ion st»:>uld reasses i t s pol icy in the l i g h t of 
ejjperJence and consider the d e s i r a b i l i t y of more f a r -
reae^'ng measuras* He thought t ha t a fundamantal chanQK» 
in the s i t u a t i o n could be brought 4iibout if# with the eo-» 
operat ion of tfie leaders concerned* the ar t^iy ware swt^ena^ 
t© i t s proper role outs ide p o l i t i c s and were devoted t o 
ilNl mm xworgantatfttiofi in order t o becexae an •ffeetliNi 
nftl^owil iiistfi|!i»iit ^Mider tl»e control of a f^oMitioiiing 
± 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ^overiKiMHittt He indicated t h a t he nfcmXd 
iMii«e»fae a Counilll 6mei:9ton txt^pAatlng him urgNtntXy t o 
take appropr ia te iwtasuies fo r aaaiatanee in sueh a £««> 
organiza t ion" . 
At the Coiaacil** nwretinge of !# 2 and 7 F«^rtiary» 
the representativies of Ceylon* oolnea^ India# Indonesia* 
Libya* Mali, Morocco* the U3SR, the United Arab Republic 
and Yugoslavia ca l l ed for urqent rnoasured t o secure the 
re lease of lAimuntoa and h i s colbleagues* the reconvening of 
tha ParliaTjent* and the t^rithdrawl of Belgian and fosiaign 
mi l i t a ry and oara-Tii l i tary personnel and advisers• Some 
of tiyem sugiested the disarming and diaba-ding of forces 
under ^lobntit. Tiys r epresenta t ive of the Congo (Ijeopoldville) 
claiffle<1 t h a t the proposals of the above menticmed represen-
t a t i v e s cons t i tu t ed Intervent ion in the Congo's i n t e r n a l 
a f fa i r s* 
The Council adjourned on 7 P«*mary t o provide time 
for consu l ta t ions vrith Govemments and among repressf t ta t ives . 
In the meantime* between 6 and 12 February* the Cowicil 
f«eeiv«d coiirmnications from tYm r epresen ta t ives of the 
Central African Republic* Congo (Brasssaville)* nwh^rmft Gabon 
and MMagasear requesting postpone-nent of discussion i n 
order t o permit o ther African S ta tes t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the 
Couneii** debate* 
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After t ^ annotiiieeiw»nt of the pxovtnclml OpvecHKioeiit 
of Katanga i n Jmnmwf 1961 t h a t Pstxriee Lmmmhm and h i s 
collaantiaa* Joseph Okits and Maurice Pt^lo had eaeiqp»ed 
£xx>m detention* some representa t ives ccrninimicated t h e i r 
grave concern t o the Secre to iy- General . Honevert the 
Katanga a u t h o r i t i e s i»j|««te<^ the Secretary-«<Jeneral*s requests 
for eo-<^perat^on in e f f o r t s t o e l i c i t the re levant f ac t s 
rseqardinq the a l l raged escape, Tho USSR, on 11 February, 
urqe<^ an urgent closed . ^e t inq of the Secur i ty Council t o 
discuss the s i t u a t i o n , !>ut no m?etlng#wa3 arranged u n t i l two 
days l a t e r . Th<^ iCatanna ^vemnient on 13 Fsiaruary announcild 
t h a t Pa t r i ce Lurauiriba and h i s colleagues had been k i l l e d on 
the t5it2Vlous dFiy by c e r t a i n v i l l a g e r s and refused to d i s -
close the name of tiie v i l l a g e or give any o ther infoiwation. 
Mean\4ttile« tlwa Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
rer>orted ^ a t "a ser ious c i v i l war s i t u a t i o n was developing 
i n Katayaga provlnc** iirtiere tlw» a u ^ o r i t i e a u n i l a t e r a l l y ab-
c«»9atad t h e i r agjBwsmeiit of 17 October I960 with the United 
Nations t«5 s e t up a n e u t r a l xoim in northern Katanga on the 
grounds t h a t omc had f a i l ed to discharge i t s obl iga t ions 
32 
and allowttd troops from Stan leyvi l le to penet ra te the a r e a , " 
3a. Y>ll>»««i960>P. 81 
(llhasa tmitm hadt according t o omic, antarsd the region 
t^ffough areas held l»y the Katanga gendaxiiMirie*) 
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v#h©n the Sectirity Council wmt again on 13 Febfuarf* 
tli« S«eretary - General a u g ^ s t e d tiimt *the t r a g i c develop* 
ment concerning Lumuntsa deaerv^t^ a fu l l and impart ia l 
i n t e rna t i ona l inveatigation*» The Secur i ty Council ad-
journed for two days aft«»r several rep ^ s e n t e t i v c a had 
expressed the^ r shock o r indignation a t the nm^m IDuring 
the next few davs, tSV2 cottncil received a nwEtoer of coinmKi-
n ica t ions from ^feraber S ta t e s including Brs?5il# Bu3.oaria, 
Byelorussian SS"i, Cvtbti, Caechoslavakia, ^thiotjia, Guinea, 
:iaiti# Liberia* nali# ltoroceo# Hor*jay# 'Poland* noTiania, 
SOTialia, cudan# 'Poc«o# 'r'uniaia, TJkralnlan s>% tisSR, xitmmr 
Volta, Vanezusla and Yufroslavla, Iftooe ^*5^3^gos aandemned 
th*» a^aanslnat icn; t«^iln s<^veral of thf» co-rrainlcations 
criticis«3d th'? role of tim Secretary-General in t h i s connexion. 
f%li expressed d i s t r u s t In the Secretary-General* 
whilf* Cuba and Guinea c a l l e d for h i s resignation* The 
VISSR Government* in a statement of 14 February* ca l l ed for 
the dismissal of Pag Hamrnarslcjold from the post of the 
Secretary-General, immediate removal of a l l Belgian t roops 
and 'seraonnel from the Congo* and the disctmtimiance of the 
tMited na t ions operat ions in the Congo within a raon^* I t 
aloe annotmeed t h a t i t would not recognise*- Hatmarskjold 
as Se«retarf*General nor maintain any re la t icms with hiait 
But several o ther s t a t e s l i ke USA and tnc while mmnimtming 
thm assassinat ion* eaq^rssvsd oomfidanee in the S««f»tafy<» 
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oatfUN^l ma& iitvessed the importancse of the eontimiation 
of the T*iit«d l^ations OpsrstiOR In tlie Cowcro. 
file Securi ty Council » t i t s imMitings bettwen 
15 and 20 February eontinued conaidarat ion of the question* 
At the meeting of 15 Fet>jniacyf the irepresentatitm of 
the United state® c r i t i c i a « d the tJSoR otatenisnt as an 
attiwik on the f^tfiitasd t^ations, lie claime ? t h a t the i^^an* 
donraent of the trnited Nations ooeration would lead t o 
chaos and c i v i l war in tiio Congo. Hn opposed a l l d i r e c t 
foreign - d l i t a r y aid t o the Conqo, iuaking p a r t i c u l a r 
reference t o the USsa, Tae iJecretaxy-'General# on IS Feb-
ruary* nsplying t o ttm accusat ions :iiade by UC3R said in 
the Council meetinq t<iat he t'liinted t i » re levant fac t s 
as t o witen and aow tim cepresentabives of hhe tftiited 
Nations had n>t used a l l ttie nwans put a t t h e i r disposal 
i n accordance with the taidates given by the Securi ty 
Council arvifl 'he n^rneral Assemdaly* He refused tso res ign 
^ s p i t e the withdrawl of the confidence of a oenwBmit 
laantoer. However, he stiogaated an inlal^mational invas t i^a* 
t ion in the circumstances surrounding the assass ina t ion 
of Pa t r i ce l<umy»i>a« He indicated t h a t i n s t ruc t ions had 
alfead^ been given t o tim Force to prolsect the c i v i l i a n 
pcHnilation aga ins t a t t a cks ftom afsisd u n i t s moA o a l l « l 
for an endorsssHMtit of tihisse nsMums mnA i o r Wm pwovl^ 
• ton of ^ le mssitSff su0i • • ^ i i l A f y eontingMitii *^ 
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- - -S^e mim!»Mmntmti,m» of Qkin«« ChiXe« Keaa 
Tuiluiy and the l7nit«(S MnqOom «)epr»Mi«d stqppoirt for ttui 
Secreta£y-»Geitei:«l and for the iwsntinuatlon of th« tiiiit«d 
Nations Operation. Th© reprasentative of France eondenuaed 
«wi attacks ©qa^nst the Sacratary •• Gen«ral« The repre-
sentative! of Bel<|iuffi deftiad any involveaent Isy hia Govern-
ment in th« asaasinati'^n o<: lAifauirija* Moat of the repraaen-
tat ivas l«*nt their sijpport to Sacretary^^eneral and cal led 
for an impartial inquiry into the niurder of lAimumba and 
h i s <x>llea<|ttes« 
On 17 February 1961 # Ceylon» Mberta and th© Tlnitad 
Arab Repitolic jo int ly submitted a draft resolution in the 
Security Council* The Council adjourned on 1? February to 
await the publication of two massagea sent by the ct^ncilia* 
tion Co nmission to the Advisoxy C^nmittee on the Congo* 
These i«ere circulated the neset day* ttie na^agea contained 
certain concluaimis on the situation in the Con^ and oon^ 
damnation of the e v i l pxactiea of xwaortinq to v io lent means 
to eliiKlnate p o l i t i c a l opponents* In i t s covering note* 
the Advisory Cemnittea stated: "i t had not eonsidaxed the 
conclusions contained in the msssages and lOtat they should 
not be taken as the view <9>f the Oovensnenta repxesented on 
Idle Caimittea'** Qi 18 fiibjniacy* the Cotmcil a lso rsceivad 
• ett»%m §wm tlia PiasidMMi ef Ghana containing several 
p^smwMiia fo# ttha 0Bi]><iiti<!m o£^tiha pxds^ iiMSi*, 
t.« o 
i«i«n th« Council mut Again on 20 PobnMi£y# i t 
«M9 infoxmed toy tho s«M!r9t«ry General that s i x p o l i t i c a l 
l o a ^ r s is^rlaonea in i4iopoiaville»inel%iain<? Mr* Finant* 
Pcasident of the pxov^ineial govexnment of Oxioatale 
province, had been deixsrtea to Bank$iranga« the Capital of 
the so ca l l ed **Ktal rainier'' of South '^aai$ aad their 
stibse(:|t»<«nt exacutir n in Bakwanga had bean eonfifmed* 
Furthormore a «un45©r of prorrdnent leader© had bean arraatad 
in ii«ot>oldvHle and elaswhate. The Secretary-General and 
90^>«ral reprasentativea es^iressod the ir shock at the newa* 
on 21 Pebr«ary# the Special "^oresontative of tho Secratary 
fSeneral asked the authorit ies in Baltwanga for Information 
concerning the fat© of several other prisoners <Mhose t r a m -
fer to Bakvranga had toy then become knovn. c^ 20 Fdbraary 
196it Ceylont Idberia and the united hrtSb Hepublie proposed 
a second draft resolution in the Council on the question 
of arxestst dsfiortations and assassinations and asked that 
i t be ao(K»rdNid priority in voting* After some discussion* 
the notion for priority was put to tdh» vote and not adoplMitf* 
having received 4 m t a s in favour and 7 absentiona. As to 
the f i r s t three-pOMer draft resolution of 17 Februafy# tha 
representatives of the tJHited Staties# ^Kk«y« aiina« the 
United Kingdom and Chile e3Q>ressed support dsspita z«ser<» 
vatiens about oertain of i t s aspects* 
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*S»Mi S«cuKlW ^wavstt juaqptiid the «hxee potver 
j o i n t d r a f t xv»3ol%ition preit«tnte<9 by C«ylon# Liberia and 
33 
the UAR on 21 Febrtiary 1*?61« 
Pat^ A o£ th© resolut ion urged ' 
" l . t h a t th« tJjftlted Nations tak« irniMidiately 
a l l appropriate measureg to orevant the 
occurance of c i v i l war in the Congo, inc lu -
ding arrangements for cease-f i res* th© haltinc? 
of a l l mi l i t a ry opera t ions , then re ten t ion of 
e lashea , anr? th« it©e of fovce, if nftcessary, 
i n the l a s t r eeo r t i 
"a* TJrget^  t hn t measures be ta"H®n for the 
tfnmadiate withdrawl and evacuation ':rom the 
Congo of a l l Belnian and other foreign 
m i l i t a r y ana para-rol l l tary personnal and 
p o l i t i c a l advise JE^  not undar th© tJnited 
ffationa conffi^nsi, andf rnsrcenariesj 
••Sw Call/upon a l l S ta tes t o take inetmdiats 
and energet ic tueaaurea t o prevent the 
depar ture of such peraofinal for the Congo 
from t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a s t and for the d«>iiial 
of t r a n s i t end otilier f a c i l i t i e s t o them; 
*'4»D«eld«d t h a t an immediate and impar t ia l 
inves t iga t ion be held in o f ^ r t o ascer ta in 
the eiyeiuMitaiices of the death of ^.l^vRumbe 
ana h i s colleagues and t h a t the pe ipe t r a to r s 
of these erisies be punishadi 
"S . fieaffinaed the Security Council r ^ o l u -
t i o n s of 14 iT^ly, 22 July and 9 August I960 
and the General Asseintoly reso lu t ion 1474 
(FS-XV) of 20 Septenft>er I960 and reigned a l l 
S t a t e s of t h e i r o b l i g a t i n under these reso-
lut ions** 
3St V4 t t2 
o 8 
In p a r t Bi« tha reeolut ion uvgo^t 
**!.» th« csonvaning of the Parliament and 
th« talcing of naeesaary nsotaet ive maa-
sures in t h a t oonnexioiif 
*2« Urgea t h a t Congolese armed vinita and 
loersonnel should be re<»organiz«d and 
brought tmder d i so ip l i ne and exmttolt 
and arrangements be made on i n p a r t i a l 
and equi table baaea to t h e t end amd 
with a view to the el iminat ion of any 
p o s s i b i l i t y of intArfeceiKre by such 
u n i t s and personnel in th^^i^political 
l i f e of th© Congoj 
•*3« Calla ut>on a l l s t a t e s to extend t h i e r 
f u f co-operation and ass i s tance anr* take 
such measures as •nay be necessary on t h e i r 
par t* for the iraplementation of t h i s 
£effolution*'«l4 
The Secrstacy-General welcomed the resolut ion as 
giving a s t ronger and c l e a r e r frame-woric for tdia United 
Nations aeticHi thvtMjh not providing a wider legal bas i s* 
This reso lu t ion reoognieed for the f i r s t time* altibough 
a f t ^ r inord ina te aelay# the necess i ty fo r the use of fofce^ 
35 
as a l a s t r e s o r t t o pnevent e i v i l war. The G«iieral 
Assembly^ resumino ilui f i f t een th sessioni, on 7 March 1961« 
had before i t four d r a f t resolut ions by d i f fe ren t tmittrnv 
on the s i t u a t i o d in the Congo. 
34. y«W*£.,19«0,Pl». 104- 10$, S/4722 
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On 3.5 ApxlX 1961, the hammxftoly vote<l on the 
four dsmft xooolutionft boforo i t* the 21 ponnr dfftft 
rettoiutlon sponsovea l>^ Buxnia* Cairboaia* GsyloA* ^thopia* 
the £'ed«ration of Malaya# Qh€Aa« Guinea* India* Xnaoneaia* 
Iraq* Liberia* Libya* Mali* Hbcocco* ^pa l* 3«a<fi Arabia* 
Sudan* Togo* the United Arab Reptjtblio*Yeif^n and Yux^oalavia 
was adopte^^ with aomsi a nendtients as r^fsolutlon 1559 (TCV) , 
Th© luaaolution aaked tim ''^-twetwrnn" of B«l<|ian to comply 
ful ly and ororaptly with tha wi l l of the Security Council 
and the f onoral AssRinbly. I t raquestcd al"" States to 
extend the ir co-or>Qr«ttion for the i!»le?nentation of the 
36 
resolutions* 
The second resolution* proposed by 17 ^ieBtoera*^!^,, 
Buzraa. C^ad* Ethiopia* the Federation o£ %laya* Iran* 
Japan* Liberia* Libya* !ligex:la* Pakistan* the miilippines 
Senegal * Somalia, Sudan* Tuniaia* Turlcey and t^per ^olta* 
37 
%#a« adopted aa a n^ole as resolution i600(x\r}« I t asked 
the Congolese authorities to des is t from att«nptiner a 
militacy solution to the ir problems and urged for ifimadiate 
release of a l l tmttmrs of i^arliament* provincial asse!!i>lies 
mn4k a l l other p o l i t i c a l leaders vender detention* I t urqped 
the eonveAinq of t^ie P»rlteiiient inmsdistely* with a safe 
*»• y*««lt. 1960* PP» f$«.9« 
IDO 
eoekluet an<$ security extended to i t s msnbers by th« 
United nations* Further the zesoiution reeomfoeaaed 
the appointment of a cotwnissi^^n of csoneiliation to 
a s s i s t the Congolese leaders to achie'sm reconcil iation 
and to end the tx>litlcal c r i s i s . I t fins"! Iv urqe-^  the 
Congolese atithorlti^^s to co-operat4irc fu l ly in the Im-
ple7»nt,ation ^f theresolutlons of the Security Council 
38 
and the General Ansen^ly* 
39 
Thft third draft resolution ororxjsed by IKJSR was 
40 
rsjeotea by a rol l c a l l vote of 53 to 29 with If abstentions 
The fourth di^ft resolution sidcimitted by four pomirm 
e»g« C«ylon» Ghana#India and f'5otocco#concemln<j the comitd*-
sten of 5 nvestigatlon# the circumstances leadlnq to the 
death of LumuTtoa and h i s colleaoues, was adopted as resolu-
3»»JCa5l*S« i^60# i'- ^6 
39* »y the third draft resolution, proposed by the WSSRt 
the Asseniily wouldt* (1) declare that no acticms le^^ding 
to a y io lat lon of the WnltapSUpolJtical indepMidencMi mnd 
t err i tor ia l integri l^ of the Congo could be uiclmmm allowed t 
(2) Deam i t necessary that the Parliafnent should restma 
i t s ifOffc not later than 21 days asfmr afl^r the adoption 
of t l i i s textf and (3) re<3Uftst the United l^ations conHMind 
to ensaxe the safety of the nwribers of Parliaaisnt. * 
*^* *lMtfceinina« Carnbodla« Camsrowit central Affican Republic 
ChaiitiXMiiiniean liap«d>lic# Peda»ition of Ailaya* 
7inland#Xr«n 
PakiataAf !••»»« Mberia* nepalt iifi^mH9k , i9tmm§mh 
Bommnm,'Pog& # T m i s l * . (lASaS«l9«0p p« tOfI 
10. 
t i on 1601 (XV) byji a jcoll c a l l vote of 45 vtJtea t o 3# 
41 
with 49 abatentlona b:^  the G«nsraX Assambly cm IS ^ril 
42 
1961, 
I t requested thft Com-alasion of inVfBtlqatlon to 
proceed as ea r ly as ooss ib le to carryout t^e task ent rus ted 
to i t . Tt^ co':tinlss4oii was t o include four oeiw^ns nomi-
nated by the overnmenta of Burraa# fSthloola* Mexico and 
43 
Togo, 
In the tneantirnQf the Secretary-'<3eneral Hammarskjold 
accepted the inv i t a t ion of the Prlrm Minister Adoula to 
v i s i t the Congo and a r r ived a t Leop-'ldville on 13 Gootnntoer 
1961 t o negot ia te oersonal ly . Me offered to meet tirith 
Tahoretoe* the leader of Katttnqa a t Ndole, northern Rhodesia, 
t o find peaceful ways of resolvin*'' the tsr-^sent c o n f l i c t 
and to open the way t o a solutfr^n of the Katanga orobleia» 
Tim explorat ion of Haimtiarskjold ended in a crash of t l ^ 
a i r c r a f t on 17 Septetiaer 1961, which led t o h i s death t o -
gether with h i s wiiole party* U-thant t o k over as the Acting 
Secretary-General a f t e r the death of Hanwaarskjold. 
41 , MeHber s t a t e s eJ&stainlna included^ Belniu-^fChina*France, 
Japan, Pakistan, imion of South Africa, tiSSR, tlinited 
Kingdom, United S t a t e s . (y«U>tl. 1960, PP 107-108) 
42. IaJIi». 1960,P, 96 
43 • 2 fe l^ 
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The secur i ty Council met again on 13 Hovamber 
1961 t o eonaldsr tho a l t ua t i on in the Congo* Aftar a 
lon<gf dNebattt a thraa^Powar (CayXon # Liber ia and the 
TJnitad ArsT iepiiblic) d r a f t r~solution v/as adopted on 
44 45 
24 Hnvantoer 196l» by 9 votea t o 0 with 2 abstentions • 
AccosxSincT to the reso lu t ion i 
*Tho secur i ty Council , Recalling i t s 
reso lu t ions S/4387, S/4405# S/4426 
and S/4741, 
"Recal'^lng fur ther General As»«inbly 
reso ln t ions 1474 (RS-.IV), 1592 (XV), 
1S$9(XV), 160T (XV) end 1601(KV). 
"ReaffIrTiinq the p o l i c i e s and purrxisea 
of the United Nations with respect t o 
the Congo (Leonoldville) as s e t out in 
the aforesaid resolntiona* narielyi 
"(a) "Po timintain the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e -
q r i t y and the p o l i t i c a l Independence of 
the Republic of the Congor 
*(b) To a a a l s t the Central Government of 
the Ccmgo in the res to ra t ion and rnainte* 
nance of law and order; 
"(c) to psevant the oceurance of Civ i l 
war in the Congo; 
"(d) To saeuina the inmediate withdrawl and 
evacuation ffzom the Congo of a l l foraign 
la i i i t acyvpara^ id l i ta ry and advisory parson* 
n a i not imiar ^m United Nations eomnand* 
and a l l mftreanarias; and 
"(«) 90 ran^r technical assistance »••••* 
mmmmmmmttmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm n mimiriii i m • — — » • > — — — — i ^ 
44. S/9002, XlMtJS[»»^ ^^ «^ ^» ^ ^ 
4S* Franca and the ^ itai Kingaem 
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''Reeo^niofng tii« Go^fiiiNiiit of id*® 
Rttpud^ilc of ttm Congo B» «aiciu«iv«I:f 
f««|M>f}slbl« for the eonduet of ttis 
ex t e rna l a f f a i r s of the <kmQO» 
"(SO) Vft^m a l l ^ndber Sta tes t o l^nd 
t h e i r mai^pottt aceoraing t o t h e i r 
na t iona l procedures* to the Centra l 
Government of t he R«py»llc of the "^ngot 
in conformity w.^th the Charter and the 
aec is ions of the United nat ional 
* ( l l ) fteq««s8t a l l Matflaer s t a t e s t o re f ra in 
from any act ion which m«y d i r e c t l y o r 
i n d i r e c t l y impede the po l i c i e s and pur-
poses of the tftiited Nations in the Congo 
and i s contrary t o i t s decisions end-g 
th««* <j«an©ral purpose r>f the Char ter" . 
i*h«St t h i s resolut ion authorised the t>se of force 
t o el iminate mercenaries and o ther foreign persoimel not 
47 
tinder tftiited Nations CoTtwiand, This r e su l t ed in more 
e f fec t ive tTnited Nations peaee*keeping ac t ion in t^ie Con<|o# 
as has been diactisimd in the next Chapter* 
<e} ?9tiU9yi %%ym\ ^r ^:.Timw. st§tffiff» 
Vim pracs4ding Chapter has shotMn MSoytsers took 
d i f f e ren t o r even opposing pos i t ions on various prOblsm 
t h a t arose r e l a t ing t o the Congo e?»8e« From the bsgiiming 
of tdie dise\uisions in the SecurityCouneil and the General 
As8efflj»ly» there was a divergence of vie«#s. In the iiords 
of ittHi H*G* Nieliolass 
•I Ill Willi I L I — ri •wi«»widNw»wiwi»«i»ww»»MM»««»ii»M« 1 II mil mil n 
4^* IftSlfi** l ^ l t PP <^ C>«81 
47, iii»afnMHi*« m Bm id* (!«••}» P* i i» 
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"As every mi debate fiom tbft Jtiiy 13 (i96a> 
seeur i ty CouneiX rneetlnci i l ^ r d ahowad* the gravest 
differences of oplfiion *«tlsted among Wtember Sta tes as 
t o what '<lnd of settl«^ment# what Tdna of Congo lndee<1, 
should be alrrr»a at,,,,,,... <!•'fferences, ntoireover#not mezely 
between the Soviet block and tJie ifest but a l so within 
the 3ie8t# within the Afi:o«»/4sian group# and even within 
48 
tne ranks of the Africans themselves". 
Thus, China, F anco^ and U.K. abs ta 'nea in the 
f i r s t r e so lu t ion (sTXJn3ore<l by "IHmisia) of the Securi ty 
Council* aaootea on 14 Ju ly I960. It i la resolution* h-^w-
ever# authorised the Secretary^-Ceneral # HaowTarsKjold-* 
t o taKe necessary s t eps in CK>nsultahion with the Republic 
50 
of tho Conrro. , , ," 
The U3sn on 'ts side, condemned from the very begin-
ning, Belgiara for its 'arined intervention* in the Congo 
and lai<1 stress on the immediate withdrawl of all Belgian 
51 
troops trorfi the Congo* The tiSSR delegate eviBn threatened 
48* Nicholas* G, Herbert* United Nations Peace Force And 
the chanqing Globe; The lessons of Sues taiA Congo*P«408i 
(i«aters«%7 Tlw. .ffl^ 4tal ftUfflR^ ^^ ntf ^m^nVOfi A<!m||||f* 
49« The iKiolutiavi was passed by 8 votes to 0*.^ ith 3 abs-
tentiens (China* France* and tl*K, as resciuticm S/4387 
SO* Clmtmm 2* S/C Resolution of 14 J^ly*19«0 
SI* s/c*« discussions of I3»I4 %ruly 19#d 
to M«i» t the Congolese Oovmmmnt a i fwet ly . Thl* wa» 
52 
«Sf»p&(Mid by the United S t a t e s cep iesen ta t lve . 
f«>reover« the x«»oiiition (sponaosttd by c«yion ena 
Tunisia) passed by the Sectsrlty Council on 22 July 1960, 
r«H3uaste<3 al^ Sta tes " to r e f ra in from any acti-^n t^ilch 
m l ^ t tend t o ltupe<3te th«=* ijestoj-atlon of le-^ ^ end order 
and •#«•!»»•«>«••««»•)•••««•««««•••••• 
a lao t o re f ra in from any act ion tihich minht undermine the 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and the p l i t l c a l Indeoendenc© of the 
53 Repttollc o£ the Congo", 
The resolut ion n£ 22 July and 9 Aucjust of 1960# fhich 
e s s e n t i a l l y rp»affirmed the Force ' s o r i g i n a l mandate «©re 
passed by the Security Council* Fjrance and China absta ining 
on both* Br i ta in on one. Tl'iese reso lu t ions represented 
54 
votes of confidence in HaniraarsHjold*s approach t o idwi problem. •* 
Most s igni f icant ly* the Soviet Union puft>liely broke 
with the S«cretarsM3eneral a t a moetinq i t ca l l ed on 14 
55 
SeptentMir t9 i0 • liater* ttm Soviet iftiion a lao appllad ve to 
on the j o i n t d ra f t r eso lu t ion of Ceylon and Tunisia which 
led t o the c a l l i n g of an entergency Special session of tha 
52« S/C*s discussions of 14-22 July I960 
53« Clcuaa a»S*C*« Resolution of 22 July , I960(X)t|2Aii*S960#p»97) 
S/4405 
54* CftiMiNlfi«,j««kf ^united Natlona ^ a e e keeping i i ( t lTl t laa*A 
«Mia m^m^ in Osfsniiifttional task Siq^iisioii»P«3<l|.i¥ha 
10 u 
a«iiftr«l Assembly pf 17 Qepteaimr 196a« Ixi th&« n»etitwtr 
both tiSA «ad USSR e r i t i e i s e d each oth«tr*« po l i c i e s towsrdls 
CongOv "^hs ensuing General Aaa^Hbly session included 
Khrushchev's famvm t i r a d e aaa ins t the Secretary'-Oeneral 
S6 
and h i s Cftll for an United Nations execut ive , *troiks4 
I t was nr>t accepted by th© laj '-rl ty rrendsera s t a t e s , i'he 
hastmhly paasc'd a reso lu t ion on 20 Septe-iaer 1960 by 70 
57 
votes t o 0 , with 11 abstent ions , ninr? v^ere from the 
Soviet b loc , vi2i«^, Albania, Bulgaria, CaechoslovRklSt 
H\ingary# t^olan-?* ncraania, the TJkrain©# tho tSiSR end^JyaX^jcis 
t ^ i s i a alao si«^nifleant t l iat in Deceraber 1360, 
with pubHc attp*ntlon focusp»c? m limau^rba's a r r e s t a resolut ion 
t h a t ejepreased in e f f ec t a vote of confidence in the Secre-
t s fy - c:ener?l*3 policy fa i led by one vote to obtain the 
58 
requlxed 2/3 ^najorlty. "the Soviet block, and s«wne of the 
' r a d i c a l ' Afre»-A8ian s t a t e s , t^tticii as Indonesia, Mali* 
Ghana, «md guinea, voted aqains t the pro-HaTroasleJold r e -
59 
solution*** 
At the Counci l ' s uneatino df 1,2 and 7 Fabruary 1961, 
the represen ta t ives -^f Caylong, Guinea, Ind ia , Indonesia, ii 
Libya Hsl i , Mortscco, the USSR, the UAR and Yugoslavia ca l l ed 
Ikir ioMiMi uegant rMi«au««is teo saoice the xelease of tmrnmSam 
Si« iM€m iOt {9wtaamUmi9Sm ?<> atooliah the poat of Smm* 
»agy»a—»iyl vmA m eaptaee i t by an 89ia«iitiv« eonsi««|fi9 
oM '"iii^ ^^ i^iWMHMWnii dipii WaiHwiti lilociiaf sneiaAAat 9iiatav ails . 
PlO*P# IdKI 
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aiiiS hia eolleagu(i8# the reconvening o£ Parlia^nent* 
«na the withdraw! of Bf^lqian a»a £otmign militHtv and 
60 
para- ra l l l ta ry pers^mnel an<3 advlsojgw. 
The f i r a t e x p l i c i t reeofinition of domestic s t r i f e 
in o uni ted Nations rGsoiution of February 21, i96l 
.•?fter the assass inat ion of iitnwfifoa and the Katanga 
61 
govemRisnt's annotmosTiQnt on ISi'ebruary t36 l . This 
led to a f a i r l y aacceaoful attempt to recrea te a breaf^ 
coa l i t i on -jhSch tTOti'd includG t:ie United s t a t e s and most 
Afro-.'*sien o tasos . The ^oviet Union ei6 not voto the 
proposal , »-;hiclii ant.ic'pat-^ei mere vigorous United Nations 
rc t ion anrl receiwsd ^V2 votes of Lu^uiiba*3 Afro-Asian 
62 
supporters* Th'.-^- Soviet nninne alonq with france abstained 
63 
on the r!=?solj2ti n of 21 februnry#136l which was r®£fi .mad 
64 
b^ the Af^ s'-rsbly in i»pril 1361, 
France and it»K» al^talnod the rasolution passed 
.65 
on laoventoer 1961 by the council following t*ie setback 
to TM forces in Kstanga and the accession of jtt» tJMPhant* 
They expressed their reservati ns concerning the grant 
of military powers to United r^ ations forces by this res©-
66 
lution without -"hapter «II beinc invoked* 
Hill— mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmi^imm-mmimmmmmi'--mmmmmmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmm—mm 
*®» y*Oi^* I960, P* 80 
61 • Critrinf<7«ck»P. 301 
#«• Ciri%triii«J««i(»301 i 
i i« s / sod2 
103 
In a Xott«r of 25 January 1962# th© USSR «a-
l»f»9entatlva mquaatad an urgent nieat:<i>n9 of tho 3««tirity 
Council t o consider the In^Ieman'-ation of "-he CoisKsil 
rea'^lutlon of 24 Nov«!ittoer %96l* Tim l e t t e r malntalTMStd 
t h a t the reaoiutirm had not been impleitianted iaeeauae 
of th0 opposi t ion of c e r t a i n colonia l Tjowera. 
'rhen tha secur i ty Council m^t on 30 January 1962 
c t tho ns";R'3 request the Tint tod ^ t a t a s i:^t>«ss®ntatlve 
mo'</f?fi tao ."r?jnum iont of tne ^naetim^ on tho ground t h a t 
tho CouncJ.l £3houl«1 b-^  guit^ fsfl by t'em v l e t ^ of the Conqolese 
G'^vemment and ttyy '"^etlnfj Gecmtary-CJenorai and tho 
United NQtiona Co?i«nand sh-^u^d be l e f t elon« to * 'cont inue 
tlK»ir vigorous eff'->rts to carry out «ie nandates . 
After morm procRdural f^5 ^co3sion# t*i<» united ^ t a t ea 
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nwtlcai W3S appr ve* by 7 votes t o Hi, vdth 2 abstentiona • 
I t can be sa id t h a t though the super poolers were 
Involved in the Congo issue t o a c e r t a i n degree* the 
smaller powers played an important ro le in solving the 
Congo probl<*m, J^m HmGm Nicholas observeds"—-—reason 
for OTTC's survival i s the general ^willingness of most 
of the **tates var iously dp»scribed as *aoi^igned # *n«utra-
l i s t ' o r the f i r e brands" t o support the opersticMi by 
68* Zl»id«# p . 78 
o9« j^^<^^ 
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t^mix votma and often By fljettr-'^ioiitrtlmtlona* -in^-
thl8« the role of t±ie Afro-Asian has hmi»n cniclal««»*«'** 
ThB ir,s»A», on i t s pa r t i and i t s Westerri st^jpop-
t e r s a id not i n th© beginning want any bold s teps fo r the 
withdraw! of Belgians froT th© Congo# as nroposed by USSR, 
Later# hot«»ve»rt t©A along with sonjp- "^iirop^en and the Afro-
Asian S ta t e s supported vigorous s teps for the i-nmp?diate 
withdrawl of '^pilgian t rooos and oth«r foreign ol«ssT«nt3 
fro-^ th« Conryo, for tim Conqolese ^mitv and t o preserve 
peace in the Congo, 
ttic- d iv i s ion of Mem -^jera sr»latS-na t o ttm Congo 
ques t i -^ vihicii conforming f"-o tiw*. t rac ' i t i '^nal United nat ions 
d iv i s ions on co lonia l •'ssrw^s was not a simple ewie, For# 
in addi t ion t o tir? colonii?t an^ ant5•colonia l confrontatiMi* 
t t » cold war rsol i t ics and avm^r ;x>wer r i v a l r y was a l so 
mixed «p with the Con^ problem. 
70# Nicholas^ G, HeWrt* United Hations Peace Force 
And the Changing Qlobei The lesjsons of Snies and Cong»# 
P. 4121 (vietevStMi Thg, lit^i,^,^. Wf^t^qf^., lt|,Sffigni<^<?>B§|. 
o rgan iaa t ion t i and AdministratlonJ» 
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Sesides this as Stanley Hoffman has rightly obaervedt 
We find that i^ their<Meniber8) approach to the Iftiited Nations 
is a purely instrumental and tactieal one;when they think 
that the organisation can promote their Interest, thai* . 
quite wlllino to strengthen its mand'ite. When they think 
their interest require that the local status-qpio be left to 
take care of it8elf# they see^it that the mandate remains 
71 
unobtrusive. 
iitoffman further cites the examples of the U.S.Se USSR 
to show how they chan;?© their nositions from ocasslon to ocas-
sion. He saya that thn U.S», long resoectful of the Congolese 
right to settle their oi-ra disptitee, nevertheless pressed for 
and obtained iTnlted **Tations recognition of Kasavabu. ''Jhen the 
local situation becatie disturbing to U»ited States interest,.* 
United States sr^ported first the strengthening of the mandate 
in February 1961 and subsequently It further strengthening in 
November. The USSR was unable to get a majority support for 
its policy either In the Security Council or in the Gen«^ ral 
have 
Assembly. This would^made the ONUC Inimumba's instruments and 
then his liberator. But the USSR opposed resolutions like the 
seventeen po%»er draft of April 1961 \ihich would have some-what 
strengthen the iSaited Nations mandate but in a direction 
c-ontrary t o Soviet i n t e r e s t s . 
71 , Hoffmann,Stanley; in Search of a Threads 
The uinlt«d i<iation8 in the c^ngor f^e unitad Hatioiis 
Poii t iealr gv**m« <«d.)#Kay, David A., j S S n w H ^ f e 
s»ns# Ifew ir^irk^ 1967 
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Similarly* majority of the Casabalanca pouters 
coulS not mlRe the Rsiewi&l^ iti?«n§th«H th€ omx: wceorafng 
t o tJaeir d e s i r e s . As a r e s u l t they weakened the ONtJC 
del ibera te ly^ as i t was not serving t h e i r in te res t* by 
with-drawing frurn the ONUC and the conc i l i a t ion comnisslon* 
A nu toer of delegates favouring Lurauntoa's pos i t i on and t o 
United Nations act ion designed t o br ing out the re-emergence 
of Iniraumba as a leader , opposed the sea t ing of Kasavubu in 
Nov.1961 on the ground t h a t t h i s would r e t a r d the process 
of conc i l i a t i on on the Congo* Similar ly , the catch word 
sovereignty and non-intervention were used by the former 
French African colony and by cshana,Guinea and Mali in 
opposite senses . 
Now turning t o the super pcrt>7ers We find tha t they are 
pursuing pol icy qui te divergent fro:^ one anoti i ir , Jtnis L, 
Claude has paresented t h e i r stand po in t s v i v i d l y . H« says 
t h a t the constant theme of the Soviet a t t ack vpon the conduct 
of the Congo Operation was tha t the Ouuc was only spurious^ 
neu t ra l , t h a t the whole a f f a i r was a aubject- ion of the 
United Nations to the i n t e r e s t o£ th<2 T«festem powers. I t 
iq^oearv t h a t the Soviet de legata t lons had ser ious doubts about 
the i i f lpart ial i ty of the United Nations. Clau<te then observes: 
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"Indeed, the Soviets aire not alone In intezpreting the 
72 Congo C^ration as a raore favourable to the west"* 
He then quotes Anioassador Adlal ^tevenson's address at 
Hofstra College «m June 5,1961* 
•* The Belgian withdrawal was followed by anarclq^  with 
which on the one hand the Belgians stepped back and on the 
other the Kussians began tc step in. In these circumstances 
any direct intervention by the West would have been inter-
preted as an attempt to reinpose colonialism. Local opinion 
wou'd have swung over to si^ tpport the CornmunistSt and the West 
qould have been left in the in^oslble position of fighting 
a guerrilla war against a bacT^ groimd of implacable local 
hostility-...direct Western interventions tend of their very 
nature *o produce a revuls:5on of local feeling which thsreatens 
the effectiveness of the intexrvention,.. .The result is that in 
situations such as the Congo, the Western World would be 
almost powerless if there wejpe no United Nations force available 
to restore order* (an?^ ) check a takeover by an outside power. . 
Dire«t Western action would only hasten a eonmunist takeovezi''*, 
72, Claude*orr,I»» ffinisi United Nations Use of Military 
Porce; Tine %AtS«a NftU^Rf ^ 9 U U f t l ^YttgwCEd*) 
Kay, Davd hf John Wiley and Sons,New York, 1967 
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Stevenson went on to say clearly that the iTnitedl 
Rations had frugtral^a the i^ sviet pl«ii to establish control 
over the Congo and that United Nations is "the only instru-
ment lay which the end of the Western system of Colonialism 
csn be prevented fxata opening the doors to the new imperia-
lism of the Ea»t*».^ ^ 
However* the Soviet union was on the tdiole rather 
isolated. In the Security Council at first the Soviet Union 
did not oppose 4n operation sponsored by Tunisia and Ceylon, 
They used their veto against the draft which clawed bila-
teral military aid to the Central Governments but they were 
alone in opposing the aame text In the Special Session of 
the A8sea±>ly* They never sxdwaitted to the Assembly then plan 
of February 1961 for the dismissal of the Secretary-General 
and for termination of the United Nations operation within 
one month. In their suspicion of any Iftiited Nations under-
taking which did not serve their own policy they were in a 
way closer to the more "conservative" states-such as those ex-
French colonies \^ iich Joined them in opposing the seventeen-
power draft in ^ ril-than to the Casablanca powers* v^ose Congo 
polieies largely coincided with Soviet desires but %fho would 
73, Adlai £, Stevenson*"The Onited Nations First Step Toward 
a World Under Law"t Department of State Bulletin* v© l« 45 
*19$1. p« 7©( (pioted cia«de»Op-cit## P. 21l4> 
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have liked the United Nations to turn over the z^ esponsi-
blllty for enforcing those policies to a kind of African 
command and peace force* with the exclusion of anyone else« 
particularly the Grsat Powers. 
The United States on its part was more succes'sful. 
It got its views endorsed by C3eneral Assembly e»g» the a±k 
seating of Kasavubu or it reccmclled its views and those 
of a large nuittoer of African and Asian States. SStai 
It 10 true that at sorne of the Crucial stages in 
the Security Council, the Soviets and the Americans found 
themselves either voting together (resolutions of July and 
August 1960 and November 1961) or not voting against one 
another ( February 1961), This conjunction reflect?ed the need 
for both superpowers to court and coax the "Third world" 
rather than tocoerce and constrain it« But it is also true 
that/ on the v^ole# and until now at least* it is the Soviet 
Union which has lost its gamble and the Urited States which 
was to a considerable extent succeeded. Dag Hana»arslcj®3Ld*» 
definition of Preventive Diplomacy seemed to facilitate a 
concillatlAn of iftiited States interests and United Nations 
role* 
tt we study the attitude of new states* we find l^at 
the attAtude of the Members of the Afr«KAsl«n block i s qi^tm 
mmp>%m^ the i r alignments son un^vxen and t^e w«y in whi«li 
ietoMf i iv lded w«i far from deteiminedi. 
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Much depended on the events* ofcourse* but also on 
the kind of leaderihlp prtrvtaed botii by the SecretiulE-
General and by the United States. A fine analysis by 
Robert Good has shown that# on the whole, the new states 
can be divided among "conaervatives** "raoderates*# and 
"radicals*. But two teraarks must be added- First# one of 
tiu^ se sub-giroups has been monolithic. Thus*among the "conser-
vatives, " the vote of %>rl| 17, 1961, showed that some* like 
Senegal, wexre less conservative than others. Among the 
moderates, some, like Ceylon and India, evolved in the dine* 
tion of the radicals. Others., such as TunislB, remained 
more favourable to a policy of non-intervention* Still 
others, such as Togo and 'Nigeria, passed through a "radical* 
phase during the winter, and left it when Luimimba disappeared 
ABK>ng the radicals, there remained thr'^ ughout a difference 
between states such as Guinea or 'iall, which not only with-
drew their troops but also attcked the Secretary-General 
in violent terms, and Ghana, which eritieised his policies 
and proposed An African substitute expendition but never 
broke with him nor withdraw its troops. Secondly, and 
consequently, it becomes obvious that the opporttulities for 
political maneuver are considerable. In the ciretimstances 
of Uoventoer-Dsscerriaer 1960, too narrow an interpretation by 
11 u 
th« JSeerefeaacy-General and too stPOn^ a ^ nit«d States 
siopport for one of the loeal etmtenders produced a 
deadlock in which a United States and British resolution 
received the stajiport of only eight African and Asian 
States* In April 1961, a less restrictive Interpretation* 
endorsed by the United States* was baclced by 23 of the 
Nations of Africa and Asia. It was clear that no procolonlal 
stand has a chance of being accepted either In the Security 
Council or In the General Assembly, 
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A* ay IniMiffyiattitfi wig thijatimfff fiiirlw VBinnfci' 
Ac««di>Kr to a r«qwi«t t»7 th« Congoiett* Qormrmmnt* 
tti« tinited ilatlofia »rAmx!k»fl on tibe biggsst single tRili-
tazy «saistftrtc« oporatlon organised and dixa«ited by itaelf* 
ZiHRMiaiataly after tlie adoption of the aeeuritr 
i 
Cotincll resolution of *?tily 14^ 1960« ^ifdi J« Bvuru^ e^ r the 
f irs t Special ^Representative of the Seer«tary<-General in 
the Congo* enteced into negotiationa with the Belgian re*' 
presentativea in i^eopoldville for the spe«dy withdrawl 
2 
of their troops as called upon by the said seearitr tiknmcil 
resolution* In order to oarrf out the resolution the 
SecretsryGeneral set up the tikiited Rations (^ration in 
the Congo (C^ ration des i^ations t)nl«is au Congo) or 3^Hi9C 
as ma iniaortant step towards is^ilemaating the Security 
Council resolution* ONtx: was oonposed* on tim one h«nd» 
of «iirili«ii operations and* on the other* of an intematlonat 
ariMid peace fofce# the tmited Hationa Force In the Congo* 
On 19 «3^ ily I9ft0* leas than forty eight hours after 
the Security Council resolution* the f irs t tmited Hatioiui 
contingent landed at Leopoldvllle. Xt was soon followed 
by others* until the stvangth of the tmited NatlCAS force 
1« t /4i0f 
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xm&slm^ m nmximm of about 20,009* thia iovem, iii«a« vKp of 
coiUdfi^At* from States other ttian th« g n a t i»oirair sna 
plaood vndhir tho •3Nsiti»iv« eoHWHma of th« Ukiitad H«tiofi«« 
OHOC ims under 0t«naiii<i o c ^ r s to use foro« only in Milf<-
a«fenai ioid not to intanrvne In tim internal affairs of the 
5 
Congo* ThVMt "OmK^a purpose frcNn the outset vas oonse* 
quently a dual one* the amcvtrin^ oi bot^ internal mnd external 
6 
security*•••* 
Conse<ia»ntly# title f i z« t contingent of Belgian anted 
forces l e f t Ireopoldville on 16 July 1960 upon the arrival 
of the united Nations troops. Following assurances that 
contingents of the United Nations Force ^^ould arrive in suf-
f i c i ent nuni9e£«# tYm Belgian authorit ies had agrred to 
withdraw a l l their forc<^s from the Xieopoldville area by 
7 
23 Ju&y 1960 , The Beli^an Oovemment did not e?'rrfOut 
i t s assurances properly and again the Seciri ty Council in 
S 
i t s resolution of 22 July 1960 asked the GovenMaant of 
Selgium to iniplemsnt spiedi ly the Couneili resolution of 
14 July 1960 and t»> witi^rav the troops from the Congo* 
4.gVfgyiiiai^'e m 8th «d*»1968, P* 169 
6. Hicholas* G. Hextoertf jj^ j ^ , ^ Forces and thaChanging 
QltHimi thm Lessons of Sutss and Congo» P* 4Q6(wat«K«, 
til* l>Rited Nations i int* Organisation and Adndniatration 
nmwAltimU 
'^* JUl i t . 1940« P.S3 ani. 
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!l»f«ov«r« Vkm e l v i l l v n aspttCts of th« ixnitod N«tdon9 
a e t i v i t i « s in « ^ -^apidalie of ttue Canoo %ra9 tmaairliiMid 
by IEM Saeitrity 0»«iiieil twaoltitioti of 22 Jtily t9$0«iifh«r« 
by i t inirit«<9 *th<i »pmeimlla»6 agmncitia of the united 
nations to t^ndmr to th«» Secretary OQaeral such 8S8iataae« 
*»8 he ra«y xKqaii«i« 
A d i i e f of Civi l ian Operation was aopoint<»d on 
26 Jialy I960 with a atattis paral lel to that of the SuprenMi 
9 Coawander of the Iftiited ?iations military force* Thie 
indicated that <foe in^»ortano was given to the solution of 
c i v i l i a n problems in the Ccsngo* 
Ttm xmited tiations Force assuoied i t s functions o 
in most regions of the r%cpu39lic and ensured withdrawl of 
Bel<|ian troops* But«the entry of tlM Force into Katanga 
province was delayed caused by lack l»f authority to the 
10 
omic as interpreted by the Security Council* However* the 
lOm 
entry into Katanga was adhieved in August i960, 
* 
The entry into Katanga gave r i se to serious d i f f e -
rences betwe«»n the Secretary»Oener«l and Patrice Oamuidba* 
11 
the Frime Minister* tt^OKOitom dassanded direct omtc assistance 
to him in putting down by force th«s secession of Katanga* 
»* 1f*P'M* 19fi0# PP. 108-109 
10* See SUSIS* ^* ^^^* p*c':->-u 
l0a» iv»fyiiim*s onited nations #8th Bd. (1968)«P* 169 
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Th9 Seexvtary* C3«IMIS«X x«ftuitt4 to aecMidti to thi« immm^t 
pftinMining tha t to 60 mo w>ttXd be esontr«zy to ONiQC** 
nMuidatOn Ttm 3«ef«tttxy«><3«iier«l*« atMid tv^ardlifi^ ONtJC** 
mandato was tiphaia by tho Socmxlty Couneil. in a zttsolm** 
t ion adopted on August 9f in wliic^ the Council stated* 
among other thintja* that oniic "will not be a party to or 
In any way intervene in or be used to^nfl«ence the outcome 
of any intexnal conflict , eonatitutional or othorifise in 
the Congo*** 
Later* when a consti tutional c r i s i s t»E>ok place 
af ter S Septerriber I960* the chief of the State CToseph Kasa 
Vuba and the Prims Minister Inxrmtinba dismissed each other 
i2a 
f rons the i r respective posts* The ca?OC closed a l l -najor 
a i rpor ts to t r a f f i c other than that of the lAntited Nteti<Mis 
for niaintaining peace and security* ThB a i rpor ts and «he 
radio s ta t ion were zeopefmd by the tmited Nations on 12 
Septeiriber* 1960 af ter the C<m^le8e Parlia-aent undertook 
13 
surveillance of the i r uise. 
On 9 SeptMriber I960* a t the Security Council's aieet* 
in9« the Seeretarf-'<3aneral said tha t ""he assvmed rssponsi* 
s i b i l i t y for the actions of h i s replsesentatlves in the C^mgo* 
13. Zbid«* Pm 170 
tl#,niiiiymin!i Vttttid fitiogy. stu ed, (1969}« »• i n 
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9%%t^m that th«(]r had. aeta^ iwpnrtimlVf aarlnq tha_ ^tiat4>. . 
l^ii^Hftal mTimitt and that t}M» •'Wf^aney inaaaiirvia eoneamlii^ 
airports and the radio had b«an nacaasary to anaura tha 
oparation o€ the tlhitad Hationa lit fulfilmant of i t a mandata* 
lUt i^aphaaiae'^ tha dangaxw eintated by tha financial batilcniptey 
of tha Congoi he atated thf^t the effectivanaaa of ^initad 
Nations aasiatance to ImXp ensure the ind«ip«SMc!enee of tha 
Stats depanda'^  on the maintenance of lair and ordar# the sansa 
of responsibi l i ty of the leaders and sfforta to solve do?nes-
133 
t i c probletwa by peaceful neans"* 
ifithout a le<iral govermient vith ^ i c h i t could deal* 
omic's policy was to continue to carry o u t f i t s rsaoi^te in co» 
operation^ on local level# with authorities actually in con* 
14 
t ro l of tiie area. 
Daring t h i s period of deepening \uirest* Oiroc eseartad 
as rmdti aa poss ible to protect mway p o l l t i e a l leaders three* 
tanad by the ir oi^onants* Measures had also bsMi tiiken to 
avert c i v i l war between the r ival factions and to prevent a 
15 
resurgence of tr ibal violencse* These measures ware endorsed 
by tihMi General AsseiRbly* which eataaiined the problcsi at an 
emarganey special session held from Sept^alMir 17 to 20«1940» 
U 
after the Security Couneil had fa i led to a r d v e at a da«tsl«Hi« 
I3a« iiiiii 
122 
aii)tilMliii«» kKimmsmimr Mm3«0vtttr timfml #£ Iiidl« was 
«ppoifit«di Sp«ei«l Rii£»f»««»t«tiv« of tha SB«r«it«rsfM3«iifliriii in 
Cr* Kaifii J* Biafie^ tt» <wlio had ber«is Speelal lUipr«»«iittttiv» a t 
It 
th© beqinning of th« <^?«iwitlofi» 
The contliin©<l constltaiti'-tial. e i l«i« poaed a aialiaraa 
for o?'3i]C in eo?»>lyifi<y with th® i?fiKjiii3cwB»nt» of tii© Oawsnil 
Asaeffltoly teaoiution of 20 BmptmsSimr to the effact that i t 
shoiald continue to aaaiat t*i« O n t r a l <55V»3ff»!ie«t in the swa-
torat ioa aniS malnteiiauci© of Imt ana o»asr» <M!lC*« efforts 
to amlntain mn attituuSe of s t f l c t isroartlali ty l^d to f re -
ere^at oriticissa aii^ li^dtiMty of tfe© rival coiit©Jna©r» itor 
18 
posiar* Ho%«v®r# tim attltai^e of " s t r i c t inpartiality** of 
omic lad to mora chaos and oonfualon ralatiitg to the ,^^|y^l^t#' 
of tUm Ceatral Qmfmtmmim* th© aacsoaaicaaiat piKJvinolal govam-* 
ment of Katanga and tim Offtjc* xt lead oltifnataly to a mmr 
p l a t s 'l^raak donn of Xtm and oriiar* 
Honaver* **fiNMn«ltt«dl t o tha priiKSiplaa o f nautzv l i l iy 
ana laigiality* OH^ could not chooaa batwaan r iva l pwara* 
19 
fflanta •» # • • 
On a octobar 1960* tha s«er»tafy^<*>'>*^^^ «»)c«d TiAioiiA>a# 
the iPraaidant of tha Katanga oxtivineial <g^ »vant{Nant# for hia 
12^ 
co<»<»|»ftmtion In thft flHitt«r of tho ytiVMvtml of Belgian 
l^rnoan*!'* Ttm Seer«t«ty-0«ner«l /effor t« t o rssolve 
thfB Kat«dii9« pfObl«iii i n « s p i r i t of conoiliait ien and latni^ 
in t h s in te r»0 t8 of the futiuRi of tho Congo and of i n t a r * 
na t iona l paaee* But in a reply of 27 Ovttohmrtt^^O^Tmhoaim 
**veJocted tha contention t h a t th@ praaanea of Belgian pmr^ 
20 
oonnal in tha Congo had eontr ibutad t o continuing twaaion^*.*" 
x«atar on# tension imsreasetS v^mn during the month 
o^oveniaer 1960, the Ctangoleae troops stopped and conf i s -
cat©*^ mimarous OiJlic motor v^icl©8# ar raa ted and detained 
a nuabftr of o^ ^^ njc c i v i l i a n and mi l i t a ry poraonnel* assau l t ing 
and threatening tho l i ves of many of then, and brolc® in to 
21 
thp> houses of soma 0*tic personnel* 
Zn tha itieantinR»« Zmrmirriba's c@8id@m:a had been gu^dad 
by tftilted Nations troops «nd anci rc lad \yy h o s t i l e Congolasa 
t roops for savera l weeks* He f led from h i s rasidknice on 
the night of 27*28 Kovwober* 1960 and ^^as pursued by Vhm 
Congolese troops under the order of the Chief of st«ff# 
22 
Colonel t^^ lMitu • 
20. X±aifi»t3l««0# «»• «9 
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Tha imited t^atiofia h«d ordmtmd i t s troops in th« 
s^»>«iiM»ry t^ £efs«it) f corn «)Qf interfferef^ ?1ra«# -tMs 
' ' inpar t ia l l ty" and "non-intarfftxtsnea** nent to the axtant 
o£ zamaining passive €tv«n whan Patrice l^ itmnidaa was being 
captumd Toff unaul^o«ise<l gmv^s* UmmibB, was arrested 
a t Bitiongo on 1 Decenft>er i960« brought t o Leopoldhrille 
on 2 Deceateer and transferred to detention a t CaR|> Hardyt 
23 
Thysviliet <m the next day» Two tieTteers of Farliamsnt« 
*%»olo mtA Okito wer<» also arrai3^<^« 
Tim t ransfer of Lu'miRd>a and his cotioanions by the 
Congolese atstJiorities from Thysville tx> SXiaabethvill** in 
Katanga in »7anuary 1961 and the i r stibseqtient raurder in 
February led to a f E^sh c r i s i s both in the Congo and in 
the l^ited Nations t^iere the XJBSU called for the dismissal 
24 
of Hafiniarslcjold* But* the majority of the mmttmra, however* 
ecmtinued to support Ha« narsicJold amA the united Nations 
operations in the Congo* 
In Apfil 1961 # a four»^iian Co^vaissi n of Investigation 
was establislied to investigate thet death of hwmmtm and 
25 
h i s oolleaguss and i t s re|>ort was circulated to naaibers of 
Security Cc^mcil v»A the Oeneral Assi^ably on ^Mavanber ll#19€»l» 
23«JCAS2«fi.*t9W, P, n 
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Tim commtsMion eoiMllnd«di 
"thflt «N»l9ht of evidAnc« was agaiji»t 
Wm of f i«^«l^ iren^R -of tdti9 liQls«pu§Ni 
pvoviiuital Qtgrvmmmnt that Xitwuiiitm 
and hi a collaa^uea had bean )ci3Lad 
by cartain trlbeaaiaii on Fabi^ oaiey I2# 
1961# that tdie evidenea indieating 
that the priaonara h^d bean k i l l ed 
on January i7,1961« in a v i l l a near 
Bliaabethvillet pxobably by Cttrt»in 
?!»Brc«nari©8# in the pr sence of 
Kataneia Provincial Offioialst seamerd 
to be aubstantially true; and that 
President Kasa*Vt:ibu antf hi a aides 
and Tahontb© and hia aides ahonld not 
eaeaoe reataonaibillty. The Co-Tmia-
sion noted that i t had been \mable 
to v i s i t tiie CongOf owing to objection© 
by t t e liesopoldvillQ anthorltv"»2Sa 
In the words of ^ajeswar nayal ''the death of 
l#UT«rrft>a was a wtershed in the United nations Opearation 
as i t brought about a sharp revision in the concept of the 
•neth-^ ds to ba employed by the tjnited nations in the 
fulfilment of i t a tas^t*. 
Thus andad the f i r s t phase of the Congo episode 
% e^n the earat*while duly eleel»»d Prlnder «d)o had eal led 
the united Nationar^Vas seised# detained^ and done awigr witdi 
by reballioiui r ival ^roup* without any resiatttnee being 
offered by the ONUC present ther»» 
2Sai^  Everyman's ^ i t a d liationa# 8th ed* (1968)#P* 172 
26. Dayal, R«iasva« *m§Mimf9X mmWhi^M, 
£l | | l |g ,Oxfotd university Pm99$ ^3.lii#197$^iyei^l90 
8« ,m,J,p^ OTg-^ -^ i.Q» m?9, T?y wiTtf>^ i^^  or y p t p , mimm, fmp^^ * 
, After tim death of I«timunba« "the react ion to th« 
murders began l i k e an African thunder a t o m *rlth low r o l -
l ing re-v^rberations s t e ad i l y galnimt i n . _ ^ | ^ i i ^ y # » . * 
•?tiia lea the secu r i ty Cotineil on 21 Ff»bruary 1961, t o 
author ise the use o*' force . Ttm reso lu t ion urged imme-
d i a t e uni ted Hationa Tiaasures to prRV«iit the occurence 
< 
of a c iv^l va r in the Conqo end to t h i s «ffect» sanctioned 
28 
of use of force* i f necessary, as tho l a a t r e s o r t . 
The Secretary-<5eneral also# on 24 February 1961# 
requeote*^ the contr ibut ing s t a t e s and o the r African Stat^ts 
t o provide new or additi-^nal troops t o the united ils*J.ona 
i?orce# for the iraplemRntatlon of the resolu t ion of 21 Feb-
ruary 1961* vliieii required « subs tan t i a l increase in the 
29 
s t renoth of lOie tftiited ^^ations Forces, India on 3 %rc^» 
1961t assured the despatch of a bidgade to the Congo for 
the fu l l implementation of the Council ' s reso lu t ion and 
accordingly sen t i t s forces* Substant ia l reinfofeement* 
we'-e a l so stipplied by Sthlot>ia# the Federation of '%l«ya» 
30 
Liberia* Nigeria and Tunisia t o the ' t^ai ted Nations Forces* 
27. Dayai * aajaswar* ?ttaij^ 9B in ^mmmYWW SM.Sam^ 
9 l^s* p. 198 
38. S/*72a 
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In the meantime* ONUC ass i s t ed in the e^raoMttion 
of ove» • t^ho\t8in^ l^tmi^n na t ionals in tlMi Kivu pxovinee, 
United Nations p iotected areas Iter threatened c i v i l i a n s 
were eatablisli^d in Stanleyvi l le* Orlentale province and 
in BaksvMt c^ma and Kln<fu# Kivii province/ as v e i l as in 
Iriaopoldville* owx: mad© c r i t e r i a t o o ran t atJ'bpM only 
t o persons ^ o could show t h a t they were in rea l danger* 
but not t o oersons tflider lawful prosecution for co!nr;On 
orines* Mo p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s were permit ted to oersaaris 
3i 
granted asylu-n. Another prc^lem biought t o the a t t e n t i o n 
of the t3WLted nations a u t l w r i t i e s t^as t h a t of the denial 
of freedom of moveiaent. 3tt was found t h a t a mitdber of 
persons in X^eopoldville* includinq wives and chi ldren hav-
ing no rmana of l iv i l ihood i n the areai. were not allowed 
t o xetum to t h e i r homes in S tan leyv i l l e and o ther areas* 
On the o the r hand* masmy Congolese and EurosM»ans in Orien* 
t a l e mad Kivu provinces were not allowed t o leave those 
areas* To deal with t h i s problem* the (^tic n^OKeatedly 
made representa t ions to the Congolese a u t h o r i t i e s heeded 
by Kasavubtt t o allow* as a f i r s t p r i o r i t y on humanitartan 
grounds* wives and chi ldren t o rejoin t h e i r husbands and 
31 
fathers* 
,28 
The tJtoitM^ nmti,&n*m mativHsXmm in th» Cofi<^ %m& 
l««<SR»i XmB toy K«tainite« fimf a l l e ^ d tha t T^ite^ H«ti®ii» 
e o u ^ t to MBMtm the Connies© asnisr «wa tiiptoiMi a tf«ite«» 
ahlp ovar tH© country* Thay i«efit to tJte aactaiit of awptatint? 
aavaral tmits'^ nmionm ^ivlXimns and •military pe3s»miii«l l a 
La®poiavilia who iwsr® aiatojactsd to at tention mi«3 acta of 
33 
vl©l«nce. Thm Qmmtxemnt of tiia Congo lea by KassvitilRi 
appaalaia Tshont^,* the l©«^©r of Katanga* to jolitf forces 
with ttm Republic of tho Congo in the fac® of the c^ faroem 
34 
aancpBJC §£0-n th© Ohitsod itations* 
Inapit* of th© S©cimtajcy-<l««riaiiral*© clar i f ica t ion of 
tha iion*«^arti»-an woitaa ttetiona poaition &n 3 March t^fel 
to tha Pre»14aiit of t^a Goii^« a aarlaa of attacks on Waited 
flati<^« oaraonnal toy the ff^ -3ra»e 'nationala Commlu^mm CM3C) 
took pXaea i n aiff«r<Mit araaa* 
Vim policy of '*noa«ifit«riaf«ia««** by tlnltad Hationa 
Forcaa« <Mliieh aimufitaa to aDpeaaaiaant of tha forcaa in tha 
C(tmgo hoati ia to tinitadl Nations action^ dlid not aeara to 
arypaasA theta» 'Pha tflaitad Mat!ana did not aawfi a ca r t i* 
fi«!atnr of diainteraatadnaaa frofn thaaa <iuartara» 
•mmmmmmimmimimmmmmmmmmmmmmmammimmmmmimm • ' im .iimii "1111111 1 n 11 iiiiiiii 1 iiiiriii imii 
120 
Tthdnkm ftivo strongly eritielstttt th« dttspntch 
of the Indian eontlngant of the united Nations Force 
to Kwnina on 2 April. 1961* which he dutobed es ifiir«et«ii» 
<4hen owing to the ettaek nn the united ilatione 
Forcea# tension inci»a»ed# om3C reinforcennnts were flown 
into SliseOJethville on 5 April 1961, The Tjnited nations 
Poros, on 7 April 1961, also took into custody 30 foreign 
merceneries who lanrJed in a plane o^ the Katanga anaed 
forces a t the Kabalo a i r fe i l^d . They were transf©ri»d to 
the Kandna basa for qoQsti nin<r» and arrangeTients were 
Tade for t he i r deportation* A re|K>rt on the intorsogation 
36 
was atft)r«ltte'3 t» the Security Council on 14 April 196l, 
Moweirer# an agree^nt on ^ n e r a l principles concern 
ning the implernentation of the Security Council resolutiim 
of 21 February 1961 was i n i t i a l l e d by the Congolese and 
t^i ted Nations representatives on 17 A p r i l 196i» Under 
th is agrewaent* the i^puhlie of the Oongo aecepted the 
Se«urity Council resolution of 21 Fehruary 1961 and i t ' s 
Prssident* Kaaavubu undertook to rs»exaaine the appoint* 
ments of foreign personnel fa»de wider hia authority and 
tottake neeessary decisions eoffipatible with the in teres ts 
of the Congo, 
mi'11'mmmtmimmmmmimmmmmmm in mini mi • I W M I I I . I irniii 
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On itm sidtt* tht» tmilMia Mfitions tiiia«»t<»olc to 
9iir» to th« '^iBSidttftt stXX possible assistance in veMsrui-
ting n«e«ss«fy tecimlcians aiid' in firainimg^aaalfilvtxvti^e 
tectmical cadre* Not«over# tha HaptibXie o£ ths Congo 
also recognised tha naed to nsoxc^anise the National Arn^ 
under the authority of the Praaident# with tmitad l^ations 
assistance* Firti action by the tJni-.ea Bfationa Force 9eeiTm^ 
to raaJce the Con-ioles© President more amenafoie to reason* 
i^ hen the Qenerai .msmrrtoXy considered the s ituation 
In the Congo durlnr' i t s larch-April 1361 8@ssion# the 
s i tuation tjas cotalicated by osntinuin^ constitutional orl8is# 
-narteed by the existence of several rival authorities in 
the country* In th is situation* the United Nations Opera-
tion In the Congo <omJC) ^&B ende0\«5nring to prevent the 
leaders in po«»r front using force and violence agalAst the ir 
oii^ pcmefits# At the same timaf the G^ UC intens i f ied i t s 
e f forts to indues the lewSajrs to solve the ir diffarenees 
through negotiations and concil iation* 
The Sacretary-C3aiieral# in May* 1961 announced s r s -
org«iiaation of the administrative arrangements for the 
Congo Opemtion* i:he Spaeial i^epresentativa of the Saeia-
tary* Oanaral in the Congo* Anbassa^r Rajas^far Dayal of 
3t* y»ty*H** 1961 , P* Sf 
l3i 
XiHli«# wM x«3ii«v«d «t hi* mm xwiuest and NeKki Abb«s 
wa» appointed «« iBha Aeting Spealal itapc«s«ntativ« in 
ti«opola[9>i3.1«* Stujra C. hinnmr* t(»mmrlt Clilaf o€ tAsitad 
Nations Civi l ian (^xttt ions in th@ Congo# was appointed 
Of£icer-ln«Charge of the tmited nations Operation in 
33 
thB Congo as o£ 25 Hay 1961 • Meam^ilo* the rapjcaaanta-
tiinea of the Secretarsr-'KSenQral had taken i n i t i a t i v e s for 
tha convening of the Parliament as uxged by the Security 
Council and the Ge^ieral Aasenbly* Bvery e f fort was a lso 
made by ONUC to f a c i l i t a t e a raporoclwent between the 
39 
Con<|olese leaders* After a aeries of fru i t fu l discussiems 
among the leaders of Leopoldville and Katanga* the Presi-
dent of the '^public* on 5 July 1961, issued an ordinance 
convrening Parliewient* ffentoers of the v>arliament assenteled 
at the TJnlversity of Leovaniur% Iieopoldvllle from 16 July 
196i« under Security arrangements wade by the united Nations 
in close co^Qperation with the authorities fro^ Leopoldville 
and Stanleyvil le* 
Th» Senate and the House of Representatives started 
the ir sessions on 22 July 1961 and 23rd July 1961 respectively* 
38. XalliI^1961, P. 59 
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on t Angvmt i9l»i« thft Prucident of th« Repubiie 
^ 40 
RofttiiatMKl Cyril;l« Adiouift • • tlMililMMMi of the Go¥oi^ni«1lt« 
Adbula pittaented h i s Oov«mm«nt to nm two Hou««s of Par-
Xifiunsiit on 2 Atiguat t961« which tms X«t»r •ppeovodi by 
the ]?arliwiMint« The S«cs«tar3jM39n®E«l. a lso confixned that 
the t%ited flationa would deal trith Adoula's Goveznment aa 
beinq the Central Govemraent and would render aid and 
aaaistanee exclusively to that Government* i"he Seci?etasy» 
General a lso acceoted the invitat ion extended to hiw 
by the Prirae-Mlnlster to v i s i t Leopoldvllle 
to disCTJSs the tv&imwojfk within »diich united Nationa aid 
and assistance for f u l f i l l i n g the future progratwae of ttm 
Govexnntent, could be given. 
ti* Kafa^^'i^ ray<?|^iaiV\^B A HI? mmp ^T;O»S A<?TiOfflt 
Zn the niaantitne i t was disoovarad in Jtnia#1961 that 
thera wara tnora than 500 foreign ndllitary pecsonnal and 
42 
mercanaries in the KUitangese ^ndastmrie* Std»aeqiiantly the 
omic authorit ies avacuatad batwean June and Axigust#aaveral 
42 
of Tsh«iA>e*s foreign military and p o l i t i c a l advisers* 
^0« y*q»a>.i9gl> P, #1 
4i« Bvaifwa»*s imitad nations^ 1969. P« 171 
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W'^m^«>r» t h e OHiic pxe^mmAmik t o ecntnd w m«re«]i«ri@s in 
SliaabethvlH® on August 28,tS>6l, for asportat ion^ This 
vmm Asgm a f t e r tmMm e» r t a ln ammtidw pjraisaiitlona^ in* 
eluding »«r / e i l l aac« ov«r th© El is i^sa t^vi i le raadto s t a t i o n , 
t*i© g&n€»rrmrt& heewScniartera anfl o thar k®y points* Tho 
rotin<dling vip operat ion was successful ana peaceful . 
lloiieir@r# In tiie months of Aug«®t-saptent>©r#t96l, 
soi» serlows inc ia«nts t.odk pl^c© In ^lisabcstlwill©. On 
1% Septentoar 13>6i, ttm Bexmt:^ ^ i t e a Wations resores^ntative 
was a r m s t e d In EltsabeUi'si'ille on os^dters gi"^en hf a ntm-
congoles© off iosr* cmiC representnt i ims act inq under 
ttm Securi.ty Council i»»olut lon nf 21 February 1961# r e* 
qu«stea tJ*a Kataneja a u t h o r i t i e s t o avacwat© tlie 'Oftitad 
44 
Mations Of f i c i a l t^ithin 48 Ivsuxs* Ignoring tM.s r*»queat# 
tti« KatsHicia au t i io r i t l a s r®tnforced t h a i r po l i ce force and 
Imgim i59aintainin«i heavi ly apaed p a t r o l s and guanS pewits 
a t a l l publ ic bu i ld ings and i n s t a l l a t i o n s « i*ater* ho^iiaver* 
the tJktitad iNTations' Off ic ia l was ralaassd a f t e r a hamQ 
persuation by United i«ationa R«pr»s«»tatlv»» 
On i3 SeptfiMriber i96i« the iteited na t ions ?ore» took 
secur i ty precaut ions in order to ensure the maintenaiiee of 
mmmmtmrmmmmmmmmmmmimmtmmmmmmimmmmm iimiimmmmmmmmimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmmmmmmmmtmt 
43« tveryman's tUMl^d Wati '^s* 8tli ad» 1««8, #» 174 
mmmin i»»»»w«i»«i«i»»i»»»i»iw««i>««»«ii»i»iiiiiiiijiiiiiiiiriii^  11, mm 
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Imt «ii^ <»c<d«r« Xt mwimm4l If «««k of ^pf«h«fiaing «iia 
9¥9mimtim t0mim aiiiitAsy ana p«r««*niilitary paraoniMl* 
foMigii ml l i taxy persomiQl attacked thiim. Despite pe iv i s* 
t a u t e f fo r t* by the tmitedi Natlona repsesentat ivea t o 
obtain ceasa t ion of hoa t i l a t i e a* a t t aeks on ^Jnited* Natlona 
peaco-kRi^ing foxtse <soiitimi)^a ana gpi?Ba<^  t o Taaotvllle* 
Kamlna and o the r areas* A ntvaSber of foreign 
of f ice rs who ware In hl<?lng# s?ftatroeat«a. Aff^r xs»pertea 
e f fo r t s t o contac t Tahfw*?^ ! t o end the flahting# the TJnlted 
Nations representative! In n l l snbe thv l l l e received a iisssa*?® 
frora |dra, thw>u<3fh the B r i t i s h consul on 16 Septeniaer 1961, 
oropoalng a nieetlnoi in North Sho<*ite8la» 
The Seeretarjr-General following the Inv i t a t ion from 
Premier Adotila, arr ived a t Leopoldvlllo on 13 sept«n*>er,1961* 
After being Informed of the niGsoage from Tshonft>e# he rep l i ed 
t o him reaffirming the deal re of the *%ilted ^atlona to 
ensure a ceeaat lon of h o a t i l l t l e s . lis, then aakatd the 
Katanga au tho r l t l ea t^ order an liwnediate and effec t ive 
ceaae-wfire and offejwid t o meet Tahoabe peraonal ly a t Hdola# 
ilorthem Hhodeaia^ t o find peaceful tnatih^da of tmm>lving 
the e^nf l l c t t '^^m r i s ing hopes of the iJnlted Matlona*however* 
were daahad t o growid whan I t a oruaading Saeratafif«^|paral4 
aexQplfUS had the f a t a l erash»en 17 Septaaiter IWi* 
<S« Ii2!xi«# 19*lt P« • ! 
K30 
Howeirert the nuisaiioii of the Smetrntt^ry-'OmtmrmX vm» 
talcQ^ !ip ^ r ^ i n t ^ #teha«iud KhinjElf Chlai of «>e OfltJC 
Civ i l i an Operations* flew to Nt^la on 19 Septentser* Ho 
and T3honii>e slgmsd a provis ional agraoment for an itssnediate 
46 
cease-f i re* Tiie agiretaaent became f ina l a f t e r the approval 
o£ i t « terms by th® iJnlted t^ations head qua r t e r on 24 
Septeniber 1961 • The Katangese a u t h o r i t i e s did not co?t|»ly 
fu l ly with the provisions of the agreeiiient. came were 
obliged t o continue fur ther n e ^ t i a t i o n s * and the Katanga 
47 
a u t h o r i t i e s signed a protocol on 13 C^tober l?61 for the 
implementation of the ceas<=^flro agreetaent of 20 ->,pt««fcier 
48 
196J• llie protocol \/as# subsequently* approved by the 
tJnlted Nations Headquarters. 
Heanwhile* C»ltjc attempted to ii ipress u'^on the Katanga 
a u t h o r i t i e s the urgent need* in the I n t e r e s t s of tlv* people 
of the province and of the Con^ps as a whole* to e s t ab l i sh 
contac ts with the Central Government t o achieve a peaceful 
solut ion of the outstanding issties* The tJnited nat ions Also 
gave assurances guaranteeing the safe ty of TshoMba and 
h i s representa t ives during t h e i r v i s i t t o Wopoldvi l le fo r 
such discussions* 
T6. Y*t?*tl*.196l^ p , 63 
47, Tlia protocol provided for the rsXease of pr isonars*the 
c m a t i o n of th rso sub-eomroissions for the supervisiOA of 
tliA app l ica t ion of tlia ceaaai ivs a^nianiantffXistiifn %o 
pos i t ion bald on 12 Sept . 1961 and ths vatuvn of the l o s t 
Offi«!a* radio o ta t ion and savara l otHar positiofis bald 
by ^ ^ iiifitad Nations in Slissabstbvti la in M ^ m toy 
ooytain asstiff«R@«s by Katanga atttdioriti«s*{J]S't9«l*P«61} 
1 / - . -1> 
Accoraingly# on 18 Oetdb«r l9«i , two emissaries 
CNi SahGsiiae ^ iQat tso the eat^ital with Khiari* They 
pstttentttd a mmowtm&mt fecNn Tahonim tio t^ie Pfiioa-*Minister* 
The ^rrd-^saries of TeHnxmhe returned to '^ l i sab^thvi l le 
with a ttiessaqe from the Central Gavermmnt t h a t i t was 
prepairea t o ayM-idnei a i ^ proposaXs within t he fr^pnewosk 
49 
Of the PariiaTientary i n s t i t u t i o n s . The Central Govemmeiftt 
was a lso read^ t o receive Tahonaae an<^  h i s colleagues fo r 
fur ther d i scuss ions . During t h i s tiine* howetrer* i t was 
found by omrc t ^ a t t^e Katanga a u t h o r i t i e s v io la ted a 
ntenber of the provisions of f^ie protocol of 13 Octobert 
1961- !!leverthele33# 190 omic pr isoners and 240 Katangese 
pr isoners were e.xciianged 1m 25 Octdber 1^61 end O'^ iuc 
50 
withdrew f ro'n several pos i t ions as ageeed in the pro tocol . 
The Off ioer - ln -Char^ of the United Nations Opera-
t i o n reported on 2 Movemtoer 1^1 t h a t tlm Katanga autho-
r i t i e s had f a i l ed t o f u l f i l severa l of t h e i r obl igat ions 
and had resumed a v io l en t propagfloida eo^npaign aga ins t 
the united Nations. Thus* the Security '•Council wet wi 
13 M0v«iift)er 1961 t o consider the s i t u a t i o n in the Congo. 
The Belgian Foreign Minister informad the Securi ty 
Council on IS Novwieber 1961 t h a t t h e i r o f f i c e r s were 
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INIIJI9 withdanmii at th« rmqim9% of thaf l^nitad Matloit** Th* 
Offie«r»iiM:ii«ygtt of th« tiMii^i H«tiQiit C^saicioii In %hft 
eongo submittadi a xapovt ea 19 llcnr<mlMiir 1961, giving ttsxthnr 
iiifo£Tii«tion alxnit ttw lioatilitiaa en «h« Kaaai«»Katan9a 
boxdejr and an aosoitnt of certain aistuxbancaa M^hlch tCNB»1c 
pXaea in £<aliiabcmx9f stanleyvilla# AlbartviXla and Kindu* 
Diataxbaneaa also took olaea in StanlayviXla and Ori«ntal« 
PKovinee* An aarliar x«port of 10 ttmtenSbmv 196l« said tlMt 
OKTOC granted pyotwction for the evaosation of tiiA famlliea 
of the 3taff of certain Albertville enterorisea and heliMid 
to control the altuation in the city* Distuxbamoes ocoured 
again on 13 Hoventser \^tmn a ^t ional httof contingent from 
stanleTirille reached Albertville. the tinited Hationa caynra* 
sentativa perauadted i t s officers to keep tkm troq^s out of 
the centre of the citgrt ^ t the nextday# anaed aoldiers iq;>* 
peered in to>im and began looting proparlqr *n^ threaling 
and arraatiAg ciid,li«nMi* OifllC off ic ia ls organised addi-
tional evacuations of foreign nationals# afforded protecties 
%o those rentaiaing in the c i t f and took appropriate measviies 
to restore law and order* 
On 13 HovanlMr i96l« the Congolese Goverwusat also 
eosKHinilanited tx» the tOtaited nations the teart of an Ordinance 
pron i^ding for the panishnent of ii»n«Coagolese Off&eeas and 
'«aseeiiaries serving in the Xatangsse forces vlio had sot 
entesad into contact with idle Cantral oove««inai%* Ihntiif the 
discwision in tho Cc»tticiX» Bttlgiaa r«ips^9«ntativ« stated 
tliK^ liio Ooivesmmnt rmeom^^BBS the C«iitr»l Goverwntnt of 
the Congo *8 the Xegitlimte Goveznraent and was cqupoeed 
to the seeension of Katanga* On %4 HoveiAmr 1961, Cayioa* 
Liberia and the u n i t ^ Arab ftepubXic mAiiaitted a draft 
resolution in the Secmrity Cotmeil* tUm three power draft 
reaoitition« as arnended and revised was adopted by the 
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Conxtcii on 24 tlavmtbmr» 196%, whidh provided son^ favourable 
steps towards solving the Congo problem* 
On 27 Hovenber i961# tim -ftotincj SecretaryMSeneral 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reptiblic of 
the Congo sicfned an agreement cm tfm legal s tatue, fac i -
l i t i e s , privi leges and insmmitiea of the trnited nations 
Organization in the Congo* Zt laid down i:3m deta i ls of 
the application of the basio agreea»nt signed on 27 July 
i960 and wae to be deemed to have tal«in effect from the 
date of the ar r ival of the f i r s t elesaeats of the imited 
Nations* "Fhe agreeflMiat made i t oXear tha t the responsibi-
l i t i e s of the tJtaited Rations Force for the maintenance of 
public order« peace and securltrr would be discharged in 
accordance with i t s interpretat ion of the missicaft assigned 
to i t by the Secmrity Coimcil* This would not i^pply to 
51* a/5002* Xia*BA*i^^i# ^* 80 
In its resolution of NoveniMtr 24#the Council Ofiposed 
the secessionist activities inK Katanga and authorised 
the SecrstatyoOeiieral to use the reguleite msMurs of 
force to «iHiiv»lete the removal of megaanagjee (tveyvman's 
tJ^ t^f <!^  wationa. ith edition, 1968, P* 174) 
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<3oiMi0tie Itnmt xegulatlons and pxocmMrmBt y^idh «iotild 
mmatfi fu l ty ^tm semi^emmihilitf of the Congolese aiiiaM>ri-* 
t i e s . The trnited t^ations would iK>t have recouise to the 
use of force except as a l a s t resort and subject to the 
restxrictions i!flposed hy i t s mandate and the JteiKilutions 
of the Security Council and the General As8€»aitoly« Bnth 
parties also undertook to o>-ordinate the i r actions in the 
maintenance of public order and to adopt the princlnle of 
mutual consultation* f%anwhile# the Katanga authorities 
again launched a propaganda csonpai^ eqainst the thiiited 
Nations in v io lat ion of the provision of the protocol of 
13 October i96i» the ca-npaign* accusing unite<1 Nations of 
increasing violence* becawa highly Inflammatorjr after the 
adoption of the Security Council resolution of 24 Novendber* 
i961« Tshon&>e and his colleagues alleged that the United 
Ifffttions had decided to launch a war on Katanos and cal led 
on the Katangese to prepare to fight against the Utaited 
Nations. The remsing of public feel ing against the l?nited 
nations and the sincitenient to violence against l^ie united 
t^tions pei»onnel# despite the protests of the United Nations 
representatives/ soon led to grave incidents* On the nighit 
of 28 Novernber 1961* two Senior Officials of t^e Seeretariatf 
George Ivan Sadth and Brian tirqahart* were dragged by 'V'^ t^a-
coimmidos** and gsmimmss from a private residence in ^Isa-
bethvi l le and sevemly beaten Mpm Mr* Smith was xwieued by 
1^0 
Wm tAiltWNi st«tn« mmmA» toot Mr* 0x«i«iii*i^ «•• hml6 for 
miwmgml hours tiiKlor tho the ta t of a««tlt una w«» rMlftMM«l 
53 
011I7 ttftfir dtem^u^ mum «Mfci<i IK» tINit f^ «e«f?im£ial. i£Lfiist»r»* 
An Offleor of tHe Oiitod nation* Forces Mtjor Aje«(S 
SinQhf who had lieon iookinc? for '-^0 VrqpHwrt waa fotina mi»» 
sloej eixl tho imttile«&^ ho4lf of h is driver ttas aiseovexod 
by tmitsea Ttation pi^rol®* 
A f t « r rfi€»e5ififif i t i s t root tons f ro i t ttm Aotir^gt Seers*-
tawf'-"'^tmralt tha flftit««5 'latlorwi xmpvmmntmtivmw- w«m*»d 
'?aliont>« to »?«#Q infia^iKiiatrF profKKl^ mdla agafnat tha tuaitwid 
Nations ana iis«^# l*la ts> eo*o?5«r«fe9 t*ltli I t for findliiQ 
a pe^eeftil. 80i«K:iem of th© problittns in cMmfomity with th« 
S3 
rosoItitioRS of f^ ui ommrity ComicilL «na tho c^^saral A^aa-^ly 
T»hoalK3 in his topHy of % T>?sep»n#*er# i96l# (wepreaaod 
re^rat ov^r tfm attaeasa on Smith an^ tTctiuhart and anmmnesaa 
that thoaci gui l ty had been oimiahfta* m further aff imsd 
his intention ar9oiain«i tm^ ineidksnts and tx» rQaolv«> prcriblo^ 
by paaeefttl mans* Ha aaaurad ®n Invciatigation into tha 
S4 
inoia«nt eoneazniw} Hiajor sincjh and h i s drivar* 
53* il2&A»# ^* '^ 2 
J4 j -
Gn 2 OeaeniMir 19619 th« tJMiitttd Hatlons tcixips a t tha 
BlisaaMthville aixpoirt; disaztMHl woim Ammlmn Katangan gati-
aam»a whan th«y moleatsd savaral Con9ol«afi» w^ntn* Otbar 
9aiKlarmaa and the PoXioa opanad f i re on tha UHitad iJlationa 
55 
tsoops but they tie re alao diaacmed and detained* Mbreover# 
tUte Katanga gendarmerie again began to patrol tihe t^nm and 
ae t t35> road^bloeka to if!^ >ed© v i t a l tmited nations Conwremica-
tion8«* and united Nations pensonnei ware tnolested at the 
roadbloGica and several t^ere detained by the *Vara Conranndos? 
Though tha Katanga authori t ies undertook a t the demand of 
l}nit»d Itationa representatives* to remove the roa<S0block8f i t 
soon became apparent that they ware only engaged in a delay-
ing raanoeuvr« and that the gendarmerie was planninq to en-
c i rc le the airport and attaclc and destroy the tftiited Nations 
For«^« On 5 Decenber 1961# the United l3ations troops cleareid 
tli^ roadblock by foi«ei IHiring action^ one Indian 0££icer 
o€ the united nations force was ki l led and £ourmen were ii#otm-
ded* On the other h«ad« Katanga £orees los t a t l eas t 38 
gendaotms and **t>ara-4W>mmandoa'* and two non«<^ngolese mer-
cenaries* On 6 I>M!ent>ar i961# the Katanga Minister of In-
t e r io r again mSde an inflainniatory broadeasta and called 'xpem 
the people to fight against the united Nations Force* the 
tJjsitad Nations Fofcse* on the other hand* carried out i t s 
task of TtAintaining law and order in the disturbed arsas* 
using force irtien reguiirod* 
55. T*»*»* #19«# P* '^2 
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Vimr «^*^ undsrtook to 6i»mrm tJie Katanga gandar-
nwrl« a t Maaono tiharat i n v io l a t ion of the eeaaafizvi agi?a«* 
maMti Mtvir stimiigtli had been augnwntsdlf adding t o t»n8ion« 
SvtoBmqvmntly, the gendarmes* v io la t ing tim Imm of war* 
attacluid t he Balt:ft>a refugee eanip and i n f l i c t e d a non^ser of 
ca sua l i t i e s* Evetkf Olivet* the Chief delegate o£ the Inter"-
ne t iona l RedoieoGd a t E l i sabe thv i l l e Was assas ina ted . 
On 10 Daeeniber la>61# the Acting Seeret«r3H*en®ral 
s t a t ed t h a t m i l i t a ry ac t ion had been forced on the uni ted 
Nations by a s e r i e s o£ de l ibe ra t e a t t acks aaa ins t t ) ^ tniited 
Nations personn*'?! In E l i s sbe thv i l l e* The purpose of Tftiited 
iRations ac t ion was t o rsgaln and assure f reedmi of tnovemBnt* 
x^store law and ordbr and defend taait^ad Nations personnel 
and pos i t ions* 
The ranch-needed re-inforoement of t}m tftiited ^ t i o n s 
troops in S l i s abe thv l l l e was cKjmpleted on 14 reossAier 1961 
and^ as the? Katangese a t t a cks «ontin«ed# OHIK: undertook a 
more ac t ive ro le in secar ing freedom of movement* In swif t 
ac t ion , between 15 and 17 Decenibar l ^ l # OSUC forces ca«>tured 
several iitfjortant pos i t ions around the per imeter of Slisabefeli* 
v i l l e« incli tding the tnmin ^nda rmsr i e carqp* On 13 Deesntoer 
19€U ^4iii»»d Haticms t roops began t o p a t r o l the s t r e e t s of 
i<:iisabethfVille and succeeded in res tor ing law «ntd ordkir in a 
large wmmmmf^ 
14 o 
mm OHiiMia Nationa for keapiitg th« pmmem mui 
oppomtA by tho B«igi«as cm tOi* gvmm§ thst i% h4i4 l td 
to thtt dttath of some Balfiwua* !Ri« Acting s«e£«it«ry«» 
General replying to this objaetion of tha Balgian Govam-
meiit stated that he offered to pj?0¥ide protwotion to 
the eofflpany i f i t ceased to carxyout i t s hostile aeti*" 
v i t i e s a<?ainat t ^ Of^ itx:* 
i^otwithstanding the opposition*on 19 D&&sintoer 1^1 , 
the tJnited nations Force occt^piea the iJhion Hiniere fao* 
tory and captarad a large quantity of arms* United i^ations 
curbing action appeared to have salutary effects on the 
recalcitrant iCatanga leaders* l^ he emm day'«i«e* 19 Dece^ nber 
1961* a meeting was arranged between Prime Minister Adoula 
and TshcmJbe with the assistance of the Ohited Rations and 
the tfttited StAtes at Kitona* a totrmx Belgian lailitustry base 
under ONOC control* 
On 21 Deeeatmr 1961 Tshonbe concluded an agreement 
SC 
with Adottla to end the 8i%cession of Katanga. Xt was known 
as *Kitona declaration** fshottoet as President of the 
Provincial Government of Katanga rMuSe a deelaratitm aec«»p*< 
tinq the application of the Soi fon-damentale of the Congo 
recognised t}i» indissoluble unity of the Reptiblie and the 
authoi^ty of the Central GoverNment ovmr a l l parts of the 
S», file Anwal a4f«ttg)MI^M^nPkaf"^^^^-*^**^ '^•^• ' ' 
19«^, P» 311 
14 4 
EepvibXiOt Px«sidoitt Kasa-Vulm a« Head of th« Statct^ agr»«d 
to th« part ielpat ion of Katanga** raprttsantatlvas in tdia 
GovanmKiiital Commission to b« conirened a t ZieopoX<S7ille on 
3 Jamiery* 1962 t«> atxtiStf the draft consti tution, pledged 
to talm a l l netcessar? steps tso enable Parliament lacHnSbers 
from Katanga to diadhar^ the i r national mandate ftom 27 
ti?icmb&ri%96t0 agx«sea to place the Katanga gendaniQri© 
wndar the authority of the President of the R^mjtelic and 
pledg<%d to enstiisf r00pect*iit for the resolutions of th© 
Gteneral Asso^ly end tho Security Council and to f a c i l i -
t a te t h ^ r iB5»leHi9ntatl©n» 
But latar#7shoiabe »ent back on h is woxd and did not 
iii(»leniQnt t h i s t^aolarstion* Aa Palmar and Peckins coaenant* 
"His ecmtiniiad intresigenee poiNid a standing threat to 
$7 
Congolasa unity** 
Of^UC took iijioadista tflsaaures to h«lp restora nomal 
c ivi l ian l i f e in iFlisabathvillo* tmited nations 
ta t ivas continued to press the Katanga authori t ies for 
urgraint and ostpleta i^liEnination of a l l reniaining marcttnaries 
from Katanga* 
In view of t^ eontinoed presence of i3n» mercenaries 
in Katanga* the iJkiited Nations c«pxesentatlves« aetin<i on 
instructions from the Acting Seeretary*Ceneral again issued 
a vaKfi4.ng to the Katwug* au t t^ r i t i e s • On 24 snd 2S January* 
57* Palmer* D* MOKIMMI and Perkins* C* Howard. lategftatiyna-l 
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1962^ tiie crnltoa Nations reip»»««ntativai Infomma th«i 
K«t:adS9» -leaders tMit^  imleas as^enlg. «t^is %imxm tmTmn to 
not 
«lifiiifiat« t!tm rmxemn&rl«>»0 /'ofAf in Sliaab«|^vill« bttt 
elso in etli«r tonna* omic ttoulA not hisaittt1»» to tatk* 
58 
«3JL necessfloey meatitix^s to €o so* 
In response t o this# TahoRt>e» ugmimd^ on 27 Jan* 
nmry I962» to expel the mercanaxies prasent in i^atan^a 
59 
within a iRontli* ikm&me* t*ie Katanga authori t ies did 
not carirv^ut fruitfully t h e i r obligations undar «i© terms 
of tho various agreements* tfmt®f^^, they continued with 
their violations of the agreement* 
iSeamrtiiler ^t the request of the Central C3ovem» 
ment« the united tsations Force took steps to assist in the 
maintenance of la«r and order in Stanleylle« Orientals 
province tihere it was distuxt^ ed by certain developments 
relating t:o Antoine Cizenga* Oijienga* i^ho was apoointwf 
Vioa-Premier in tim Central Oonresnment in Aiigust 196 l^r had 
xwtttmed to Stanleyville in Ovieber on leave of absence of 
eight days* Despite nnmorous rs^ndem f ro^ n the Prime-
Minister* he reSosed ^ return to Leopoldville* H« created 
a new political party and made tfpmme^mm violently attacking 
the Central Govem^nent* *niese led to increasing tension in 
Stanleyville and Orientale provincMi* 
sft, fttfiit*. mmu p* n 
14G u 
Ttitt Hoiui# of ft«px«is<»iitatly««# on 8 Januazy 19$2« 
dirttidid to malut « imqiiest to ths Gevoiamost to oider 
<7ffwiHRi txf x«ttt£it to ZittopoIdMlte wit^fi 46 iiettxw ilk e«dor 
ehar9«« of ••oossioaiffm* tknmymr* Giattnga aid not rotaxn 
to ^10 capital wit^n th« tiine limit* On the »iqht of 
i2 Jmmnmrf 2962* ttio picovinoial, fendamerio i^idi folXotiad 
or&BWB from Qi»swgm$ -toole xtp positions msfUvmiA his sesidence 
and in oainp KeteXot the gendarmerio cai«p« th@y airfo«t«4l th»ir 
oim officer*« Fi^t in^ bfoko«K»ut at Camp icotoio on 13 Jan-
uary 1962 betifooii the gontSaroerio and the arnqr* Ftmrteen 
peraofia were Iciilotd* That next taomingt nsoat of the gendarmera 
stairteruSered to General tmnduila* The omic troops^li during 
the fighting* had been on guard duty throughotit the c i ty to 
protect the civi l ian population* but they did not have to 
intervene* After the gendanaes had aurrenddred tltm OHtlC a«iia« 
ted the troops of the Armee Tlntionale Con^^laiae (AMC) in 
diaaftning the geadarcnera at the rsgueat o€ the Centrml Govern* 
ment* *Shlm operation vaa performed i#itlKnit a ahot being 
filed* On 14 JaBfuary« 19$2« Giaenga aent a message to the 
Prima-Hinister» through the omiC that he f^ould return to 
iieapoldville on 20 %ranuary 1^2* 
Moreover* on 1$ January 1962# the Houae of Represen* 
tativea censure motion for the removal of Giannga from the 
post of Vioe-ps«mi«r was confirmed by an ordinanoe of the 
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Px««i<S(iiit» Thtt Goftmxmmnx «X»o ovAmf^ « JII^IOIAI 
liiv«»ti9«tion txi <3»l5«rmifi« GiaNiiig«*if MapoAsibilitioa 
in thtt 8«Mil«YviX3, imaidmnt of II ^mmmtf S9«3« m ST 
Jiumacy 1%3* Olwin^a Mtiit • me'/ia^ * to th* AetlnQ S«cx«« 
t«ry "^ewiril mmfding ma»nrmiK»; of his aafttty asiA elaim* 
ing thtt deeiaion o£ tJtm furaser of Rflqpiwteiitatiires oomld 
httv« no validity tmtlX he had baan givea a baaxing« tha 
Acstitig S«airfttax3f*<ioiierai on the sane Avf^i^e* 17 Jamtaxy 19#2, 
in a reoasaga to lOie Pdne-.^ftiator Adoula fi^tpniaaed hop« 
t^at Gisenga'a vighta umSar the law would ba fttlly i^apae-
ted« He aaaed that th« United Hationa Foxce wouid «a»» 
pond to iMtouIa's requeata for an^ r aaaiatanee ultidb ndght 
be naeeaaaxy toward enauriag oiswnga'a aafetf. Oa 19 Jan* 
uasy 19i3y Prina Mllniatar Adeuia «ndora«(9 a ratiuieat by the 
Psaaident of t ^ Orientale provincial goveriiMmt and gexuifml 
l^ undnla for ORHC eaaiataai«a to tmmaport Oisenga to Laopoid* 
v l l le* Ado«ila« om 30 Janvuixir 19^2 aamtfiad the Acting 
Seesetar3p«><leiiaral that the Oevemnant would take al l ^neeesaary 
•tape to eayable Giaenga to arail hiaaelf of a l l the legal 
proeeaaea open to hiai twider the lawa in force* oiaenga 
arrived in the capital on 20 Jentiaxy 1962 en a ttoited Mationa 
aircraft. The cmXi afforded him ptoteetion* with the 
appxoval of AdOttla# unti i l 23 Jwauary 1962, when he was 
tranaferred at hie own requaat to hia fexiaer off ie ial reai-
denae* Qiaenga thanked the ^lilited nations and declared that 
14^  
of omic protMetclon «Mi«iEi«d opMt to hlRi* i!t)e Csntxml 
Gov'QrfHMHit thon asvuffled the xesponalbillt^ for Olsenga'a 
protftcticm and safer^ «aid trimaferrea hira on 23 J«ntia£y# 
2962 to a residenca at oaii|> Rhodela^ * then# Glsenga was 
laoved to an iaiai^ at the motatit of the Congo River* In 
fact* t4»e <:^ lic*a pxxKapt and effective role waa a deoislve 
fsK!t»r in saving the l i f e of Gisenfa. Had Giatenga mat 
the fate of the ersti<M.ie Premier UmmtStm^ them the die-
tts)A>anees ^stB taomt lilcelf' tio have been eseaiated* 
Farther on i6 ^fuly 1962# violating a l l pravious 
prcmtisea* Radio Katanga transmitted the text of a cable 
addressed hy the Onion of Katangese t^ enaen to a nunl^r of 
world political leaders protesting against *Vtm diabolic 
plan eonoeiiraid by the thiit»d nations in order to massera 
60 
woman «tid ctiildren and Katangese people****** the following 
Asft a denemstration was staged by a large crowd* mainly 
of woman^ r at the tftiited Haticms road-block on Avenoe foalMiur* 
The Katangese authorities infoxiMid the ornHZ^ evsn before 
the united nations txeops had fixed a few shoots above the 
heads of the denionstrators to disperse them* that a Katvn-
gase woflian had been Icilied* However* an investigation was 
«o. ff»*t»*^ 196a, P. to 
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H« «lao m«dft a psot»*t to TtihotAm to ttui offset th«t the 
demonntrttticm liadi be«n o]?gaiiistt<S hf tho KatsimiMM author! -^  
t i e s \4iio had dono not ing to pmtvent or stop tiu» diaordar* 
Hoiievar# an intamal OlH}C co^miiaaion rap^rtrnd mvime<^mntl7* 
*(i) tha daiBOiiatration had heafi earefu3.X? plaimad aad fully 
stBiported tyjf tha K^tast^ao authozltleai ( i t ) daapita asc-
trene provocatioii# the United Nations soXdiara had eonduet^d 
th^aMeivaa '«rith eixem^lttry disclpllna and rastrainti and 
( i l i ) tim Charges tHat a Kataoi^se vomam and a boy hi^ baan 
MXiad ae rastslt ofi fiea froia (MVIC trexms r^ara <»ini>lataiir 
6i 
unfounded** • 
f4hiXe ttoae dav i^c^pnafits wars taking piaoa# tha 
Aetiiig Saoretar3f«<jNaiai^ l w»9 in Europe oonsuiting iiitii 
various Oovarcmssits on problasHt aueountarad hf tha tMitad 
Kati(ms in tha Congo* Xn tha Advisory Co^mittaa on tha 
Ocmno yihich rasuMid i t s meating at t^ i» tJnitad Natiems Haad 
quarts rs# Hswr Yoxk on 24 JUXy 19«2# tiia Acting Saerstary-
(SanaraX statad that tha racant ineidsnts shonad that tha 
wiXX of t3m Katangase authoritias to find an agraad soXution 
thiough eonaiXiation had irav^ arad* Vigorous and affaotiva 
aeti<m to fuXfiXl idhw tAiitad Nations msitdata was* 1^rafera# 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • M W I I I M I I Ill I II -I •IIIIIMIII I H . I I i l i i i l I • • K H I I I I I l i n i i 
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urg«ntly wqaXwttB i f ch«o» and iK>nfiMion «r«s to be 
wmvtm^ i» tii» OSHC190* H» «a^ i«di ti»«% l»o<^ ifien^ -I^ MI 
{>oXitie«l mUk fJLiuuicial point of vi«ir a l l offorts should 
b« nadtt to ol>taiii en early soltttion to th« probl«iMi 
Itus xjnitmd l^ations objectivcia in ttm Congo t«OY^ d be 
achio^redf for msmBpX@|^ tsf nafegttarding t^a eoimtrjr*a tmity 
and intOHgritf and olaarlng the \#ajr for an early raocianta* 
tion of the Onited Nations Operation towards a atdMtantial 
aealing«'do«m of tiw military aapecta tn fav^ntr of ineraaaed 
tectinieal asaietanca* He alao raiadd the qoeation of the 
IK>aslbilit7 of United £lations i^ nftter states applying econo-
mic pressure on Katanga to cA>lige i t s leaders to act in 
ccMftfoxmity "Mlth United Hati<Mi8 eesolutions. Me recalled 
that* although Urn (MXJC forces had «irice been involved in 
serious fightii^ in Katanga in Septendser and t^oanSsmr i9#l, 
those enc;a<Teiie»ts had been, only in self«<defeneef The united 
Nations had no mandate to end the ae«ession in Katanga by 
force of amw* As regards the fneroenaries* he said that 
i t had beeoRMi very diff icult to appre^ei^ most of them as 
they had teken civi l ian jobs and wave indistinguishable 
fren the European population at large* *Iherefoiei. the pro* 
visions of Idle Semirity Coimcil raselutions no longer affoiled 
^le 0I3UC a good baais for effective action in dealing with 
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th« fmrtmnawi%»* Ttm qiie«tloii« thtia «cos« t^limVtme thm 
Chanel 1 should iiift«t with m rimv to fofmaltttthg A iiinl 
aflondstA for tlm Oirac* or to eXarlfy and st^ngthAii t2w 
existing m«ndato« However* the Advisory Cotmdttmi was 
of the view that the present manaate was adequate and 
that there seemed to be no iKwsessitsf for further Seatirity 
CouiK;iI action* 
The Acting Secretary-Oenaral also informed the Advi*» 
aoxy Comiittee that the Congolese Ooven»aent had decided 
on 20 July 1962 to go ahead with the drafting of a federal 
cmistitutinn aikl had reqwasted for toGlhnical assistance 
from tim tJnited nations for that pnxpose* /tecordinglyt 
tdws Aoting SecretarifMGenersl had arranged with the Govern* 
iMnt» of India« Nigeria end Switserland to proiridb C^st l* 
tutional escperts to the Congo* 
On 31 Jttly 1962t the Anting SecrBtary-'<3e»eral sent 
a Corammieation to a l l tmited Nations Mani>ers« drewing 
their attention to the serious problems in the Congo and 
appealed to a l l Msst>er Oovemmints to mm their infltienee 
*» persuade the main parties concerned that a pet^eful 
solution was in tNiir ona long^ s^erm interests as well as 
in the interests of the Congolese people as a whole* He 
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widsd that i f sttcti p«r»u«sioii wemld finftlly piovv In* 
«f£eG%i««* hm ws^A ntk thorn to oonaldsi* ^ « t ftirtlMr 
•tops WBtmt to b« talcoa* H« maggfUHmd wswaovAe pmtmwm 
of a kind that iumtXA bring home to th« Kutan^ese autho* 
ritiaa the realitiaa of their ait»iatiott and the fact 
that Katangik i^^ ui not BovQtmign atate a»d warn not racog-
nised by any Oavesnraent in the t^^ orld* 
"Sim Aotii^ SeerataryGeneral alao diacnaaod this 
matter with several delogationat particitiariy with tiwae 
states whidti had made major contributed to the 0W2% 
XII. t7.ahant*o pian of national Reocmeiliationt 
ha it turned out« the diaenssions with the Katangase 
authorities broHe down finally as a result of the "proerea* 
St 
tination and intranaigence of thm Katangeae leaders* Xn 
view of the failure of the negotiations* the Seeaeetary-
General l7«7hant#hifiiBelf» after eonaultationa with various 
m^tomr States* prc^ >osed in Augiwt 1963* a "Plan of National 
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Aaconciliation*** 
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This plan waa presented as a woxicing propoaal* both 
to Adoula and TahooftMi for aettling the problem of tha seea»-> 
• y 
' ' ' • f 
63, 8Kiiiyman*a UMilMd Nationa- 8th ad* (1968)*p« i7S 
#»• EBCtiiirirTi 
64* flia PXm pfWviiad for a federal ayatasi of gavaiwunt? 
Mviai&n af zaivaiMMS and foiaisn ait^ iaafffa aafniafs bat* 
naaii the ^miiral and proviwiial «eva«mMM%8f uniiicatian 
of idm 9mtmmf§ iiiiMgiratioii end unifisAtton of a l l 
• ( p j a a b wh TBWB^PFas W ' J^^^wP^WP^^^f^a^> Wl^m w , y ^BHWi^^ a|n^™WP8WiMPH^^PRaa'a"^^ - .^ i^^^^^iW^ •'Mt^im'^ntf VH^NV 
rr > 15. 
sicrn of Katongia* 
a» "course of aetioa** In tho fixvt ohasot imiitioitod 
isflMtdiato action to b« taken by the C^aitx l^ and Katanga 
aiililiorltiaa* with tmited Hationa aaaiatanoe* the aecond 
pren^ded that dttsing the ten <CtiKfm tolltming tho pxmaentation 
o£ nm plan# other OavexmmntB T#ould u z ^ the Katanga 
authoritiaa to aoeeot that pxoooaal and would plan ai^eific 
oireaaurea to induce theia to do ao* The thisd tshaoe provided 
that the <%9ivemm8nt o€ the Co«i^ would* i f Katanga failed 
to accept* t^e Plan within thia ten day period^ maik a l l in* 
tereaxei^ Gov^tmmmts to prohibit thetimport of Ce^per and 
Cobalt fro^ Katmga into their respective territoriea* And 
theae Goven»Mnt would in turn talca action to cc»iiply with 
thia raqpaeat and to aaaiat in achieving the daaixed reaulta* 
fiiia neaaurea for the fourth i^aae le f t tiM> pos»ibility open 
for eonaultatiomi between Oovenmanta in order to detennine 
other flvplic«d>le niaaauraa i f the «ibove««M»nti<Mied did not 
atruetuxe of a national army; proelMMtion of a geisMitral 
aaneatyf zeeonatitutlon of the Central dovemmeat to 
pxovide reprsaentation for al l pol i t ical and provineial 
grouqpai with drawl of a l l tepraaentativea abre»i^  not 
aerving under the autlwritir of aatut C«itral Ooxrefnwanti 
and freedem of iM»wea»Rt for the united Hationa Peraoanel 
thiougliout the country* (Kwervwan'a «nited Hationa. Sth ^d* 
I9«»# P, I t s ) 
«S* S¥effynaR*a QMltad !iationa«tldi ed#(i96a)»P« 17S 
154 
vihile mvHamitting thtt pXmn to th» Caiitral Gov«n»M»nt 
and iC«t:«n9« author!ti««c the OffieBr-irHQiarge o£ OMUC 9m6» 
i t el««r that that the Plan WMI to ba aoeapted or rajactad 
in i t s aRtlfety and! was not naqotlat^e. The plan was 
aeeaptad InMsediately by Ptitm Minister Adoula and bjr Tahowiae 
66 
after mcmm delay* 
On the acci5>tanc© of the pian« t*ie Office p-in-Charge 
transmitted on 10 Septen^r 1962 a programme for inrnediate 
inpleaientation to Prime rtiniater Adotila and Tsha^be« 
The pto<7wuara9 inoltided# "(a> oo^letlcm of the <lraft of a 
Federal Constitution hy the emA of Se t^eraiber and i t s subse-
quent stA»tBission to Farliarasnti (b) tJ^ drafting of a finan-
cial law on the division of revenue and foreign exchange 
earnings to be integrated in the constitution and sub.idtted 
to Parllansnt* (e> tne inraediate taking of an oath of legianoa 
to the Irasidant of t^ ie HapvOOlic by ^im Coomanders of a l l 
militaxy« para«>i«ilitary or (^ndarmeria uiiitsi (d) the procla-
mation of met cuienatr by tl»9 Central Government authorities f 
im) the dissolution of the Katangese 'Miniatxy <>£ Foreign 
Affairs* and the withdrawl forthwith of a l l Katangese nissi«ns 
and representatives abroadi wid (f) an of far cm the part of 
the Caiitral Gevamneiit to as^gn to mssibars of the Conakat 
§6* Priflie rtinislMur Adoula on 23 Asigust i963,aoeaptad tha 
Plan as "a tol^n of goodnvill to uliidh we eaiinot rasiain 
indiifarant*** TMieaide a««aptad i t on 3 SaptasiMiv* 1962* 
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Pmttt of i^ittangs c»rtaln Ninlsttm in a s«eonstitttt*d 
6«iitral BmmmmBn%** Tim ptpgvmmm mltm emXXmA for crtation 
of 9 nianid eomnsisttiofw to wosfc out th« pr«etie«i d«t«il« 
enbodiad in the miiitsiry and finanelal pzoviaiona of tha 
Pl«n« 
ChEi 27 Saptestiav i963« a draft Federal Constitution* 
prepared in consultation with a pmmX of constitutional 
experts providad by tha lAiitad tlatioA8# vas aufemittad to 
Prime-Miniater Adoula# Thia was transmitted by him to the 
Bureaae of the two cha-tjaerw of Parlia'nRnt on 11 Oct©ber# 1962, 
The diraft Constitution was again stidatnitted to a Gonference 
of provincial prasid^its held at Leopoldville from 16 to 
23 Ootolier 1962* 'Site Katan^so authorities* thouc^ invited* 
did not attend* Tim ccmferenee s^toptad a resolution invi-
ting Tatvoatm to eo«»operate constructively and sinoeraly 
with the Central OoveinsasBt moA other provinces* 
HeaBirtyile*sittincr8 of tim throe Con-nissioas be^aa at 
Ellsabethville* These co^nmisaions «fera ooiqposed of r«^te* 
sentatives of the Cwitcal and Kataimese authorities* as^«sted 
by lAiited nations eaqpMirts* the f irs t meetinq of the militaiy 
commission toole place cm 22 3ept«niMir 1962* iitilch the 
Foreign isnshange and Reventui Convidlssions imt on 24 8eptesA>er* 
However* the disevsslons tihich follotnid did sot yield amy 
pesitive lesults* tlie Offi«er*in«-Charge of the OMOC then 
4mw the attention of the two parties to the eenmitiieiits whioh 
tlwy iiad made in aoeepting the Plant 
«'^ » l i S i i t * t f i i t »• 72 
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Tlu» Prim mnis%»r Mo)tl«# cm 9 mavm/lmt 19«3 wm-* 
§.&!ttim&- lii« mxppott ^ tOtm Plm m*^ poin^mA out that 
e¥«irfthla9 posalbla h«d be«n don* to i^ply i t s tmlwmmt 
psotrlftlons by his Gmt^rmmntt «veii in the pf«e« of gtttmt 
provocation on t ^ part of Katangeaa atithorities* Me also 
of farad t^ ih t^dse roinistartal poata for tienitoers off the 
Conaleat Party* On 12 eioveaiier t96Z, TahofiOset aaa^cing to 
diapel the dotibta of tiie Acting Secratary-Generalu atat®d 
that he waa as determined aa av^r to apply the Plmit and 
denied reports about hia adopting a aeparatiat attitnde* 
Me zecsalled in that e€«meetion that $ 2 millimi in foreign 
esecdwinga had tm&» allocated to the C^trai oovemment«that 
rail traffic over tim luilyilaah Bridge was re<»c^ pened^  and 
l^Xecomninieaticms wit^ lieopoidville had been reaunad* 
On the otNar hand# he biamad tlu» Prioe Miniater Ado^a for 
aabotaging the work of the CotnialsaiQfia in fsliaabathvilla 
and for rajeoting the eaaaefii'-.ra aeoord intiallad on 16 
Ooto3>ar 191^ 2* Zn addition to ttieaa* TahonfeNi obaarrad that 
the Central Oovemmant had not fulf i l led i ta uadaratanding 
to aii»niit a Federal Conatituticm to tha Parliament in 
Saptwatwr 1962* The draft Conatitution pritpamd %faa not 
truly fedxtral in diaraetar aa leqnirad by tha Plan* Ha 
denied that Ketwnga had ever maintained, niaaiona abroad 
ainee i t waa not raeogniaed aa a state by any other country* 
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Tshonbe* on 12 Hwr^wimv 19C2 i««ti«d a px««s 
AiqiM in «Aiieh hit atao l^ liuMMi %h« OintTttl Qov«vnnniit for 
i t« £«ittix« in ttm iiiipl«n«nt«tion of the Plan of national 
Baisttnciliation* H» once again chax^ ged tho Unitod nations 
iirith looking for a protaxt to J^tstify i ta uae of foseo* 
On 16 HovitndNir«i962# in h is mplt* tho Offieer»i»-Charge 
denied tli^ alleqations of Tmhmbm* The 0£fieex^in*>Qiai;ge 
8tr»»»ea tOiat tJi© cwnly way to eomrinee the Acting Sacrotary-
Oan^ral and the world opinion that Kataaiga had daoidad to 
ZBnounce »©cea9lon would h& to adopt th© following st€fp»» 
*(a> to send Katanga*© senior railitary officer to toopold* 
v i l l e Kfithout ^ l a y to take tho oal^ of allo^iancs to tha 
Prealdent of the Republie; (b) to annoTinee ifiniadidt» ee^ a* 
afteea for applyinei the provisions of the Plan coneeming 
ravenne*^  finaneea end foreign exchanger (e) to author!ae 
the Central Govemaent'a CuatcHns and inmigration off ic ia ls 
to carrsrout their ftineti<ms in iCat«aga as elseifhera in 
the Gongof <d) to allow e<»npl«te f xeed<Mn of moKrmmMt to 
a l l omJC peimowMl in Katanga* inelitding Jadowille# 
l%nirftii and Kolwaai^and (a) to oo«€»amkte irith the omjC 
in osdler to eliminate a l l meseenaries from t^ ie gendaxmerie* ** 
On his p8rt# President KaaavitfMf on 26 l^ veaftyer i9i2« issued 
a proelatnation of Annesty* 9«it« on t ^ Katanga side no 
^S* lf* ,^ft«**1962* P» 73 
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p»tiitiv« stops ymtm ta^kmn tmmrds ijic>l«m««itlng Vhm 
Tiwrmviptmf in evtor to Ami with tli* mm fiil)«t«cil.« 
to p«aeo« Vtm S0«f«rtiavf**<3«fi^ ]»il i«<l^st«(!U on 13 DoGsniMir 
t962* various Montoex^  States to put ttconomic-i>x«ss«UE« on 
thft Katanga atithoxiti^s*' B& tec0mmnam& speoiall^f tlio 
69 
stopping of tbe Copper ana Cobalt from Katanga* 
After repeated tmsuecesSlNil dlscmssions with Tghxmkm* 
the Uhit^d Mations tr«»3ps« on 28 D&ce^ iber 2962« took action 
to remove gen(3arme«ie road blocks near Blisabet^ville* 
During tOiese operations l i t t l e resistance was offered ^ y 
tiMi Katttfi^ese* Even daring t ^ s periods ever? opporttmity 
was given to Tshonibe moH his provincial ministers to give 
practical evidenos of their readiness to put into effect 
the'plan of national Reconciliation*to i^ich l^iey had 
earlier agreed* At the saaietlne the Katangese aathorities 
were warned against carrying into effect l^ieir threats of 
toassive destnaetion of the mining and power installations 
in South Katanga* 
7inally» on 14 Januarr 1^3* Tshonbe and his minis* 
ters enpressed their readiness to end the secession of 
Katanga^ to grant frsedom of tnovemant to the united Watioas 
«#• •vsrywan^s united MatioiUi* 0th ed. 19««# P« 17« 
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tfo«p» «nd t o eo«<<9«£«tft with thtt t)kiit»4 HatioiMi in tlM 
TO 
iotpXttflMiiititiofi of tlie E^ lwt» 
ifi£oxiwia tUttt Ti^ionbe \m» pjmp^tmA to mmmt omsc wpmrnrnW' 
tativtt in SliaabAliiviXie in of^ ftir to ^iseu** tim nodalities 
of Qtmc'tf ftntsy into Kolwoai* Xn th« do<:iiiii8nt wtiieh WAS 
si^nnd on ttio foiiomisig day* Tshenftse pl«ag«<I liinmlf to 
faci l i tate omc*9 peaoefisi entire into Kolvoai* wtiich was 
to ti^e place hf 21 Jantiaxy 19^3 • This asttry WUB to b« 
carried out in ejesircise of the omc'm freedom of oiovement 
throtiQhout the Congo as f ranted to i t by th© Central Govern-
ment pending arrangements vmSmr the Secretary«^neral *8 Plan 
for the reintegration of the gendarmerie* Msnflaera of the 
gendexmerie would not be treated as prisonere-of^tmr or 
arrssted aiuS would be allowed to continue to wear t ^ i r 
unlfoxtas* They would* however# gather their aims and 
anniGniiti'^ n in ^^ ne Central ildepot wider omjc a»itrol. 'Rie 
ICataoigese authoritia* would have laines and othsr eaqp l^osives 
In aceoidanae with this agieanent* the ^tuited Nations 
tsoops entered Kolwasi en 21 January«l963 without any 
xesistanee* further* the tuiited stations feprssentatives 
mat 'ftAimibm, %ilio reiterated his ^ftsteimination to carxy out 
iGu 
th« Smamt^t^MimmwAVB plan of HatlegiAl iiacofieiliAtlaa* 
By that tiM»« Oirac tfoopa h«a gained eoiitioX of a l l inpoz** 
taut fl»fitrtt« hitlmrto Iteld by tha Katan^ira gandaxaeria* 
iihid) had eaaaod to exist aa an oxgmaizmA £i^tlngf fo««a» 
tha nieix»Baxlas oppeaxed diaoxgaaiaed and %tmvm xaportad 
to hai>^  l e f t by train for the J^ ngolan bosdar where# thay 
wave diaaxsae^ checked tyy omic and eftar the naeeasacy focma-
litiaa<* imwe to be sent to t2ieir cotmtries of oxlgin* 
During thia period tim relations betifeeo) tim OKOC 
officii^ls and the local atithoritiaa iiti^rovad* In Bliaabethii^ille* 
joint patrols of Tunisian soldiers and Katangeae police were 
organised and were success fnl in bringing theft and looting 
tmdar control* Good relations %}ere maintained with t l» judi-
c ial authoritiea* notably with tJm Katangeae-Procurer d* stal* 
DurinQ the f irs t week of January 2a«t96I Officials add 
Officers repr^sentating the Central Oovenment were floim to 
Slisabethville* There they oonstitutad an Adniiniatrative 
Cotwniaaion ii^i«^ was to prepare the way for the integration 
of the provincial administx^ticm within the Central Ciioy»n»mnt» 
Xiao arrived from Leopoldville on 33 January 1963 to assnma 
his duties as Minister ftasident* omic experts took up the 
restoration of piibliG sarvieas aueh as postal* customs and 
imnigratiOA ••wri.«^» and eonmasvial air traffic* bceadaasting 
and talaooaMMiicatioH* Thay also undavtook a spaaial and 
uffant sunray of ^la psobleMs ef repair of the biri^ Hyasy i sa i s 
IGx 
Monetasy Council of th« Cpngo #»»lgiiftte(1 « IMW «dmlni«-
tz«tor to 6»ml with i&m queestlon of th«*Hatioiiai Baalc of 
Katuuiga* «nd rmxaltf tite fiscsai authority of tim QCM^O. On 
7 <^ aima];3f iM3y Pstiw ^^nistexr Moiiia <3@c!iax«<S tliat ^Bdar* 
taas vejoinifig the A^ #^ois3.a sotaia thair ra«(}c aitd tjositiona* 
In the imaiitiaa* some €»>iif l icta oceneed in tsosio places* 
specially in South Kasai. Th& O'^T; Joined tt» Congo Gavmrn-
laont in i t s appeal for peace and aiibsoqtiently took nec^aaary 
meaattrt^ s to rsstoro o»ier» In other regions* c iv i l strifa 
had largely ended, ttwi Of£i«!Wfr-in««<Jha»g0 on 20 January i962# 
visitad Albertville, Goran &nd siianlayviile and reportad that 
thtt ailtuation ^ms qai&t and noz^nal. 
Ttm Secretary-Oen®ral#t>--i©iant# reported on 4 Fcdoxviary 
1963,to the Security <%Rincil« that the secesaion of Katanga 
had ended a?id the xemovnl of foreign militaxy* para^>fflilitary 
peraowoel and of maroenariee had* for a l l practicel pur» 
poeed« been acHieved* ^U8# 19<I3 was macleed by the eem* 
pletie«i of an ieptirtant phaae of the united Matione Opera* 
tion in the ccmgo (€lliic}|, a« neat of the ainei of the Opera-
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tien were in large '»Murare achieved* 
fl« M^mgfmm*m tHiited Metioiift*9«li id*»|96tb9* 17« 
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tha o«n«r»l hmtmatoXTf dmeidmf^ on 18 October i9$3 
to itietiiKI t h i itisr df ^Im tJiiitea Na^ess foxec un t i l 3d Juxm 
1964« to eoatifimt to osalat the Coimoleee Afmy and the Police 
in the nwintenanee o£ l«if m%d orOmr in the ccnmtxf* 1)ie 
Central Aes^nblv passed t^is ceaolution in response 1»> a 
74 
xreqiiest to tha t effect made by the Ctmgolese Ocnremment • 
I t e to ta l strength of the Powas had been brou#it down to 5*871 
officers and other e«n3cs toy the end of 1963. I t %fa8 further 
gradually reduoed during the f i r s t half of 1964 unt i l i t s 
7S 
eonjolote withdraMl by the target date . 
Til© Secretary-Ceaieralf in h i s report of 29 Jtane 1964 
reaffirtied tha t reost of the c^kjective© off the tailted Katioas 
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Operation in the Congo had heen ac^iieved, The c iv i l ian ope-
rations progra^nties was formally discontintsad with the eonple* 
t ion In Jtme 1964# of the mili tary phase of osnic* 
Xt can be seen from the fo rs^ lng that* ttM» Congo 
d e r a t i o n was the tos t eoniplex operation ever authorisad* 
financed* and adndnistexed hf tm international organisation* 
I t was "a novel enterprise that r3z«ocei^»i«d pol i t ic ians from 
73. Oeaeral Assenfely resol^tfen 1885(5CVlli)-X«2£a4.*i9«3 *P»0* 
74. lyigymiy!*.! ^M%id t^eUffii»*®<H •«» * I 9 6 8 * P , 177 
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tliimi &9tmn «tat«« ior ttmr fmmm an^ mtimtli^f 
jcefHtcdiawa %h« futam of ths tinitea NatlofM." 
Zt w«8 a dttmoiuitmtion of the &>rt&etsmmf%m poller 
thmt m fifm h«ttSlii^ of the 8lt»ati(!ii witl% i^hm iMMttsaaty 
C9«tralfi«8# «#oti!,dt make ttvs pea<so«)e««is»l,iig opacatiots of 
th»i ttttitad ^aticma a auecasa* *Sim txxxvlble ahoold have 
bean »*8>P®« in th© ****** 
1G4 
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Both thtt S»ei«t«rles Oenaral, Dag HamnMkralcjold and 
^•Thant played a vital role in solving the Congo ariaia« 
ifiiich ^rippod the Young neptdsHc Inmediataly aftar i ta 
indepandaiiea* 
Dag Hammaralcjoldf in ^sn^nse to the appe»al of tiim 
Congolaae Govomoiaat convoned without an/ dalay# a maating 
of the Security Council on 13 J^ly I960 tmdar hia authority 
aa tha SacratiarsHSanaral* He thua involcad for the f lrat 
I 2 
tiras in tmitad KTations history* Article 99 of the Charter* 
He conaidared this to be an irr^rtent constitutional x^a^on 
and a baala for hia ecKK e^ption of «n energetic* impartial* 
3 
and independent Secretariat* 
ha in each peaee-^keeping operetion* the Secratery-* 
4 
Gaaerel waa given the taalc of eseecuting a sMUidate from a 
1* vide»aiiqpra»Ch« ZlZ«p« b ^ 
2« Dayel,Re3eai»ar»g^ff#^oyi f9ff ffjgmjnU^lgMiJ^ 99mfSt ^g l t l» 
P, 298 
3« Citrin«Jacki tmitad Nationa Peaee-keeping Aetivitieat A 
eaMt atudy in Oiganlxational TaaX K3qpanaiontfP«297*Sd.Gxttgg« 
R«ir*aiid Baxkun,M| the umtad Hatione Svatea and i t e funo 
4. Iliia involved an aaai gmaant for the 8eeratery<3enaral» Hfta 
teeka had to be delineated in formal inatraetiona or a 
mAdate« Tfm in i t ia l mandate in each pea«e*-keepin^ miaaiem 
had crucial iii|^rtanee«Xt eet into motion the leoruitmant 
and daploywMMit of a fox«e nt'^Mm early mcMMintaM atrongly 
influftAaed i ta future doveionwaitta* (<!gf r^fl|ke««P»23y> < 
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iMthoria*<S "s^emtmTT*'^mmT9il »mitmm>kS&XA to fpk« th« 
ifiildL«l steps In «h« c^ngo CMMI* Ki»if«v«r# HamMMkioK 
hinuMlf •ugg«st»a th«t thtt s«aitrltr Couneil should neesas 
the request of tho Con^Iese Govfmtmmmt for mllltaxT s s s i s -
tsnod* He aia not egzeft with the ide« of using foxes by 
some t^^a&mr States^ spedal,Soviet i^ nion In sol'V'ing th« 
Congo crisis* as he xegaraed the tise of fore® *as a sin* 
and anger and hatred as an offemse against God and tnsn". 
li«SRiairskJoid tooH inrasdiate ataps t?> Isiplement the Security 
coimcii resolutions* Hs set vip the tJhitad illations Operation 
In t3i® Con^ Coiiuc) and made the necessary arrangeiaant for 
t*» depioj^ tmtnt of the tJhited Nations Force in lOsttanga* 
To resolve t^ ie Katanga problem in a oeaeeful manner 
he asked Tshonlde to co-operate in the task of ensuring the 
withdrsurl of Belgian pr>rsonnel and urged him to niake efforts 
in that diceotion* Meanwhile* Haranssrskjold instructed 
BuAtthtt* his Special Representative in the Congo to take the 
cmic to Katanga* «#ien he found that entrjf into Ketanga could 
not be adHieved witl^mt the use of force* but that he vas not 
empoMsrad to use foroe#he asked for further consideration 
of lOw iMtter by the Security council. 
5, qoiiasgiey»l^ni IheJflilml ifpt^t9fli^fCTtriigr'<?illfyil,aB^ 
»«liifiHMay no civcumstances can the Se«s»taffy«Mieiiei«i 
actint flU Ills OMi atttiiofity dispatch a p«aos'»kea|^ ing f««ce-
9m Ifl^ 
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Tlui fikiouritir Council,* in i t s intsolution of 9 Av^^st 
iSKftO^  sciftin authofltiMl the Skfcr<itarf*'Q«ii«g«JL» Ummms^hjohS, 
to «N!»atiiiu« th« raaponaibiiity pXmstid on him bjf th« p m -
viouB ]?6soXution0» Btoroover , «»«! pr«»v«ilinig opinion in 
the Seenirity Council. strotK^ly femmmA Haimnarvkjoid's ooai«> 
8 
t ion . Only Frwnee 8n6 Italy* tiAi08« deiegates abstained* 
failed to give positive supoort to a draft wteioh eonfirmad 
the authority of tJie Seoreta]ryM3eni»ral to seeate the with-
arawl of the Belqian ti^30p8« Again* i t called upon tii© 
Bru0del8 GoverxB^nt to get i t s aoldiere out of Katanga 
imnnediateiy "un^r siMted?' modalities detenaiined by t}»9 Se» 
crotary Oenesnl*" 
^he adoption of the *Si>e«M3y raodalities** resoluticm 
early in August i960 cnaiik^ the success of Hanmarslciold in 
gaining the stqpport of the Council for h i s policy* The ra-
solution also helped to maintain heavy international pressure 
10 
on tha Belgian Goverreaant* Hammarskiold arranged for eva-
cuating i t s troops Xrasi ftnltflam with considerable daring* the 
entry of united Steitioni 
middle of August I960*" 
tsat s troops into Blisabethville by the 
11 
T# V4426 
8* Gordenlc«r*I«7 The qnited Mation^ 3^^ tanM3fpara l ^nd 
Wm minfmn^^im of Mwrn* ^ a6a-269 
»P. 269 
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X«t«R9a*ii WAtmwion pwmamfXkmA an emlMitandinqi exaaipXe 
of an int«xn«l di&vmlGfpamnt ^iot) rmqpiitmA « radical adaptatimi 
of tlie policy by the Sacrotazy^Genaral* But i t wafljrparhap«# 
a iaelc of such adaptation that lad to a beealcdotm of eoopa-* 
xwtive selationsAiip beittfttoii the Sacxatary^Oanarai and the 
Congolaa^ ^ Psemier* Haiiaaralcjold aaw the oatiaa of the qtiarral 
12 in the <iuesticm of the tisa INO %rhi«di omjc ahould ba putt# but 
he saw no ways of avoiding it« 
Lurmiaiba insisted tha t the tflait^d "^Jations force ahould 
priJtBrily serv^ tho alms of the Ceatiral Govejaamant in res to-
ring i t s authority* t-l& i?eaot©<3 strongly wJien llsBatiiara1c|old 
ordered omic troops into Katanga without bringing in unita 
13 
of tha pate (Azmee ^rationale Congolaiae) • UxmrntoA declared 
tliat t^e csovernaient and the peqple of the Con<g^  had l o s t 
t he i r confidence in ^hn Secr^stary-General ar^ pcopoaad hia 
14 
replaottiaant by a Ccr-itnittcsQ of African States* 
By th i s time* thara were dei^lopnMrnta in the poliety 
of the Soviet ttoion towards the Congo whi<di consisted in 
giving di rec t aid to the Central Goverxiaaent* Aithou^ t h i s 
was professadly limited to the supply of c ivi l ian transport* 
i t meant a ehiiige #f s i tuat ion for tiie omJC in the Congo* 
II• M&**^* '^'^  
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civil aix«->ciir«ft and cM»tor vehlelas* This was not M^avdad 
by Ha iniarskjold aa being in eon£ozrtiiit^  with his cautious 
policy on pseventln^ £or«i^ Interfarenca in Conciolaaa internal 
affaix»« 
Xn a long and spirited statement Kamnarskjold 
deisand^ that the Security Council ahould call upon Menbers 
that all ©Id to the Congo bo <»jamr>llad through tJws united 
16 
Kationa# a policy h® had ettemptod to Qooly abinltio» 
fh© Security Council, however* could eqree on nothing 
and suntixmed the General Asaerably to an emergency special 
seasion (17 September to 20 '^ apterateer I960),, to meet imrnedilitely 
preceding the regular session* The emergency Special session 
vqpheld the policies pursued by Hanvnerskjold* Be received a 
specific rsoo iV«endation to continue the execution of the inan-
date given hiia by the Security Council* Hudbrntm were also 
asked not to pnavide any aid to t^m Congo* except through the 
C»n3C channel* Fully supporting the resolutions of 14»22 tT^ ly 
and 9 August* I960 of the Security Coimcil* Special session of 
the Assembly rssolutico requesteds 
*the Secr®tary>-Gene ral to continue to 
take vigorous action In accordance with 
the teems o£ the aforesaid rssolutions 
and to assist the Csntral GoveKfimsAt of 
l^e Congo *n the restoration and tsaiiits* 
nance of law and ovder tlivougho^ t tlia 
territory of idte stsptiiblie of the Con^o and 
It* 
1G9 
Intogifitf and p e l i t i e a l lnd«qi>«iKlftii«i» 
in the i»t«iwst« of lfit»mittlc»i«i poaee 
and securtty"* id 
On th^ other heend« the Soviet ttoion c r i t i c i sed the 
Secretarr*^n^ra3L#<!le{iianded[ hia reaignatlon and pot fr>xw«rrf 
it proposal to x«!r>iac^ hira by a collective e^esctitive (troika) • 
The proposal was not «m*port»r* hy a majority of Hanibera^ 
In the wordte ot Bailey# D« Sydney* " 
«t I t i s not in disrmte that the 
Soviet Oovemment ataffered a 
aedbacjk in the Congo* but i t 
ae&ma t o me aigfti£icant that the 
* troika* idea warn Xindc«rd clodely 
to possible future deweloiaaenta in 
relat ion to disamMfaent and the 
peace-keeping ftmcti'^ns of the 
tmited nations'** 19 
Ha«marskJold in his reply explained his position 
as the Seeretary-Oeneral and refuted the charges of Soviet 
Union that he was biased against the Socialist Countries* 
Bsqolaining his position^ he saidi 
** Somatims one gets the impression 
that the Cimgo deration is looked 
at as heing in the hands of the Se» 
cretary-Oeiieral*as distinct from the 
Vnitsd Nations* Nos this is your 
Operation* qentlesNun*-*™—-
It is for you to indicate what ycvu want 
done* lis the sgeiit of the Organisation* 
X asi gratefMA for amy positive sdvicst 
but if HO mmh positivtt advice is forth-
co«i»f "• -""•wtiisii X lisv« »o chsios bwt to 
f#Elkint s|f own oswi^ rtotiMif ««».«§«>«« 29 
9^ IMI 
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But*thr«« montha i«t«r# th« a«ner«X AaMMM£>iy did 
jresfiNMid %o tim SmGxmt»xy^miimimt*m-ptmm for addlitioitai 
support* Th9 Congo s i tuation had deteriotad and saemad 
to be gattlng oat of hand* Soma of Mia African a\:ipporter9 
21 
were beginning to filthdraw thair troops. 
Itia very off ice of Secretary General was under severe 
attache after the arrest of Lumnrtba* The troubles in the 
Congo caat the ir shadows in ^ e ^ i t e d Nations al80# ieadinc? 
to further divial<»i anjong the Meaabers* nag Hanntarslcjoid 
declared in the Security Council that the united Nations Force 
under united Naticms cofwaand* was the only bcxJty that could 
resct»Q the Ccmqo frcen the situntion into t^ildj i t has fal len* 
22 the body#ho^rerver, could adopt no resolution* 
the s t o m of indignation that followed the Kil l ing of 
LwmsntHi resulted in the broadest m^mdate yet given to the 
23 
®ecratary«^3eneral and OHUC. 
The Hentoers of the Ckmncll cm 21 Fsbruary 1961 (wil^ 
France aoid tht% Soviet ^Jnion abatalning) decided that the imdted 
Nations should tmke measures to prevent c i v i l war* using force 
24 
lif necessary* t h i s was more than what the Sscrstary^-6eneral 
had asked for* He had never direct ly requssted to be given 
the H^t to use force* He had remaffced at tiiaes i^at no part 
<*»IW»M»«I»««»»»1»WI<II»»III»III»«» • I I III II Iiiillii. •l»IM»l<»»«««l«*pl«>l|»«l«««M«»«l«M*li Ill 
ifiiiiiiffrffftiimgi^ il!*^ -
iirtlier see supra* Chap* III 
P»S1 
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25 
Of hi« MMundato e n t i t l e d him to Ao so* 
The veeolutitm of 21 FdbxueiY 1961 a lso urged 
the deper ture of BeXgiert and other foreign paraml l i t a r f 
personnel and the reoonvening of t^e Congolese P«rlianM»nt« 
Hsfamarslcjold taMng pronpt act ion, reached Leopoldville 
on 13 September 1961. Me i n t e n ^ d negot ia t ing perstmally 
the eet t le isent of the vacat ions i ssues with the Central 
Government of ths Con«^ and the Katangese leadesns* Bm 
offerad t o nsep-t personally with "PshOiabe* the leader of 
Ketanga at Ndola#Northern i^odesia* to find peaceful methods 
of resolv'ing the codfl ict# so t h a t a ytvf could be opened 
for the so lu t ion of the Katanga problem within the e x i s -
26 
t i n g frametfork * The fa t e fu l meeting a t Bdola had been 
fiiisd for 17 SeptenAser 1961 • In the fiords of Hajeswar 
Dayal# "The Secretary^-Oeneral proceeded t o h i s assignment 
with dtostiny with his hands tied d^wn in his negotiations 
27 
and even his p<^ rsonal safety in Jeopard^ **• The Secretary 
General and his party took off for Ndola fxxm iieopoldville 
on 17 Septetitoer 1961. The Secretary-Oen©ral*s party consisted 
of Heins Wies-Chhoff ^ o had acoonpanied him from New To£k# 
Vladimir Fabry ulio was included because of his close personal 
knowledge of the situation as onDC's legal adviser# Bill 
1%* id>»gdenkeg* o* 276 2^« XiSEaS** 1961* P. 63 
^'f* &l!KftLi.Jl£illMilC« !*• 277 
1^ , • ! 
nmtfoi0t* Othttr* vAm Joinadi tlM iai»«ioii Inel^ idNkl • Coi«aga» 
fvsm Qmic*m s«<5urity S«rrice8« Ser9«ant Henry <7 l^l,«tnuAlios 
Lalaitdbr a Caaaaian SiNsmtaxy \4io had wexked with 0«nic 
£ro?«) tha beginning o£ the ^ejmtinn* and ivaa looking aftar 
s«er«<%tarial wofic* the xemainificr B»ii«>«rfi of the party included 
^wo s^^dish ijuarda* a tinited "Jatiotia French Security guard* 
and an Irish inimstigator* *fh© Captain of the aircraft was 
as 
iialionquiat aaaisted by a or&^ o£ five Swedea* The plane 
carrying thla party tmd& due east to avoid Katancja, But* 
the i!)onentou0 expedition €or peace ended tragically in the 
crash of th<^  aircraft* follo«fed by the death of Dag Haiiimai> 
akjold and t^e entice entourage* Rajjeawar Dayal aptly <«m-
cludedt 
"Hammaralcjeld did not seek luiKOiaMi* 
martyrdCMNi* or death* I t waa death 
that eama to him like a eonaumaatiOR* 
carrying in i t s arms t l^ gariand of 
martyrdoni**«29 
Aa Dayal addadt "He i^ io had ccmaorted with FraaideUta 
end Kinga laat his end in a lowily jungle* clutching leaves 
. . d , » » in h i . ^ ^ h « a . - . ' ° 
li>¥gltii>w<xiaixiqtitiiiy»yx>w»xtH»xfewMgxiig»ktiiix«f«lat«^ 
i t . 
l » . llii»«> 
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According %o nottmmt IfiuKumikjoId's poliqf w«s 
an aittiMnpt to find • Middle wmy imt thmwm w«i tt cetntrwirt 
b«twtt«ii th« wtkY in i«hleh he tosed hie mm pmmxm end the 
30A 
feahioii in i^ieh he interpeeted the xinlted Kfatione sdeeion* 
lianmarskjold decided to tmk» the Seoreteiy*a General *e role 
es iexge aa eoncseivaabie* For the £irat timei. he used tm 
hia init iat ive under Article 99 of the Charter ma |>ointed 
out earlier • Secxotd # he made poaitive auggeationa to 
the Security Cotavsil and took a leading role there* Hia 
aug^atlona were enft>odied in tha earlier reaftlution and 
he waa given important miaaidatea* Third* tm uaed hia own 
diaeretion to intnirpret the broadly divided reaolution and 
decided npoa the llndta of hia otm powera to carry out the 
mandatea* I t may be aaid# howaver* that the polit ical organa 
paralyae by diaaention failed to give him a clear««ni% guidanoi. 
Hanaaarakjold'a estplained in hia <hcford apeeeh of i9<i» he 
waa determined to act until and unleas diavoiied by the pol i -
t ieal organa** and he waa challanged at timea« but wvtrmv dia* 
vowed by any majority* 
Hoifevar# mUmtm the role of the Organisation i tae l f 
%Mm «tonoemed# we have aeen how aubtly narrow the Secretary^ 
General *8 eonci^pta and interpretationa were* Be«auae of 
hia Inaiatenoa on a limitation of Q^Uitad iiationa enda and 
iiaaAa the Congo operation appeared to be plagwid bf thvae 
eOHtradiotiona* Vh*va waa a ffoiitiradietion betweeH ^la laa* 
Mtg i i a of gjvil war* and a pgingiple iiii«h • 0mm though 
i i ^ MoiftiHiii, ftattlayt tm aa««ili of a Irtifitait 
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I t wMi d«riir«d itom th* Chartar^ neiNirt^Ifisii CHsmXd iml? ^ 
• «vi|ipllii9 fiction 9iimn tiMi eivemmtmnommt i*«»» th* 
prineipX* of nonintexirention* Therm was anottMir eontctt-
diction lNitM««ii tha nature o£ tha prciblam mn€ tho way in 
titiie^ ftiQ (^TQiib^  Hatioiis ap|»soadtod it* i*«# tha coneantra* 
tion on the polieing rathajr fium on the |K>iiticai aapecta^ 
on tha ahibboXatti of totem rathesr th&n on the cauae which 
led to i t s usa* Such an an^haais imviiltad from tha principle 
of nonintervention^ but i t had majEtod previous ignited nations 
actions as weXX« I t raay have i^ esuXted froia Mr* Hanit«ir»1cJoXd*8 
own sense of prioritieSf tmt itban aXso be traced back to the 
Charter (where (^aptar V'XI i s infoxmad by a sense of urgency 
entireXy missing from dta^ter Vl)« FinaXXy« a contradiction 
escisted between the states of the Congo eonfXict and the maans 
at thi disposaX of ttm Organisation* 
Assessing the part pXayed by tAm SeeretaryM3eaeraX# 
CXaude says that Dag BMsnaxslejfoXd functioned not onXy as 
a man of action bat aXso as a man of thought* He sesponded 
to criticaX needi and grasped opportunity for maXinci the 
tfttitad nations significantXy usefuX in emargeney situations 
by evaatiye ii^provisation of the UNSF and Congo forces^ ha 
tutmid to tha artieuXation of a iK>st perceptive theoraticaX 
anaXysis of « i i intemationaX poXiticaX roXe which the United 
NatioHi Hitt thus assuiMdv HaMnaiskioXd's cXassic s««twiiiil% 
»»•«•> Kay*©avid A,, 0mm Wiiey S 
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o£ whttt hft ehoae to c a l l th« ^oneept of "praiTAntivw 
atplon^tsy*^ us eo^staified i n h i s Istjsoaaetijsn to th® iMmual 
Raport ««bmltt«dl to the l^iftottlith Saision of tho <3^ iieraX 
Asaenfibly in I960* 
Howevftr* the Seestttaxy^General'^idea was that tho 
tmited Rations oould useful ly OJ?" safe ly intervene in*pirobleffls 
i4tiich are c learly and def in i te ly within the erb i t of present 
30C day o s n f l i e t s between power blocks"» 
30B, Dag '^ annaxvlcjold^r "Introduction to the Annual f^ teport of 
Saeretay «*%ner«l on the liorlc of the Ovganisationt 16 
June 1959* 15 June I960*** General Aasenbly^Official 
Records s Fifteenth Session* Sx^plement >9o« 1A# tmited 
Mations* l«ew York# 1960 ( qooted in Claude* o p . c l t p . 210) 
30C, Claude* Jr. i:**Ziilsr tJiiited Nations use of Military Force 
The Waited **ati^ns Po l i t i ca l System (Ed») j^ David At 
John Wiley and Sons* Hew Yexlc* 1967 
1 CI) 
Hanim«r*lcJ©ld was determined to bring to an end the 
bloodshed in Katanga* but the force* working against him 
w«re irast and insettitable* As Dayal cstoserredthe was haunted 
by the ultisiattuii of i ^ Briti«hODvemim»nit aiui th« ^mmliigs 
of the United States* MB had no choice but to threw hifli* 
31 
s e l f as a pawn into the despexate gae^Xe* He anist have 
basn Keenly awaxe that in h i s l a s t s a c r i f i c i a l act^'the 
road of p o s s i b i l i t y night lead to the cross*** Moz«over# 
there was intense susoicion a l l over the vforld that Haffi* 
marskjold had fal len victim to foul play for there were 
32 
many t^ ho would have welcotned h i s disappearance* 
OTi© attemot to adapt th® rolo of cmvfc to a new s i t u a -
tion came soon after the fai lure to end th^ Katanga secession* 
the death of Hamnarskjold and the ap?»ointiw5nt of U.Thant 
as the Acting Seci»tary-<5e««ral. 
After a asbate conoentrating on the a c t i v i t i e s of 
Belgian nationals and mercenaries v^o supported the Katanga 
regimet th® Secu^ .h.vt"^ ' Council on 24 r3te)ve??ft»er 1961 wit*i 
France and the United Kingdcm al!Wtaining adk»pted a strong 
resolution* This resolution authorised the Secretary* 
General to talce vigoro ?s actimi* including the use of force* 
to e(Vaeua%e f o r a i ^ military persi»uiel and p o l i t i c a l ad-
33 
v isors not under the Vliited Nations ccHimand* 
31* PtYiliffjIftwiy* 9* 281 
32« ib^ltei ||2|4*» p* 280 
l i , 8/5903 
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This bxo«d«nttd thtt S«ex«t*vy^c»MittraX*« nianaate# giving 
him m6idm€ ^tittioritF «@ do«X with tlift h«rd«niii9 Katanga 
34 
psohlMi* U.Thsnt demioxmeme thA ae t iv i t i ea of th« Kataiiga 
mitreenai*i«« as intolerable* He pxoniiaad to diaeharge h i s 
mandate with "datermination and vigor" and daclatwd to 
35 
radottble fmmcefuX e f forts to cind th® saeesaion* 
A3 GordenJcer obsezvedi "for a l l of Thant'a pos i t ive 
reaction* he had nevaftheless kept h i s in£lt;i@nce cm the 
S«^curity Cottncil in the baokground^andtiiRlikQ Hanmaxrslcjoldt 
had not taken «|» a position of ooen leadership. This be-
36 
canK» the new Secretary-General*a txsual practice"* 
After experiencing the repeated attanpts at betrayl 
by Tshi^ siber u.Thant developed an extraordinarily far»reaching 
plan for dealing with Katanga within h is mandate* Tho .dan 
was known as the *Plan of Tiational Reconciliation*, I t con-
37 
s i s ted of a nuniaer of pxovlalons %ihich had to be acf»itpt»d 
in the ir entirety* Moreover« Uftlliant intended to org«Rise 
a serias of economic and diplomatic sanctions to ioice the 
TshorAte government to integrate with lieopoldvilla i f they 
fa i led to accept his Reconciliatloii Plan* itie Plan was 
presented to TshoaftM and Adoula in August 24»1962« Both of 
whoai approved the plan by SepteoilMir 3*1992* 5or tha noment 
0»fli«it had BO season to ordar the applieatton of further 
pjassuwi.« 
l'4» m^nkAMmPm 21^ 
If,, ™3[«7P» t f t 
-1 ff n 
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How«v«r« 'TnhoiiftHi mqmin eroatsd diff ieul t lea by 
issuing tli9 thxwat o£ a * i^eofcli#A iisil^ pt»lt«cf^0 Ttm 
UkiitAd l!l«tiongi force tmrnctmA by taking immsdiattt action* 
The omjc not cxily ttstabliahod order again in the Katan* 
gese Capital but spread out into the stirztranding country-
side* they went to Ka'tdna* KipuM) ai^ f inal ly on January 4^ 
1963 to Jadotville# whex« the narcenaries furnished the 
sole exaR|>ie o€ eartl>»seorchinq of which Tshooibe had 
wi^ rned* 
In the yK>r6» of Gordenker* 
"as th^ Katangese fuse sputtered out» 
the Secretary-Oeneral reached the -« 
heioHit of his influence in tho Congo," 
tJltimat®ly» Tshontoe was ccwnpelled to agree in Jan-
uary 1963 to carzyout the Secretary-General's plan of 
National Reconciliation* 
mm Secretary-Generalt U,Thant# in his report to 
the Security Council cm 4 February 1963 stated the degree 
to which the mandates given to omc by the Oouneil*s reso-
lutions had been fulfilled* He said tha t there was no 
di rec t threa t to the independence of the Congo from external 
sources any more* That pa r t of ONUC*S niandata has thus 
39 
been largely fulfilled* 
3^* 0<?gifa>»ker. P* 381 
39* Zil«j|»«l9*3«l>«3# 
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film S«ei7»tary»<3«ii«r«l In hl» wsport of 29 Jvaem 
1964 c««f£l£BHidi his eofuslusient x««ehed a 7««r «arXi«r# 
that most of t.h& obJectiir«a of tha tTiiitad i^ iaticma Oparaticm 
40 
in the Congo had baan^ln iarga maaattret fulfillod* 
Fcom tha afbraaaid faots* i t can ba (SonoXudad that 
both the Secretariaso-Ottaaral Han«»arskjo3.d and tl.lhaiit 
axaircisad a dicact# paraonal infltieiu^ an the (9tev«lo!:»iiaikta 
in the Congo ease* "ftiay played a leading cole aesMitately 
in the intavpratation and the implementation of the daeialAns 
of the Security Cotmcil and the Oenei?al Asseat>ly« 
40* Y«iy>H«^1964^P> 94 
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It can foe seen from the foregoing accoumt that the 
United Nations as a whole faltered but did not fall In the 
Congo* The organization never tried to skirt arotind or 
shy away from the many thorny obstacles that arose but 
faced the challenge with persiverance. Dag Hammarskjold# 
even if he erred on the side of caution, stood firm by his 
policies in the face of a barrage^ criticism and addressed 
himself to the task with single minded devotion. When U. 
Thant took charge by the middle of Sept.»1961, nnich dust had 
settled dovm and the verdict in favour of a strong military 
action in the Congo had becenne almost unavoidable# 
In dealing with this case the Security Council did 
not invoke Article 39, nor did it name at any stage an ag-
gressor for breaking the peace* Iter was there a gradual tr^ ffHT^  
tion from Chapter VI of the Charter to Chapter VII, On the 
other hand, beginning with Art» 99, the Council and the 
Assentoly were drawn into a situation vdiere the application 
o^ Articles 42,43 and 44 were became imperative/ even then 
the Articles were not cited* 
18 
However* to meet the special needs of the situation 
the procei^durea laid down in the Charter were modified. The 
Secretary General asked for contingents of armed forces only 
from the medium and small states# roost of then from Africa. 
The Big Powers including the super powers were kept out of 
the peace-keeping Operation. The European States were also 
not asked to contribute* From the financial point of view, 
the Secretary General did not \.rait for grants to be sanctioned 
by the General Asserrfbly but went ahead implementation of 
the resolution. 
Another i-sportant aspect ot the case was that despite 
of disagreements and divisions, a large majority of the Member 
states resolutely stood by the basic objective of the Charter 
of bringing peace and constitutional Government in the Congo. 
They also supported the two Seciretarles General in the dla* 
charge of their^ auty towards the implementation of the United 
Nations resolutions. 
Thus, the basic area of consensus and agreement among 
the Members did exist which tmde possible for the United 
Nations to bring the Congo case to a successful conclusion. 
Analysing the Congo case upto November 1961, which 
divides into five phases, Stanley Hoffmann, " accentuating 
182 
the posttl-ve* eKOPft©rates a nvrnitoer of points in favour of 
the successSirik of the United Nations xrole. He says that 
considerable accoiTiDllshment were made in the ndsslon of 
1 
••external phrophylaxy". Even in Katanga the presence of 
Belgian rtdlitary and political defenders of Tshontoe seemed 
to have been limited to men vdiom their govemment condemned. 
The intervention of other nations was either channeled through 
united Nations (US help to ONUC In Katanga) or limited to 
political pressure. Further* xremarXable progress was made 
In the solution of domestic proble"ns . A larqe measure of 
law and order was restored and a Central Government with wide 
authority was finally established. 
The undertaking proved to be d painful one and the main 
lesson about the role of the Union Nations according to Hoffman 
coul-l be the following. On the one hand. Just as events of 
recent years* Including the Congo operation, have vindicated 
to a larae extent the 'Founding Fathers' idea that the United 
Nations could not be effective tinless their existed a concert 
of the big powers, the Congo crisis has shown that they were 
wise in assuming that the Organization's efficiency i^uld also 
b e imperiled if It Intervened in the domestic affairs of 
states. On the other hand, the very nature of international 
polities condemns the United Nations to a choice between ab-
dication. If it takes literally the warnings of the Chairter, 
•Hi tuxwoli acconpanled by numerous remonstratlows of embarrass-
mtm m lm®.^nams. If it 4iiiretards those cave»«s# 
' i j i i l iHiwi i II••MJwiWMH MiniMiiM 1*1 !"• T"T—' ' 1 - f r 'T- i -II I in'-r'r--iirn-irm'Tn'rr'riTiiMwwiifyrti(i1tfffi>frr-irtfrf-inTrfr**'™'"".^m^^^^^'J* 
i«iiii»$%0ik3> f^XM B»mmh of s. 1li»|p»iiai. 
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In tsh« existing situation it appeared wiser to 
have the United Nations play the role of honest bfbfcer 
or fireman. Dag Hammarskjold calculation was that a mini*> 
mal operation would get maximum support. But the trouble 
was that a mlnlnial operation prof^ced what appeared to be 
maxlraum tormoll in the field and that the dissatisfaction 
with this state of affairs restalted in rainiraal support. 
Hammarakjold had feared that a more daring approach 
would back-fire. But his cautious approach back-fired in 
a number of ways. Thus ONUC was caught in a dead end. It's 
legal status reveals the inadequacy of the operation. Since 
it was not collective security operation^ it required the 
consent of the host state; but precisely because it had to 
rr!atrict itself to a much smaller task than the one the 
government of the host state wanted it to accomplish* it 
had to be able to stay there and operate (or abstain from 
operation)despite that government's hostility. It wwas the 
very emphasis on modesty of ends and means which led to an 
assertion of independence from the central government. It 
could not be the letter's arm# it had to be autonomous so as 
to be able often td be much less. The Secretary-General* 
half way* so to speak, between the Korean and Suez precedents*^ 
Ttm Oinlt«d IVations in the Congo* The United 1!lAt§.&nf 
ffUUml mmmf <^ «3*J ^ay, David A., John Wiley 
tmi 8«im« Hew York* 1967 
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oho«k» tya find a legal shelter In Articles 39 and 40, 
But at the same time as he was proclaming the duty of non-
intervention, he stated that the United Nations task con-
sisted of saving a drowning man even without his authori-
zation. Ambassador Dayal found that it was not easy to be 
both neutral and atJthe service of the Central Government, 
Neither In New York nor in the Congo did the policy of 
Mr» Hammarskjold provide the necessary cooperation of the 
Members and of the host* Unfortunately the ban on force and 
on United Nations political intervention resulted only in 
increasing violence. 
If we consider th^. alternatives we find that a total 
United Nations abstentions would probably have ler' to a big 
power intervention on a large scale. This could be an in-
ternational conflict as in South-East Asia with far-reaching 
effects on Africa, On the other hand a stonger United 
Nations mandate could in the first place have meant theorati-
cally a genuine United Nations take over. It could be called 
trusteship or full responsibility for law and order as 
Ghana and Ceylon suggested it notably in the Security Council 
4 
debate of February 1961 , tStiis could mean a finding that 
the Congo independence was pre-matured» Consequently# it 
could have be«n the responsibility of the United Niitions to 
exert t^ct monopoly of the use of force which the mark of 
sovereigwty «id to imvive political life. But such a solu-
tion mm%& V»t be i^ ilitically acceptable or practicable 
3ft ^tsSSM** 
4« J^|§«'# 
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b«<S®Bie of the ©©Bfecadiction betMeeii auch Uhlted Nations 
adn ln i s t r a t lon on the previotia proclairaatlon of Congo's 
independence* I t wa» a l so inpossibl® in view of the minds 
of the an t i co lon ia l change and of the fundamental t r u t h 
t h a t the United Rations was not a kind of raoolithic force 
capable of Inposing i t s order on a domestic chaos. I t i s 
i t s e l f a b a t t l e f i e ld of na t ional and bloc forces . 
I t was to prevent such p i t f a l l s in a divided world 
t h a t Dag Hamraarskjold in a introduct ion t o the Annual Report 
submitted t o the Fif teenth session of the General Assembly 
I960, bu r s t aside the idea t h a t the United Nations could use-
ful ly o r safe ly intervene in "problems which are c l ea r ly and 
de f in i t e ly within ibuttanS HmkSaaat the ©rbi t of present day 
5 
con f l i c t s between power blocs* 
As In ia Claude po in t s out the e f f o r t to out the United 
Nations e f fec t ive ly i n t o such s i t ua t i ons would according t o 
the^aSlii General not only be f u t i l e but dangerous as we l l -
dangerous to the continuing usefulness of the organizat ion in 
general and i t s chief o f f i c e r in p a r t i c u l a r . Thus Dag Hararaar* 
5 . Dag Hararaarskjoldt " introduct ion to the Annual Report cf the 
Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 
1# iNm9 1959- 15 J«ne 1960*• General-Assembly,Official 
RaeoiPis Fif teenth S«ssion,Siqpplemenic ITo.IA, United 
Hft«ioRS«llewY*]tic#l9i0, (quoted In i s Claude, op.cit»p* 210) 
6. Clauiet Ziits» F* 210 
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gkjftrid ^previsntXim diplomacy'* led to the conclusion that 
"the main field of useful activities of the tlnited Nation* 
in its efforts to prevent conflicts or to solve conflicts" 
should be defined as that of taking action to fill vacuums 
in areas of conflict outside of •or marginal to, the zones 
already clearly involved In the Cold '^far struggle* so as 
to minimize the tendency of- or to diminish the incentive 
for great powers to trrave competitively into those situations. 
Thus, he hoped that the organization might prevent the widen-
ing and aggravation of the bloc confllcs. In these terms, 
the major political ootentiality of the United Nations is to 
promote the stabilization of the Cold War, to help the 
great tjowers avoid or back away from confrontations that 
might have disastrous results for themselves and all the rest 
of the world* It is evident that Hammarskjold was not enga-
ging in armchair theorizing, but^as stating an interpretation 
of what the United Nations had been doing, and was doing 
» 
in the Middle East and the Congo, and was projecting this 
7 « 
same role into the future," 
Finally, on the basis of this study of the Congo case 
« ntsnber of conclusions can be drawn which relate to the 
issues raised in the introduction in Chapter !• 
^^ Hyyit' ?• ^11 
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1) Wh(in a Colonial Pow«r choose in th« early 1960 to 
bring anarchy and tuimioil to an earstwhile cdlOiiy* it 
could do so in the event of the United Nations failing to 
take necessary preventive measures at an early date. 
2) The Security Cotmcll or the General Assembly were not 
found lacking in constitutional cotipetence to deal with a 
situation as cotplex as in the Congor 
S) It was division among the Afro-Asian States and among 
the African States themselves that their joint anti-colonial 
pressure was considerably weakened. 
4) The conflicting political interests of the power blocs 
allowed the escalation of strife and disorder in the Congo, 
5) Dag Ha'Timar3kJold*s modification of the SanPrancisco fojrmula 
of concert of Big Powers and his creation of the United Nations 
Force for the Congo with the help of medium and small African 
and Asian States proved a successful model for future United 
Nations peaee»"keeping ope rations # 
6) fhm administrative expertise and tedhnical skill acqfaired 
by United Nations personnel in the Congo, proved useful to the 
United Nations, 
7) The lessons learnt at the Congo and the principle of pre-
ventive diplomacy advocated by Dag Hamraarskjold w»»e also 
188 
valuable for futur» United Nationa role in what Inia Claud© 
calls peace-sfaBlliafng^peace-keeping or peaee*restoj:ing« 
8) The disagreeraent among Members caused the United 
Nations role to be weak in the earlier Stages but their 
shared interests in -world peace and basic agreement on pre-
venting further continuation and escalation of the conflict* 
enabled U.Thant successfully to apply a stronger United 
Nations mandate and end the secession of Katanga. 
9) The United Nations political sy8t<»m survived the 
disruptive forces at wot^ within the Congo as well as the 
divisive factors within the organization. As a result the 
United Nations en»erged stironger than before. 
* * * * * * It*** 
*** 
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Brl*€ Life HlBferies of aotne of the Conooleae Laadftra 
ApOOtiA#cyRILLB. b» 1921 • Secondary school education. 
Joined trade union movement and became Secretary-
General of the Congolese branch of the Belgian 
Federation Generale du Travail, vice-»Presldent of 
Lumuniba's Mouvement National Congolals{M*H*C*) tt 
hla foundation, but broke away In 1959, Elected 
to the Senate In 1960 fxx>m Equateur Province, A 
moderate by conviction and temperament* he exposed 
both lA»mxraba*s excess and Mobutu's military eov^ d'etat. 
WOrlced for a political solution to the Internal Sfiua* 
bbles of the Congolese politicians and favoured a 
government of national reconciliation* Appointed 
Minister of the Interior in the Ileo Oovemment of 
February 1961 and attempted to restore the rule of 
law andto end arbitrary political arrests and assas-
sinations. Contributed to bringing about a reconci-
liation with Stanleyville, A highly respected perso-
nality, he became Prime Minister of the coalition 
government fonrntd In August 1961« when he did much 
to heal the wounds of his stricken country. After 
Mobutu's second take«>over#served as ambassador abroad 
but resigned be«ause of shattered health* A true 
patriot and a man of principle and Integrll^t He served 
his eountiry well during a vexy difficult fmwtwin 
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GIZERGA, A^INE, B, 1925 In Kwilu d i s t r i c t of Leopoldvill« 
Province* Edueaited to b« a 8«niin«riant btif dHoic ^tm 
%llitter of p o l i t i c s in/fer«nce to the atisterit ies of 
rel ig ion. A foimder and president of Parti Solidaire 
Africain (P»S»A»>. Deputy Prirae Minister in the Lumuaaniba 
Government, he was regarded as an fioninence grise by 
ONllC and a Consnunlst by the Vfestem potiers because 
of h i s East European connections* Assxsmed Lttmuraba's 
mantle of le«|dership t«hen h i s chief was imprisoned and 
later assassinated* Set t^ a rival government at 
Stanleyvi l le in opposition to Mobutu *s Commissioners 
Briefly assumed the of f ice of Deputy Prime Minister in 
the Adoula GoverrBi«nt# but returned to Stanleyvi l le , 
\^)eret^>on he was arrested and imprisoned on an islmid 
by the Central Oovemsnent* Habitually affected dark 
glasses which gave him a s i n i s t e r appearancei lacked 
Lumuniba*s charisma and popular i^peal appeal* Present 
whereabouts tmknown, but i s believed to be l iv ing 
quietly in Eastern Europe* 
ILEO J^OSgPH »b«1921, of an Equateur trible* the Bamong®* Partly 
educated, he became a journalist and founder meober 
of iUimumba's M*N*C., which he helped to split,Mnrinnr 
Elected to the Senate in 19i0 with the support of the 
Union des Menge (ONZMO), and elected i t s President 
despite opposition of Immumba gzisnp* ^irfeiti^us t«> 
become Frifne liAiiister« he advised K«i«f^m to oust 
1Q 
( iii > 
Lumuiribtt, Became Prime Minister of a shadow govenewsnt 
in September 1960, but was himself set aside by Mobutu 
and his Commissioners. Briefly became Prime Minister 
aqain in February 1961, and information Minister in 
Hdoula's Government. Weak and ineffective, his ambi-
tions greatly outpaced his capacities* 
KASAVUBUi, JOSEPH, b. 1917 of th© Bakongo tribe in the Bas-
Congo region^ but believed to have some Chinese blood. 
One of thefev/ older men anttong the Congolese leaders. 
Trained as a seminarian, entered politics as leader of 
the Abako, an essentially tribal party. In 1958 elected 
Mayor of one of the African communes of Leopoldville and 
acknovrledged leader of the independence movement. Was 
blamed for the 1959 riots by the Belgians and imprisoned. 
Bitterly opposed to Lumumba<who ousted him from national 
leadership. As a compromise, and with Belgian support, 
elected first President of the Republic. A patriot turned 
Belgian prote9e# he treacherously dismissed Lumumba and 
continued as Head of State until himself ousted by Mobutu. 
g 
A phlematic and scheming mati, he and Mobutu \itmr& the 
prime movers in Lumuntoa's assassination. Retired quietly 
to his village, where he died. 
1 o :> 
JL v-* »--
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LPMUMBA,PATRICE^h. 1925 in the Sankuru district of Kasai; 
tirlbe- Batetela* Educated «p to secondary level, 
became post office clerk, tried and sentenced for 
entoezaleinent. Active politically in 'evolue* 
circles, became manager of a Leopoldville brewery. 
Pounder of M.N.C. and acknowledged leader of the 
Congo. Teraperamentally unstable though a true 
national!st# he opposed tribalism, alienated many 
of his friends, and Incurred the bitter enmity of 
Tshombe, Kalonji, Kasavubu. Arrested and sent trea-
cherously to his death in Katanga. Has become the 
symbol of Congolese nationalism and Africanism; his 
name has been posthumously associated with many 
Institutions in his cotmtry and abroad. President 
Mobutu has built a vast menrarial to commemorate his 
victim* 
r^BUTU, JOSEPH, b»1930 in Equateur Province in the Bangbandi 
tribe, A clerk in the Force Publique, later took to 
journalism and becatae a fervent disciple of Lumumba. 
Appointed by liunmniba in June 1960 as his own Secretary 
of Sta»-e and later as Chief of Staff of the A.N.C. 
with the rank of Colonel, In September 1960, he 
'neutralized' both the President and Prime Minister 
and assumed power through his College of Commissioners, 
He had Lumumba arrested and imprisoned in Thysville, 
but fearing a mutiny and Lumtimba's forcible r»-
l«ase by hl« own paratroopers, sent hlra to his death in 
Katanga. Assisted by the 'Binza group*« which included 
Foreign Minister Bomboko and Security Chief Nendaka, to 
attain supreme power* he began toelirainate his rivals 
and associates in order to set up a one-man rule. Today 
he is supreme in Zaire , having eliminated all his erst-
while friends by various means* Reputed to have amassed 
a vast fozrtune. 
TSHO?®E«HOISE^ b. 1917 in Katanga in a well-to-do family of 
Balunda merchants. Married to the daughter of a chief*he 
began a successful business career #joined the Conakat 
party and became its head after Munongo. Elected to the 
Katanga Provincial Assembly, he became President of the 
Provincial Government. Allergic to Iiura«nft>a#he declared 
Katanga's independence after the mutiny. While highly 
critical of Belgian suppression of the Congolese people, he 
paradoxically became their firm ally. A plausible and 
ebullient character, he played his nefarious game of seces-
sion with skill and dexterity, ignoring thelarger interests 
of his country in favour of the lure of Katanga's riches 
Imprisoned in Equateur by the Central Government, he made 
good his escape on giving false promises. A sworn enemy of 
the United nations, his stubborn espousal of the chimera of 
I P H 
( VI ) 
lndei>endence led to repeated armed clashes with 
the tJ*H» Force, ^Mliich ctiltnlnated in the Seereta3cy-G®aeral *s 
death in an a i r accident \4hile on h i s way to negot ia te a 
cease - f i r e with hlra, Tshorribe*s p o l i t i c a l r e s i l i e n c e l a t e r 
ca tapul ted him to the office of Prime Minister of the Congo, 
bu t he was dismissed by General Mobutu and l a t e r f led the 
country t o lead a gi lded l i f e of l e i s u r e in Europe, Abducted 
by a ruse by Mobutu, h i s plane was intercepted in Algeria, 
where he died supposedly of a hear t a t tack ^ i l e in prison 
In the Sahara. 
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